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ABSTRACT 
Aggressive behaviour after traumatic brain injury (TBI) has been associated with general 
language impairments (Alderman, 2007). Figurative language has an important role in 
modulating emotional intensity (Dews & Winner, 1995), and sarcasm, a form of 
figurative language heavily linked to social cognition, is considered a socially appropriate 
communication of aggression (Haiman, 1998). The present research aimed to investigate 
the processing of sarcasm in individuals with TBI, and in healthy adults, in an attempt to 
explore whether possible deficits in linguistic performance may contribute to aggressive 
behaviour. A novel, auditory-visual, computer-based task was developed to test 
comprehension of factual and attitude (others’ intentions) information in sarcastic and 
literal contexts. Experiment One compared the performance of seven participants with 
severe TBI with seven matched, healthy control participants. Experiment Two compared 
20 low aggressive with 20 moderately aggressive healthy young adults. Reaction time 
and accuracy data were statistically analysed with parametric and non-parametric tests, 
and the TBI data was also correlated with neuropsychological and behavioural data. In 
Experiment One, results suggested that TBI participants were as able as healthy control 
participants to comprehend sarcasm, given explicit prosodic and contextual cues, though 
they struggled with drawing literal inferences and did not benefit as much from priming 
when comprehending questions. Correlations suggested that their difficulties inferring 
others’ literal intentions related to poor emotion identification, and these difficulties also 
linked to aggressive behaviour. In Experiment Two, reaction times were significantly 
faster in literal contexts, on factual questions and on the second of the two questions 
presented. No statistically significant differences were found between the low and 
moderate aggression groups on their reaction times or error rates. Overall, these findings 
shed more light on the appreciation of sarcasm after TBI and the role that language, and 
in particular sarcasm, plays in modulating aggressive behaviour. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a form of acquired brain injury (ABI) that is commonly 
seen in children, adolescents, young adults and the elderly, and is more common in men 
than women (Langlois, Rutland-Brown & Thomas, 2004; Yates, Williams, Harris, Round 
& Jenkins, 2006). TBI is said to be the leading cause of death and disability in young 
people (Ghajar, 2000), and, in survivors of TBI, it is associated with devastating 
cognitive, behavioural and emotional sequelae, collectively referred to as 
neurobehavioural sequelae (Wood, 2001). 
 
Agitation, irritability and aggression are common following TBI (Silver, Yodofsky & 
Anderson, 2005). Behavioural and personality changes such as increased temper, 
irritability and childishness, are commonly reported by relatives in the short term 
(McKinlay, Brooks, Bond, Martinage & Marshall, 1981) and longer term (Brooks, 
Campsie, Symington, Beattie & McKinlay, 1986). These changes have been associated 
with difficulties with social adjustment for the individual (Cattran, Oddy, Wood & Moir, 
2011) and the magnitude of behavioural and personality changes have been found to be 
the best predictor of strain amongst families (Brooks et al., 1986). 
 
In addition to behavioural changes, impairments in language comprehension and 
production are common after TBI (Levin & Chapman, 1998). It is well known that global 
language difficulties, such as aphasia, can be detrimental to an individual’s wellbeing and 
social functioning; however, more subtle language deficits can also have significant 
implications. Research indicates that the location of the brain injury dictates the type of 
language impairment, with the left hemisphere (LH) broadly being associated with 
verbal, linguistic processing and the right hemisphere (RH) with non-verbal, emotional 
elements of language (Buchanan et al., 2000). RH damage after TBI has been associated 
with many different deficits in pragmatic communication (McDonald, 2000) such as 
verbosity and inability to identify emotional cues or indirect meanings in language, and 
approximately 50% of people who suffer a RH TBI will experience some form of 
associated language difficulty (Joanette, Goulet & Daoust, 1991). Given that 
communication is so important to social adaptation and psychological wellbeing 
(Prigatano, Roueche & Fordyce, 1985), further research into the impact of these 
difficulties is necessary. 
 
Empirical evidence exists that broadly links language deficits and aggressive behaviour in 
people with TBI (Alderman, Knight & Morgan, 1997; James & Young, 2013), and 
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Miller, Collins and Kent (2008) have proposed a theory that implicates language skills as 
central to the modulation of impulsive aggression. Interestingly, it has been suggested 
that figurative (indirect) language has a role in modulating and often diluting emotional 
intensity of language (Dews & Winner, 1995; Gibbs, Leggitt & Turner, 2002). However, 
no research to date has focused specifically on the role of figurative language in 
modulating aggressive behaviour. 
  
Sarcasm is a particularly interesting form of figurative language as it is considered a form 
of verbal aggression where negative and critical attitudes are conveyed in a polite and 
socially appropriate manner (Cheang & Pell, 2008; Haiman, 1998). In addition, sarcasm 
is associated with social cognition, i.e. relating to and making sense of other people in 
order to communicate effectively and coordinate with the social world (Fiske & Taylor, 
2013). Recently, McDonald (2013) has argued that there is a need for more tests of social 
cognition that are able to help make predictions about social functioning and to further 
understand and dissociate deficits following TBI, with a view to guiding rehabilitation. 
 
The current study attempts to tie together two areas of research, namely figurative 
language difficulties and aggression after TBI, and aims to shed more light on the 
relationship between the appreciation of sarcasm and aggressive behaviour after TBI. 
 
1.1 Traumatic brain injury 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is defined as damage to the brain as a result of a single or 
multiple traumas (Gennarelli & Graham, 2005) and is considered an important global 
public health problem (Langlois, Rutland-Brown & Wald, 2006). Motor vehicle accidents 
are a common cause of TBI, along with falls, assaults and sports related injuries (Kraus & 
Chu, 2005). Often secondary brain injury, as a result of brain swelling and associated 
problems, is a major cause of disability or even death following the initial TBI (Ghajar, 
2000; Murray & Lopez, 1997). Severity of TBI is typically determined by the Glasgow 
Coma Scale (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) score which reflects level of consciousness 
at the scene of the injury and is used to grade the TBI as either mild, moderate or severe 
(see Ghajar, 2000, for more information). Increased severity of injury, as per GCS score, 
is a reliable predictor of poorer prognosis (Brain Trauma Task Force, 2000). 
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1.1.1 Prevalence and risk factors 
Tennant (2005) reported that, between the years 2001-2002, 112,718 people were 
admitted to hospital in the UK with a TBI. This reflects an incidence of approximately 
229 cases per 100,000 people per year. With regards to prevalence elsewhere around the 
world, numbers vary greatly, and can even vary within the same area from study to study 
due to sampling methodology. In the United States, Silver, Kramer, Greenwald and 
Weissman (2001) found 8.5% of a community population self-reported experiencing a 
severe TBI, and for mild-moderate injuries that do not require institutionalisation an 
incidence of 618 per 100,000 people per year was found by Sosin, Sniezek and Thurman 
(1996), again according to self-report. 
 
Common risk factors include gender, age and socio-economic status. It is consistently the 
case that rates of TBI are higher in men than in women, and rates are high for children, 
adolescents and the elderly (Langlois et al., 2004; Yates et al., 2006). Bruns and Hauser 
(2003) reported that men were up to four times more likely than women to suffer a TBI in 
late adolescence/early adulthood, and Yates et al. (2006) suggested this was due to their 
involvement in particular leisure/occupational activities. Socioeconomic status seems to 
be a risk factor also (Kraus & McArthur, 2006). Tennant (2005) linked the 
socioeconomic factors of unemployment and being unable to work due to ill health to 
higher incidence of TBI. In addition, Yates et al. (2006) found that rates were higher for 
people living in urban compared to rural areas, and social deprivation linked with higher 
TBI rates in childhood. 
 
Other specific groups of people at high risk of TBI include homeless people, people in 
prisons and, perhaps unsurprisingly, military personnel. In terms of homelessness, in the 
UK TBI is significantly more common in homeless populations, compared to matched 
controls, at a rate of 48% to 21% (Oddy, Moir, Fortescue & Chadwick, 2012). In 
addition, there is over-representation of TBI in UK prison populations, with one study 
reporting a prevalence of over 60% (Williams et al., 2010), and a similar picture is seen 
in prisons around the world (Ferguson, Pickelsimer, Corrigan, Boger & Wald, 2012; 
Schofield et al., 2006). Williams et al. (2010) highlight that in the UK, individuals with a 
TBI entered the custodial system at a younger age, spent more time in prison and had an 
increased rate of repeat offending. In addition, a recent UK study found significant 
neurobehavioural and neuropsychological disability associated with prisoners who self-
reported TBI (Pitman, Haddlesey, Ramos, Oddy & Fortescue, 2015). Finally, considering 
another high-risk group, military personnel, a US based study reported the prevalence of 
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mild TBI in soldiers returning from conflicts to be 15% (Hoge et al., 2008), whereas in 
the UK prevalence rates for mild TBI have been reported at 4.4%, increasing to 9.5% for 
those in a direct combat role (Rona et al., 2012). 
 
Given the above findings, TBI is more common than many people might expect, is over-
represented in certain groups, and consistent risk factors include being young, male and 
of low socio-economic status.  
 
1.1.2 Impact and consequences of TBI 
The impact of TBI can be wide-ranging and difficult to predict, though often it has 
catastrophic consequences. TBI is reported to be the leading cause of permanent 
disability in adults under the age of 40 (Fleminger & Ponsford, 2005), and psychological 
difficulties, incorporating disturbances of mood, cognition and behaviour, are a major 
cause of this long term disability (Fann, Katon, Uomoto & Esselman, 1995). In addition, 
TBI can have a significant impact on family members and surrounding systems; 
relationships are strained and family members feel burdened, particularly at the point of 
transition from hospital to home (Brooks & McKinlay, 1983; Fisher, Lennon, Bellon & 
Lawn, 2015; Ponsford et al., 2014; Turner et al., 2007).  
 
It is no surprise, therefore, that TBI is linked to high levels of unemployment (Ponsford et 
al., 2014; Prigitano, Pepping & Klonoff, 1986), offending and imprisonment, as discussed 
above (e.g. Williams et al., 2010), and homelessness; 90% of homeless people who self-
report a TBI have obtained the injury prior to becoming homeless (Oddy et al., 2012). In 
terms of recovery and change over time, a recent longitudinal study (Ponsford et al., 
2014) found little change across three time points (two, five and ten years post-injury) in 
many areas of cognitive impairment, and an increase in difficulty was reported for 
planning, socially inappropriate behaviour, following conversations and being understood 
when speaking. In addition, there was an increase in reports of difficulties with personal 
relationships, social isolation and making friends, and reported difficulties with anxiety 
and depression did not change significantly over the three time points. 
 
1.1.2.1 Neurobehavioural sequelae 
Considering the psychological impact of TBI, mental health difficulties are very 
common; for example, prevalence of depression post-TBI has been reported at 42% 
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(Kreutzer, Seel & Gourley, 2001) and clinically significant levels of anxiety and 
depression have been reported at a rate of 50% up to 7 years post-TBI (Anson & 
Ponsford, 2006). In addition, an increased risk of depression, phobia, panic disorder, 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), substance abuse and suicidality was found post-
brain injury (Silver et al., 2001). These difficulties can be longstanding and hugely 
debilitating. Koponen et al. (2002) found that in a sample of 60 Finnish individuals, on 
average 30 years post-injury, nearly 50% presented with Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual axis 1 disorders (4th edition; DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) 
that began after their TBI, with major depression, alcohol abuse or dependence, panic 
disorder and specific phobia being the most common (26.7%, 11.7, 8.3% and 8.3% 
respectively). 
 
Behavioural difficulties are also very common after brain injury and are frequently 
reported by relatives (Brooks et al., 1986; Brooks, & McKinlay, 1983; Kinsella, Packer & 
Olver, 1991). Behavioural difficulties can arise for a number of reasons including 
impaired behavioural control as a direct result of injury to the brain, confused mental 
state, frustration and struggling to come to terms with disability and the potential impact 
of psychological trauma (Johnson & Balleny, 1996). In terms of prevalence, Deb, Lyons 
and Koutzoukis (1999) reported that one year post-injury, 40% of adults hospitalised after 
TBI displayed three or more behavioural symptoms such as irritability, lack of initiative 
and social disinhibition. More recently, in an Australian sample of adults with TBI in 
community rehabilitation programmes, the rate of post-injury challenging behaviours was 
reported at 54% (Sabaz et al., 2014).  The most common of these behaviours were 
adynamia, at a rate of 23.1%, aggression, at a rate of 31.9%, and inappropriate social 
behaviour, at a rate of 33.3%, and more than a third of the sample displayed more than 
one challenging behaviour. Rates have been found to be much higher when reported by 
the family members of people with a TBI who have been discharged home, with 
behaviour change reported in 79% of individuals, with 58% resulting in significant 
problems at home (Johnson & Balleny, 1996). In this same study, behavioural difficulties, 
particularly aggression, were reported to worsen over a three year period, as rated by the 
family members. Aggression will be discussed further in section 1.2 below. 
 
With regards to cognition, TBI is very often associated with multiple and varied cognitive 
impairments which depend on the location and severity of injury (Lezak, Howieson, 
Loring, Hannay, & Fischer, 2004). Impairments of processing speed, attention, memory, 
working memory, perception, visual-spatial and visual-motor skills, abstract reasoning, 
executive functioning, language and social cognition are common post-TBI. Impairments 
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in any of these areas can be more or less visible and profound, and this variability is 
particularly striking in relation to language. Highly visible language impairments such as 
aphasia, which relates to problems with comprehending or producing language, are 
familiar to clinicians and researchers in the area and can have hugely debilitating 
consequences (Levin & Chapman, 1998). There are, however, many more subtle and less 
visible impairments of language comprehension and production that can present after TBI 
which can be equally debilitating (e.g. Beeman & Chiarello, 1998). In particular, deficits 
with understanding and using indirect, figurative language are of particular interest to this 
study because of their links with social behaviour and social cognition. Figurative 
language will be further explored in this chapter in section 1.3. 
 
Social cognition has been described by McDonald (2013) as “the capacity to attend to, 
recognise and interpret interpersonal cues that guide social behavior” (p. 231); social 
cognition “enables us to predict the behavior of others, share experiences and 
communicate effectively” (p.231). Deficits in social cognition have been reported after 
TBI (McDonald, 2013) and findings by Spikman, Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra and 
van der Naalt (2012) suggest that social cognition impairments (theory of mind, empathy 
and emotion recognition) were not due to or related to more general (non-social) 
cognitive deficits. Cummings (1995) and Tekin and Cummings (2002) suggest that 
impairments of social cognition are associated with injury to subcortical networks of the 
frontal lobe, incorporating the orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
(terms often used to describe largely overlapping areas; Spikman et al., 2012). 
 
Cognitive and behavioural difficulties are often considered to be the most problematic 
consequences of severe TBI as rated by patients and carers (Oddy, Coughlan, Tyerman & 
Jenkins, 1985) and create the most burden for families, even after rehabilitation 
(Ponsford, Olver, Ponsford & Nelms, 2003). Draper and Ponsford (2008) reported that 
following rehabilitation, many cognitive and behavioural difficulties are present up to 10 
years post-injury. In addition, Oddy et al. (1985) point out that lack of awareness into, 
and underestimation of, cognitive and behavioural difficulties can often cause more of a 
problem than the actual difficulties per se. Prigatano, Altman and O’Brien (1990) discuss 
the underestimation of behavioural limitations in the context of social and emotional 
interactions, such as handling arguments, control of temper flexibility in the face of 
unexpected change, and recognising when others are upset by something you have said. 
These elements of social cognition and aggressive behaviour are of particular interest to 
this research, and the next section of this chapter will focus on aggression. 
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1.2 Aggression 
Aggression has been defined as any behaviour directed towards another person with an 
immediate intent to cause harm, and where “the perpetrator must believe that the 
behaviour will harm the target and that the target is motivated to avoid the behaviour” 
(Bushman & Anderson, 2001, p. 274). 
 
1.2.1 Types of aggression 
Two main dichotomies are used to understand aggression; reactive-proactive, referring to 
the underlying function of the behaviour, and direct-indirect, which refers to the form of 
aggression (Little, Henrich, Jones & Hawley, 2003). These are discussed further below. 
 
1.2.1.1 Reactive-proactive aggression 
The reactive-proactive dichotomy relates to the similar dichotomies of impulsive-
premeditated (Stanford et al., 2003) and hostile-instrumental (Bushman & Anderson, 
2001). Vitaro and Brendgen (2005) describe reactive aggression as an impulsive response 
to real or perceived threat, provocation or frustration, whereby the aim is to hurt the 
perpetrator. The term relates to the similar concepts of hot-blooded, defensive, hostile, 
impulsive and emotional aggression. Proactive aggression, on the other hand, is an 
acquired/learnt behaviour, driven by anticipated gains considered contingent on the 
aggressive act; “proactive aggression can be used as an instrumental means to secure 
goods from others or to dominate others” (Vitaro, Brendgen & Barker, 2006, p.15). It is 
synonymous with the ideas of coldblooded, offensive and instrumental aggression. 
 
These aggressive subtypes have been distinguished by pharmacological and 
neuropsychological findings (Barratt, Stanford, Felthous & Kent, 1997; Barratt, Stanford, 
Kent & Alan, 1997). Dodge (1991) describes the roots of these subtypes of aggression 
being grounded in childhood experiences, with reactive aggression developing out of a 
threatening and inconsistent environment, and proactive aggression manifesting as a 
result of a supportive environment but one where role models use aggression to achieve 
goals and resolve conflict.  
 
1.2.1.1.1 Reactive (impulsive) aggression 
With regards specifically to the reactive, or impulsive, subtype of aggression, which is of 
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particular interest to this study, Miller et al. (2008) describe this form of aggressive act as 
being a ‘hair-trigger’ response which is disproportionate to the stimulus. The 
disproportionate nature and loss of control is often recognised after the event leading to 
feelings of remorse. Reactive or impulsive aggression can be separated into three 
subcategories; verbal aggression, physical aggression towards people and physical 
aggression towards objects (Yudofsky, Silver, Jackson, Endicott & Williams, 1986) 
which are thought to be distinct and associated with different neurobiological pathways 
(Miller et al., 2008). 
 
Miller et al. (2008) outline the defensive rage model which has often been used to 
understand impulsive aggression. Derived from animal research, they describe defensive 
rage as an automatic reaction to significant threat that involves neurological pathways 
including the medial nucleus of the amygdala, the dorsal periaqueductal gray and the 
medial hypothalamus. The anterior cingulate cortex and the orbital prefrontal cortex are 
thought to be involved in the inhibition of defensive rage, and abnormalities in these 
areas have been linked to the states of dyscontrol and hyperarousal observed in impulsive 
aggressors (for a full review see Miller et al., 2008). 
 
1.2.1.2 Direct-indirect aggression 
The second major aggression dichotomy, direct-indirect, refers to the form of the 
aggressive act. Direct aggression is also known as physical aggression, and indirect is 
also known as social or relational aggression, and this distinction has received 
psychometric support (Little et al., 2003). 
 
Indirect aggression involves targeting a victim circuitously, often through other people 
and other relationships, in such a way that the behaviour is seen as not overtly aggressive 
and yet still causes significant distress to the victim (Archer & Coyne, 2005). This can 
involve teasing to cause humiliation, ostracism and deliberate social exclusion, spreading 
of rumours and spiteful gossip and emotional manipulation. Kaukiainen et al. (1999) 
found that indirect aggression was associated with higher levels of social intelligence and 
social abilities, such as interpreting the social cues of others and interacting socially to 
achieve goals. They also found that it linked with lower levels of empathy. Indirect 
aggression has been shown to be more common in older adulthood, perhaps when social 
skills are more developed (Walker, Richardson & Green, 2000). 
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Archer and Coyne (2005) discuss the evolutionary advantages of indirect aggression in 
having less cost to the aggressor than more direct forms of aggression, for example less 
retaliatory responses, and suggest it is used more often in environments where there 
would be more serious repercussions for use of direct aggression, for example in a work 
place. Furthermore, whilst indirect aggression has been associated with a larger social 
network and perceived popularity (Green, Richardson & Lago, 1996; Xie, Cairns & 
Cairns, 2002), direct aggression has been associated with rejection by peer group and 
symptoms of depression (Leadbeater, Boone, Sangster & Mathieson, 2006). 
 
1.2.2 Gender differences 
Considering gender differences in aggression, a meta-analysis by Archer (2004) found 
that men are more likely than women to display direct aggression, particularly physical 
and extremely violent aggression. This sex difference was observed as early on in 
development as two years old, and becomes larger between the ages of 18-30 years. This 
gender difference has been less clear cut with regards to verbal aggression, particularly in 
younger groups, whereas in an older population men demonstrate more verbal aggression 
than women. Interestingly, despite the gender differences in behavioural manifestations 
of aggression, the subjective experience of anger does not show a gender bias (Fischer et 
al., 1993). This finding challenges the stereotype that associates anger with men (Plant, 
Hyde, Keltner & Devine, 2000), and raises the question as to how women manage and 
respond to their anger differently. This may be explained by findings that females exhibit 
more indirect aggression than males, particularly in teenage years, for example age 11-17 
years (Archer, 2004). 
 
1.2.3 Aggression after brain injury 
Aggressive behaviour is frequently seen after brain injury, with verbal aggression being 
more common than physical aggression (Alderman, 2007). Aggression after TBI has been 
found to be associated with depression and low satisfaction with life (Alderman, 2007) 
and with a breakdown in relationships (Wood, Liossi & Wood, 2005). 
 
1.2.3.1 Prevalence 
Agitated and aggressive behaviour is very common after acquired brain injury (ABI). A 
recent study found that 41% of patients in the early rehabilitation phase following 
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neurosurgery after a TBI exhibited agitated behaviour, and a third of these were classed 
as severely agitated (Wolffbrandt, Poulsen, Engberg & Hornnes, 2013). With reference to 
more overtly aggressive behaviours, Rao et al. (2009) reported that 28.4% of individuals 
seen within three months of their brain trauma showed aggressive behaviour (verbal and 
physical), as measured with the Overt Aggression Scale (OAS; Yudofsky et al., 1986). 
They noted that verbal aggression was much more common in the acute phase. 
Furthermore, aggression rates across a nine week assessment period in a post-acute 
residential neurorehabilitation unit indicated that 59.7% of individuals with TBI 
displayed verbal aggression, and 33.8% displayed acts of physical aggression (James & 
Young, 2013). 
 
Interestingly, even years after the injury, similarly high rates of aggressive behaviour 
have been recorded. Again using the OAS, Baguley, Cooper and Flemingham (2006) 
reported that 25% of patients with a TBI in a specialist rehabilitation service displayed 
aggressive behaviour, and this rate remained stable over time, up to the last follow-up at 
the five year point. In addition, one study that obtained reports from family members 
found that violence and aggression increased significantly over a five year period (Brooks 
et al., 1986). 
 
1.2.3.2 Why is aggression common after brain injury? 
Post-brain injury aggression is often related to injury to the brain’s frontal lobes, which 
leaves an individual less able to regulate and inhibit behavioural impulses, resulting in 
impulsive behaviour (Grafman et al., 1996; Pardini et al., 2011; Tateno, Jorge & 
Robinson, 2003). However, some studies do not indicate there being a role of injury 
location in presence of aggressive behaviour (Alderman, 2007; Baguley et al., 2006; 
Wood & Liossi, 2006). In addition, with regards to severity of injury, some studies 
suggest this is significantly related to aggression (Miller et al., 1999) whereas others have 
found injury severity to be unrelated to aggression (Tateno et al., 2003; Wood & Liossi, 
2006). Alderman (2007) and Baguley et al. (2006) found that younger age at injury was 
associated with a higher incidence of aggression and greater severity. In addition, 
depression has been correlated with aggression after TBI (Baguley et al., 2006; Rao et al., 
2009). Baguley et al. (2006) demonstrated the significant role of these factors over time, 
finding that younger age at injury and presence of depression remained significantly 
associated with aggression at six, 24 and 60 months post-injury. 
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Pre-morbid personality and behavioural tendencies are also thought to be important in 
predicting post-brain injury behaviour. This was supported by Greve et al. (2001) who 
found that evidence of aggressive behaviour pre-morbidly, as measured by the Lifetime 
History of Aggression questionnaire (LHA; Coccaro, Berman & Kavoussi, 1997), was 
more common in individuals who displayed aggression post-TBI than those who did not. 
In addition, they found that significantly more aggressive TBI patients had impulsive 
personality traits, as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale-11 (BIS; Patton, 
Stanford & Barratt, 1995), compared to TBI patients who were not aggressive. The 
authors concluded that the combination of a pre-morbid impulsive and irritable 
personality, and disinhibition and inflexibility as a result of the TBI, is most likely to 
result in overt aggressive behaviour. The role of pre-morbid aggression was also 
highlighted by James and Young (2013), however this was only found to predict verbal 
aggression, but not physical aggression. Alderman (2007), on the other hand, found no 
such association between post-TBI aggression and pre-morbid characteristics. 
 
Finally, aggression after TBI has been linked to cognitive ability. Wood and Liossi 
(2006) found that as verbal memory and visuo-spatial test scores decreased, frequency of 
aggressive behaviour after TBI increased. They argued that verbal ability has a critical 
role in mediating interpersonal conflict and modulating aggression. This is a central 
question to this piece of research, and one which will be discussed further in the 
following section. 
 
1.2.4 Aggression and language 
Non-clinical research findings in the aggression literature have linked history of 
impulsive aggression with low verbal ability in a prison population (Barratt et al., 1997) 
and in a college sample (Stanford, Greve & Gerstle, 1997). Similar patterns have been 
found in a brain injury sample. James and Young (2013) explored factors that predicted 
verbal and physical aggression in individuals with an ABI who were residing in post-
acute neurorehabilitation units. They found that, alongside use of psychotropic 
medication, poor verbal functioning, assessed by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 
3rd edition (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997) Verbal Comprehension Index, was a significant 
predictor of verbal and physical aggression following ABI. 
 
One way to explore the link between verbal skills and aggression is to look at the triggers 
for aggressive behaviour after ABI. Alderman et al. (1997) identified the events which 
occurred prior to an aggressive behaviour (the antecedents) within a hospital inpatient 
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neurorehabilitation setting. They developed the Overt Aggression Scale - Modified for 
Neurorehabilitation (OAS-MNR; appendix 1) which is an adapted form of the OAS that 
incorporates categories to systematically code the type of antecedents to the behaviour 
and the interventions employed after the behaviour. Their data revealed that most 
aggressive behaviours were displayed during structured rehabilitation time during which 
there was verbal interaction with others, e.g. in conversation, following a verbal prompt 
or in response to others' verbal behaviour. Although the authors noted that crude 
recording of antecedents is not enough alone to understand why participants behaved 
aggressively, they hypothesised that poor communication skills may contribute to 
aggressive behaviour. 
 
A follow-up study, similarly using the OAS-MNR in a neurorehabilitation unit, showed 
that in cases with no obvious antecedent, low language function was the common factor 
linking cases of physical aggression towards others (Alderman, Knight & Henman, 
2002). The authors also identified that these acts of aggression without clear antecedents 
were more difficult to manage, and needed more intrusive interventions, than acts by 
people with preserved language function, or acts by the same individuals where there 
were clear antecedents. Furthermore, Alderman (2007) reported that over 80% of 
physical assaults on others were accounted for by brain injured patients who displayed 
the most neurobehavioural disability and impairment of communication. Thus, these 
studies highlight the significance of language function to triggering and also managing 
aggressive behaviours after ABI. 
 
1.2.4.1 Why is language important in regulating aggression? 
Wood and Liossi (2006) have argued that poor verbal skills limit the ability to verbally 
negotiate and resolve interpersonal conflict, and thus regulate aggressive behaviour. They 
suggest that this is further impacted by impulsivity. 
 
Miller et al. (2008) attempted to explain the findings discussed above in more detail by 
describing a model in which language is important in the modulation of impulsive 
aggression. They argue that linguistic processing is key in helping the regulation of 
aspects of executive functioning that serve to inhibit aggressive impulses, including 
cognitive restraint, emotional control and adaptation, deductive reasoning and reflection. 
They hypothesise that activation of brain regions associated with language processing 
helps to dampen down limbic (e.g. amygdala) responses which might otherwise result in 
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a purely emotional and behavioural response, i.e. impulsive aggression. They discuss the 
significance of the anterior cingulate cortex and the pre-frontal cortex in integrating 
information and inhibiting responses, in particular defensive rage.  
 
In studies which have explored the neuroanatomy of behavioural inhibition, Pietrini, 
Guazelli, Basso, Jaffe and Grafman (2000) linked right hemisphere homologues of left 
hemisphere language processing regions with the cognitive restraint of aggression. In 
addition, orbitofrontal cortex activation (seen through PET study) in response to anger 
has been proposed to play a key role in the inhibition of aggressive behaviour (Dougherty 
et al., 1999). Furthermore, considering emotional regulation, which seems inextricably 
linked with behavioural control, research exploring its neural correlates has demonstrated 
the involvement of Broca’s area (associated with language production), the amygdala and 
the premotor cortex in a task requiring verbal cognitive reappraisal of fear responses to 
wilfully regulate emotions (Kim & Hammon, 2007). Ochsner, Bunge, Gross and Gabrieli 
(2002) argued that the prefrontal cortex has an important role in the use of cognitive 
strategies to modulate responses to emotional stimuli. They used fMRI to monitor neural 
activity during a task in which participants were asked to mentally reappraise negative 
stimuli until they no longer elicited a negative emotion. The reappraisal involved creating 
an alternative story about the image they saw, for example seeing a woman crying outside 
a church and interpreting the context as a wedding rather than a funeral. This reappraisal 
reduced the participants’ subjective negative experience of the stimuli and, in terms of 
neural activity, increased activation was seen in the lateral and medial prefrontal regions, 
along with a reduction of activity in the medial orbitofrontal cortex and the amygdala. 
This study, then, suggests that internal verbal reappraisal strategies can influence some 
control over the emotion processes that have a role in evaluating the contextual and 
emotional relevance of a stimulus. 
 
Furthermore, Gyurak et al. (2009) considered the role of executive function on the 
behavioural manifestation of emotional regulation, operationalised by measuring facial 
expression and body movement in response to a startling stimulus. They found that higher 
scores on a verbal fluency task were significantly related to the ability to regulate 
emotions. No other test of executive function that they utilised (tests of working memory, 
task-switching and inhibition) had the same relationship with emotional regulation. Again 
these results link verbal skills with control over emotionally driven behaviour.  
 
Miller et al. (2008) also suggested an alternative explanation of the language-aggression 
link whereby defensive rage causes inactivation of the language processing brain regions 
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and thus verbal modulation or reappraisal becomes impaired, leading to impulsive 
aggression. They concluded that impulsive aggression may result from multiple 
aetiologies and they recommended that further research is conducted into the dimensions 
of language processing that may be involved.  
 
Although there is research demonstrating an association between language impairment 
and aggression, the language impairments and verbal skills that are discussed in the 
literature have been described very broadly to date. The generality of the discussions 
around the role of language in aggression are not very helpful for furthering 
understanding given that language impairment following brain injury is often 
multifaceted and incredibly complex. Research that has concentrated on more specific 
aspects of language in relation to emotion and behaviour, particularly aggression, focuses 
on figurative, non-literal language. Gibbs et al. (2002) discuss the idea that figurative 
language has an important role in modulating emotional intensity. They explain that 
unlike literal language, figurative language has the ability to communicate subtle nuances 
of emotion whilst maintaining emotional control. Figurative language, such as irony and 
sarcasm, has been found to dilute the emotional impact of language (Dews & Winner, 
1995). For example, when an individual feels angry towards another individual, by using 
indirect, figurative language in communicating this anger, the risk of offending or 
upsetting the individual is reduced. This further highlights the role that language seems to 
have in modulating aggression, and these more indirect, non-literal uses of language will 
now be explored. 
 
 
1.3 Figurative language and sarcasm 
This section will first discuss different forms of figurative language, and will then focus 
specifically on sarcasm. The use of sarcasm in everyday language will be explored, 
followed by how sarcasm can be affected after brain injury. 
 
Figurative language is a heterogeneous group of speech forms that imply more than their 
literal meanings, and which require the non-literal meaning to be processed in order to 
grasp the intention of the speaker (Rapp & Wild, 2011). It is generally accepted that 
metaphors, idioms, proverbs, metonymy, irony and sarcasm are among the most 
important forms of figurative language (Rapp & Wild, 2011). 
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1.3.1 Role of the right hemisphere in figurative language 
Figurative language is most commonly associated with involvement of the right 
hemisphere (RH) of the brain in processing. Although less widely recognised, and often 
less overtly apparent, the RH does play an important role in language processing. It is 
generally accepted that the RH is involved in affective/non-verbal processing and the left 
hemisphere (LH) with linguistic processing (Buchanan et al., 2000). The lack of 
awareness into the contributions of the RH to language comprehension and production 
may be due to the more subtle impact on language after RH damage, compared to the 
more overtly catastrophic consequences of LH damage (Lindell, 2006). Beyond the 
widely recognised aphasia disturbances associated with LH damage, there are many other 
specific and subtle language impairments, often resulting from damage to the brain’s RH, 
which can have a huge impact on an individual’s linguistic functioning and quality of 
communication (Beeman & Chiarello, 1998). 
 
RH language deficits have been researched using neuroimaging, visual hemi-field tests, 
dichotic listening tests, as well as looking at deficits evident in brain injured individuals 
(Kacinik & Chiarello, 2007; see Tompkins, Klepousniotou & Scott, 2013 for a review). 
Aspects of language function that have become associated with the RH include prosody 
(Pell, 1999), pragmatics (Kaplan, Brownell, Jacobs & Gardner, 1990), discourse 
(Beeman, 1993; Lojek-Osiejuk, 1996), interpretation of humour (Johns, Tooley & 
Traxler, 2008; Shammi & Stuss, 1999), interpretation of metaphor (Bottini et al., 1994; 
Klepousniotou, Gracco & Pike, 2014; Winner & Gardner, 1977) and interpretation of 
sarcasm (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer & Aharon-Peretz, 2005). Joanette, Goulet and Daoust 
(1991) report that approximately 50% of individuals with RH damage will experience 
difficulty in at least one of these areas. 
 
1.3.1.1 Impact of RH damage 
Although RH language deficits are considered ‘subtle’, they can have significant 
psychological and functional impact on the individual with the injury and the people 
around them. Prigatano et al. (1985) discuss the impact of RH damage on social 
adaptation, suggesting that the ability of the individual to communicate in social and 
vocational settings is very often compromised and can lead to unemployment and social 
isolation. They also highlight that non-aphasic disorders are likely to persist for longer 
than aphasic disorders. Unfortunately, RH language deficits are often neglected, or even 
go unnoticed, because common language tests are not designed to pick up on these RH 
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functions (Abusamra, Cote, Joanette & Ferreres, 2009). 
 
When considering the impact that specific RH language deficits might have on receptive 
language, problems can arise with inferring intended meanings or emotional valence, 
leading, therefore, to miscommunications and misunderstandings (e.g. Beeman, 1993; 
Johns, Tooley & Traxler, 2008). In terms of language production, RH deficits may also 
cause problems for the speaker in communicating intentions, e.g. as a result of 
monotonous intonation (prosody) or less informative speech content (discourse), and may 
risk damaging relationships by being unable to use subtle, polite, indirect language (as in 
irony and sarcasm). Of particular interest to the present study is the RH contribution to 
the interpretation of sarcasm which is explored further below. 
 
1.3.2 Sarcasm 
Sarcasm has been described as a form of verbal irony, and is sometimes used 
interchangeably with irony. For the purpose of clarity these terms will be defined. Irony 
has been defined as “expressions in which the intended meaning of the words is different 
from or the direct opposite of their usual sense” (Cheang & Pell, 2008, p. 366). The same 
authors describe sarcasm as “verbal irony that expresses negative and critical attitudes 
toward persons or events” (Cheang & Pell, 2008, p. 366). Haiman (1998) states that the 
main differences between the two are that, firstly, whereas situations can be ironic, only 
people can be sarcastic, and secondly, whilst irony can be unintentional, sarcasm requires 
intention. He describes sarcasm as “overt irony intentionally used by the speaker as a 
form of verbal aggression” (Haiman, 1998, p.20) and states that we are ostensibly 
communicating a message whilst framing it with a meta-message that implies we do not 
really mean what we are saying; in fact we may mean the exact opposite. 
 
1.3.2.1 Types of sarcasm and frequency of use 
Sarcasm can be considered positive or negative (McDonald, 1999). In negative sarcasm, a 
positive comment is used to convey something negative, such as “you’ve been a big 
help!” when the person was not considered to be helpful. With positive sarcasm, a 
negative comment is said to communicate something positive, such as “you did a terrible 
job!” when someone did something very well. Positive sarcasm is thought to be less 
frequently used than negative sarcasm (Gibbs, 2000; Kreuz & Glucksberg, 1989; 
Slugoski & Turnbull, 1988). 
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The terms positive and negative sarcasm are closely related to the concepts of ironic 
insults and ironic compliments (Pexman & Olineck, 2002a). Ironic insults are similar to 
negative sarcasm (e.g. “a fine friend you are” when implying the friend is a bad friend) 
and ironic compliments are similar to positive sarcasm (e.g. “you’re a terrible friend” 
when meaning the friend is a good friend). In terms of frequency of use, in line with the 
more frequent use of negative sarcasm, Dews and Winner (1995) found that ironic insults 
were more frequently present in scripted American TV shows than were ironic 
compliments, with ironic statements overall being present on average four to five times 
per 30 minute episode. A similar pattern was seen in the case of everyday, spontaneous 
speech, with 69% of sarcastic remarks being negative sarcasm, 15% being positive 
sarcasm and 17% either being difficult to classify by this distinction or not fitting with 
this idea of a direct opposite implied meaning (Gibbs, 2000).  
 
As raised by the Gibbs (2000) study, some instances of sarcasm cannot be understood as 
meaning the direct opposite of what is said. Channon, Pellijeff and Rule (2005) 
introduced the terms direct and indirect sarcasm to distinguish these types of sarcasm. 
Direct sarcasm refers to instances when the implied meaning is the direct opposite to the 
remark, and this is the most common use of sarcasm, whereas with indirect sarcasm the 
meaning is different, though not the direct opposite, to the remark. For example, in the 
context of someone burning a meal, the comment “you’re a great cook” would be 
considered direct sarcasm, whereas the comment “I’d hire you as a chef” would be 
considered indirect sarcasm. This distinction has been referred to by other researchers as 
direct and indirect irony (Dews et al., 1996) and simple and complex irony (Bucciarelli, 
Colle & Bara, 2003). 
 
Considering the frequency of irony use in day to day conversations, Gibbs (2000) found 
that on average there were 4.7 instances of irony per 10 minute recorded conversation 
between college friends in the USA. He calculated that approximately 8% of their 
conversational exchanges included some form of irony. The term ‘irony’, in this study, 
was referring to jocularity, hyperbole, rhetorical questions, understatement and sarcasm. 
Sarcasm was rated as the second most likely form of irony, accounting for 28% of the 
ironic comments, and was used more by men than women (64% and 36% respectively). 
Furthermore, Rockwell and Theriot (2001) found a similar gender bias; men were more 
sarcastic overall than women, and both men and women used more sarcasm when 
interacting with men. In addition, Jorgensen (1996) showed that sarcasm was most 
commonly used between people who were familiar to one another, rather than unfamiliar, 
and was more often directed specifically at a present rather than absent individual. 
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Given the frequency of this style of communication, it is important to consider why it is 
so often used, and what communicative purpose it serves. 
 
1.3.2.2 The function of sarcasm 
Sarcasm is thought to have a number of functions such as to provide humour, to enhance 
the critical nature of a comment or conversely to reduce the critical nature of a comment 
and protect the speaker from coming across as overly critical, insulting or aggressive 
(Blum-Kulka, 1987; Colston, 1997; Dews, Kaplan & Winner, 1995; Gibbs, 2000; 
Haiman, 1998). In Gibbs’ (2000) study, 74% of the sarcastic comments were considered 
humorous. Interestingly, 90% of sarcastic comments were considered mocking of other 
people, events or objects, and 54% were considered critical. These critical and mocking 
functions were significantly more common with sarcasm than any of the other forms of 
irony considered in the study. 
 
In Jorgensen’s (1996) research, the most common use of sarcastic irony was to criticise or 
complain to close friends, especially about trivial errors. The sarcasm served to save face 
so that the speaker was able to get their point of concern across more politely, without 
appearing to be insulting, unfair or thoughtless. Similarly, in their study about irony more 
generally, Dews et al. (1995) reported that irony functioned to allow the speaker to be 
perceived as more in control of their emotions, to soften an insult and in turn maintain 
relationships. 
 
There is mixed evidence regarding how sarcasm is perceived. In some experimental 
studies, sarcastic criticisms have been judged as more polite (Brown & Levinson, 1978) 
and less aggressive (Dews & Winner, 1995) than direct criticism. However, other studies 
have found the opposite; sarcastic criticisms have been perceived as more offensive and 
aggressive than literal criticisms (Toplak & Katz, 2000). In an attempt to resolve these 
inconsistencies, Pexman and Ollineck (2002a) suggested that the perception of the 
sarcasm varies depending on the type of sarcasm used and specifically what is being 
asked to be judged, the social impression (e.g. politeness) or the intention of the speaker 
(e.g. to mock). They suggest that when compliments are made sarcastically (e.g. “you 
look terrible” when implying that someone looks great), they are judged as more mocking 
and less polite than direct compliments. On the other hand, insults made sarcastically 
(e.g. “you look great” when implying someone looks terrible) are again perceived as 
more mocking, but this time more polite than direct insults. 
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In terms of how people respond to sarcasm, in Gibbs’ (2000) study, 33% of sarcastic 
remarks were responded to with some form of irony, 23% with a literal remark indicating 
understanding of the sarcasm and 13% with simple laughter thought to represent 
acknowledgement of the sarcasm. Twenty nine per cent of the time the addressee changed 
the subject or ignored the sarcasm and four per cent of the time the addressee’s response 
indicated that they clearly did not grasp the sarcastic intent. 
 
The above research indicates that the majority of the time receivers of sarcastic remarks 
identify these as sarcastic, however, occasionally this communication fails and the 
sarcasm is missed. The next section will consider what elements of the communication 
help to identify sarcasm as sarcasm indeed. 
 
1.3.2.3 Identifying sarcasm 
The ability to identify sarcasm is thought to depend on a number of different factors 
including specific acoustic and prosodic cues (Cheang & Pell, 2008; Haiman, 1998; 
Rockwell, 2000), context (Woodland & Voyer, 2011), beliefs about the speaker (Pexman 
& Olineck, 2002b), and socio-cultural factors (Katz, Blasko & Kazmerski, 2004). 
 
Bryant and Fox Tree (2002) demonstrated that when sarcastic comments taken from a 
radio show were presented in writing, without any context, they were not rated as 
sarcastic. As soon as those comments were presented either auditorily or with a written 
context they were rated as sarcastic. This demonstrates the importance of prosodic cues 
and context in the identification of sarcasm. There has been debate in this research area 
regarding the relative roles of context and prosody. Whereas some researchers pay more 
attention to the role of context (e.g. Ivanko & Pexman, 2003), specific prosodic cues have 
been favoured by others. For example, a study conducted by Voyer, Bowes and Techentin 
(2008) suggests that pitch alone is sufficient to identify sarcasm.  
  
Considering speech cues, Rockwell (2000) reported that sarcasm is indicated by slower 
speed, lower pitch and raised volume. Haiman (1998) has identified a number of 
additional prosodic cues observed in sarcastic speech including comments being 
accompanied by sneers and laughter, presence of an inverse pitch obtrusion (where the 
stressed syllable has a lower pitch than the neighbouring syllables), emotively 
inappropriate intonation (e.g. positive words stated with negative tone), exaggeration and 
caricature, flattening of affect/apathy, sing-song like melody, monotonous tone and 
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separation with pauses. In addition, Haiman (1998) also highlights that some specific 
words or phrases have become closely linked to sarcasm, due to frequent use, that they 
automatically signal sarcasm without the need for prosodic cues. 
 
In response to criticisms of the term ‘ironic tone of voice’ (which features slower tempo, 
heavy stress and an increased nasal sound; Kreuz & Roberts, 1995) as being too general 
and unhelpful in reference to sarcastic speech, Cheang and Pell (2008) have considered 
more specifically the sarcastic tone of voice. They conducted acoustic analyses of 
utterances spoken in English that were sarcastic, humorous, sincere or neutral. They 
found that compared to the other types of utterance, sarcastic utterances were associated 
with reductions in mean fundamental frequency (related to pitch variation) and harmonics 
to noise ratio (related to changes in voice quality), which in practice means sounding 
lower in pitch and more monotonous. Nasal resonance and speech rate also played a part 
in communicating sarcasm. 
 
Recently, Woodland and Voyer’s (2011) research has highlighted an important 
interaction between both discourse context and tone of voice in the identification of 
sarcasm. In addition to this, Katz et al. (2004) highlight the role of socio-cultural context 
as well as context and prosody. They state that males are more likely to use sarcasm than 
females, and sarcastic comments spoken by males have been rated as more sarcastic than 
by females. In addition, they argue that social class and occupation play a role; lower 
classes and occupations such as comedians and factory workers are more likely to use 
sarcasm and irony and thus comments made by people in such occupations are perceived 
as more sarcastic. 
  
1.3.2.4 Neural basis of sarcasm and sarcasm comprehension deficits  
Consistent with the evidence discussed above implicating the RH with indirect, non-
literal language, the ability to recognise sarcasm is also thought to be lateralised to the 
RH of the brain. Dichotic listening tasks, where processing of sounds directed to one ear 
indicates involvement of the opposite brain hemisphere (e.g. Grimshaw, Kwansy, Covell 
& Johnson, 2003), have been useful for demonstrating such lateralisation in non-clinical 
groups. For example, Voyer, Bowes and Techentin (2008) found that when sarcastic and 
sincere statements were played to either the left or the right ear, there was an overall left 
ear (RH) advantage for sarcastic stimuli, and a right ear (LH) advantage for sincere 
stimuli. 
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Difficulties interpreting sarcasm are present in many different groups of people. Some of 
these will be discussed below, and where the research references brain areas and 
pathways this information will be presented. This will be followed by a discussion about 
sarcasm comprehension difficulties after brain injury. 
 
1.3.2.4.1 Sarcasm comprehension deficits 
It is widely known that children struggle with fully decoding non-literal language 
(Ackerman, 1981; Capelli, Nakagawa & Madden, 1990). Interestingly, similar difficulties 
have also been observed at the opposite end of the age spectrum. Phillips et al. (2015) 
found that older adults (ages 65-86 years) were impaired at understanding sarcastic intent 
in verbal stories and in videos (from the Social Inference-Minimal task from The 
Awareness of Social Inference Test; TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan, Rollins & Kinch, 
2003), when compared to younger and middle aged adults. They also found that the 
results on the video based task were mediated by emotional recognition, based on 
identification of emotions in facial expressions. These findings were in line with other 
reports of age related declines in a wide variety of social cognition tasks where decoding 
of mental state was tested (Henry, Phillips, Ruffman & Bailey, 2013). 
 
In terms of clinical groups, difficulties interpreting non-literal language, including 
sarcasm, have been observed in individuals with semantic dementia (Rankin et al., 2009), 
frontotemporal dementia (Kipps, Nestor, Acosta-Cabronero, Arnold & Hodges, 2009), 
temporal lobe epilepsy and lobectomy (Cohn, St-Laurent, Barnett & McAndrews, 2015), 
Parkinsons Disease (Pell et al., 2014) and, perhaps most famously, autism spectrum 
disorders (Channon, Crawford, Orlowska, Parikh & Thoma, 2014). 
 
In the semantic dementia group, Rankin et al. (2009) found that poor performance on the 
Social Inference-Minimal task from the TASIT was related to atrophy in three areas of 
the brain, and these areas have each been associated with a particular role in sarcasm 
comprehension as follows. Firstly, the reduced volume in the posterior parahippocampi 
was associated with inability to identify abnormal paralinguistic speech patterns. 
Secondly, the temporal poles were implicated and thought to be important for 
interpretative processing. Finally atrophy of the right medial frontal pole has been linked 
to difficulty reading social cues and inferring a speaker’s intentions. 
 
The role of the temporal lobe was further indicated in the cases of temporal lobe epilepsy 
and lobectomy (Cohn et al., 2015). The study indicated a link between overall social 
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inference abilities and left side hippocampal atrophy. Whereas sarcasm comprehension 
more specifically was linked to left anterior atrophy of the temporal lobe neocortex, 
considered by the authors to be “a convergence zone of higher-order perceptual and 
emotional processes, and of stored representations” (p.636). 
 
1.3.2.4.2 Sarcasm comprehension deficits after brain injury 
Further examples of the role of the RH in processing sarcasm can be seen in cases of 
ABI. For example, Giora, Zaidel, Soroker, Batori & Kasher (2000) found that when 
aphasia was controlled for, individuals with RH brain damage performed worse on a test 
of sarcasm comprehension than individuals with LH damage and healthy controls. This 
difference remained significant even when the ability to perceive emotional prosody was 
controlled for, suggesting that there is RH involvement in the comprehension of sarcasm 
that goes beyond detection of prosody. 
 
Beyond the role of sarcastic prosody in identifying sarcasm, Channon et al. (2005) 
discuss the role of theory of mind, i.e. the ability to infer the mental states and intentions 
of others. They looked at comprehension of direct and indirect sarcasm in adults with 
ABI and healthy control participants. They presented sincere and sarcastic written 
sentences incorporating a context and a remark; participants were asked to explain the 
intended meaning of it. The results of their task demonstrated that participants with ABI 
were impaired on the sarcasm task compared to controls, and they struggled to 
comprehend the sarcastic comments significantly more than the sincere comments. 
However, there were no differences between type of sarcasm (direct or indirect). From 
the error analysis, the authors suggested that ABI participants were able to access the 
non-literal meanings, but were unable to correctly interpret these. This is in contrast to 
previous research (McDonald & Pearce, 1996) indicating that errors are usually due to 
making literal interpretations. Channon et al. (2005) suggested that, in their study, 
participants with ABI demonstrated an element of grasping the non-literal nature of the 
comments but they had difficulties working out the precise intended meaning. 
Channon et al. (2005) related the difficulties with interpreting intended meanings in 
sarcasm to difficulties with mentalising, i.e. being able to infer mental states and 
perspectives of others. Being able to appreciate a speaker’s intentions is important for all 
speech where alternative meanings are implied. This was evidenced in a study by Winner, 
Brownell, Happe, Blum and Pincus (1998) in which participants with RH brain damage 
had difficulty distinguishing lies from ironic jokes. The authors concluded that this was 
the result of being unable to attribute correctly the mental states of others. Channon and 
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Crawford (2010) studied this further and found that a group of patients with ABIs were 
consistently worse than healthy control participants on a number of measures assessing 
mentalising and the ability to take others’ perspectives. 
 
This social cognition element of sarcasm comprehension is suggestive of frontal lobe 
involvement, since theory of mind and mentalising is associated with the frontal lobes 
(and often the right frontal lobes) of the brain (Rowe, Bullock, Polkey & Morris, 2001; 
Stuss, Gallop & Alexander, 2001). Indeed the involvement of the frontal lobes in sarcasm 
comprehension has been supported by studies showing patients with prefrontal brain 
damage having difficulty interpreting sarcastic utterances and written scenarios (Channon 
et al., 2007; McDonald & Pearce, 1996; Shamay, Tomer & Aharon-Peretz, 2002). 
 
In particular, Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005) attempted to localise the neural bases for 
understanding sarcasm. They compared individuals with prefrontal lesions to individuals 
with posterior lesions on tasks requiring comprehension of sarcasm and social cognition. 
The sarcasm task consisted of audio recordings of conversational exchanges between two 
people, each ending with a comment that was either sarcastic (spoken with sarcastic 
intonation) or neutral (spoken with neutral intonation). Participants were then asked two 
questions assessing story comprehension (factual question) and comprehension of the 
speaker’s true meaning (attitude question). Results demonstrated that patients with right 
ventro-medial prefrontal lesions had most difficulty detecting sarcasm compared to 
patients with posterior lesions and healthy control participants. The authors suggested that 
an integration of theory of mind (requiring frontal lobe involvement) and identification of 
emotions (associated with the RH) is necessary in order to understand sarcasm. 
 
1.3.2.4.3 Impact of impaired sarcasm comprehension after brain injury 
It is important to consider the effects of impaired sarcasm comprehension for individuals 
with brain injuries, and the people around them. We know that the ability to communicate 
is considered fundamental to social adaptation and psychological wellbeing (Prigatano et 
al., 1985), and the literature clearly indicates that communication difficulties after TBI 
are related to poor social integration and reduced quality of life (Galski, Tompkins & 
Johnston, 1998). In relation to the links to aggressive behaviour, it may be that people 
with TBI who experience difficulties identifying the non-literal meanings in sarcasm may 
experience offence in relation to comments, or simply not understand them, leading to 
frustration and in turn more overt displays of aggression. In addition, it is possible that 
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reduced ability to interpret sarcasm correctly might also indicate inability to actually use 
sarcasm. Thus, the lack of skills at communicating aggression subtly and socially 
appropriately may again manifest as more overt aggression. 
 
These subtle difficulties over time may lead to communication breakdowns, further 
impacting relationships, having a compounding effect of frustration tolerance and 
aggressive behaviour. Thus, it is important to explore such potential links in more detail 
in order to assist understanding and development of rehabilitation and family support 
strategies. 
 
 
1.4 Theories of sarcasm comprehension 
Several theories have been suggested to account for the language deficits observed after 
RH brain damage, and the inability of such patients to appreciate non-literal language and 
alternative interpretations including sarcasm. Some of the most prevalent theories are 
outlined below. The first two models focus solely on processing non-literal language in 
the intact brain and do not make predictions about processing in the impaired brain. In 
contrast, the remaining three models make predictions about the processing of non-literal 
language not only in the intact brain but also following brain damage, and receive 
experimental support from studies with patients with LH and RH damage (in addition to 
evidence from studies with healthy participants). 
 
1.4.1 The standard pragmatic model 
Traditional theoretical positions have argued that sarcasm (and all figurative language) 
must be processed through typical linguistic routes first, after which context and 
pragmatics are considered. This manifests in slower reaction times when reading sarcastic 
material as the literal interpretation must be accessed first, before reaching the non-literal 
interpretation. This was the position of Grice (1975; 1978) and Searle (1975; 1979), 
whose work and theories have come to be referred to as the standard pragmatic model. 
 
There is little experimental evidence in favour of this model and it has been criticised for 
being too simplistic in assuming a simple meaning substitution accounts for the 
complexity of processes that go on to interpret a comment as sarcastic (Kreuz & 
Glucksberg, 1989).  In addition, evidence contradictory to this model has shown that non-
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literal interpretations can be accessed before the literal if the context biases the non-literal 
interpretation (Gibbs, 1980; Turner & Katz, 1997). 
 
1.4.2 The direct access model 
Challenges to the standard pragmatic model as the ones raised above led to the 
development of theories which argue that the processing of literal and non-literal 
language follow similar mechanisms, resulting in similar reading/response times for 
literal and sarcastic material. Gibbs (1982; 1983; 1984) proposed the direct access model 
according to which literal meanings of indirect requests and non-literal language do not 
have to be activated before reaching the intended, non-literal meaning, assuming that 
there is an appropriate context. Therefore, unlike the standard pragmatic model, the literal 
meaning can be bypassed and the non-literal meaning directly activated. 
 
Early evidence for this theory came from studies of healthy participants in which reading 
times for literal and non-literal utterances did not differ (Gibbs, 1986; Inhoff, Lima & 
Carroll, 1984). Furthermore, using methodology which tapped into on-line processes, 
Blasko and Connine (1993) found that whereas unfamiliar metaphors were processed 
literally before their non-literal interpretations were accessed, familiar metaphors could 
be processed and interpreted figuratively in parallel with the literal interpretation. 
However, later evidence did not consistently support this model. Giora (1995) found that 
literal meanings were being activated before the non-literal when processing ironic 
utterances. 
 
1.4.3 The graded salience hypothesis 
As a result of the contradictory evidence in relation to the previous two models, Giora 
(1997) presented the graded salience hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that literal and 
figurative language is processed and understood in terms of the salience of the language, 
i.e. what is the first meaning to be accessed. Factors that contribute to salience include 
familiarity, frequency and conventionality (Giora, 1999), therefore salience can be culture 
specific. For example, the interpretation of the word ‘bank’ might be interpreted as a 
financial institution for an urban-dweller, and a river-side for a rural-dweller. 
 
When it comes to figurative language, Giora (1999) argues that there can be conventional 
(salient) and unconventional (non-salient) metaphors and ironies. When metaphor or 
irony is conventional (e.g. commonly used), the non-literal (figurative) interpretation is 
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the most salient and will be accessed first. In contrast, with non-conventional (e.g. novel) 
metaphor or irony, the literal meaning would be accessed first, as it is the most salient. If 
the activated salient interpretation is in fact incorrect and does not ‘fit’ (e.g. in un-
conventional irony), the non-salient interpretation is then accessed. Giora (1999) also 
states that conventional ironies can have both literal and non-literal interpretations in the 
mental lexicon, meaning both salient and non-salient interpretations can be activated. 
 
Giora (1999) highlighted existing research that provides support for the graded salience 
hypothesis. For example, McGlone, Glucksberg and Cacciari (1994) showed 
conventional idioms to be processed faster than less conventional idioms. In addition, 
Turner and Katz (1997) found that the figurative meanings of familiar proverbs were 
accessed as quickly as the literal (non-figurative) meanings, whereas figurative meanings 
of unfamiliar proverbs were harder to access than the literal interpretations (the most 
salient). 
 
When assessing sarcasm (where the figurative interpretations were considered non-
salient) and metaphor (where the figurative interpretation was considered salient) 
comprehension in LH and RH brain damaged patients, Giora et al. (2000) found that RH 
damaged patients performed as well as controls on metaphor comprehension and that LH 
patients performed significantly worse. In contrast, on the sarcasm test, RH patients 
performed significantly worse than LH patients and controls. The authors argued that the 
RH is specialised for processing non-salient figurative language while the LH is 
responsible for salient figurative language processing. 
 
1.4.4 The coarse semantic coding hypothesis 
In a similar manner, the coarse semantic coding hypothesis (Beeman et al., 1994; 
Beeman, 1998) suggests that, when comprehending language, the LH activates narrow 
semantic fields (information closely related to the target word) and the RH activates wide 
semantic fields (distantly related words and concepts).  
 
Evidence for this theory comes primarily from studies with healthy participants. Bowden 
and Beeman (1998) demonstrated that on problem solving tasks, information processed 
by the RH (left visual field) led to more creative and insightful solutions than information 
presented to the LH (right visual field), as the RH enables activation of distantly related 
concepts and less common interpretations. In addition, using functional brain imaging 
techniques, Seger, Desmond, Glover and Gabrieli (2000) found increased RH brain 
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activity when participants produced unusual verbs in a language task requiring distant 
associations to be made, as opposed to usual verbs. Furthermore, using a dichotic 
listening task, Techentin and Voyer (2007) demonstrated a left ear (RH) advantage for 
identifying the emotion in words when the word and the emotional tone were 
incongruent. The authors suggested that the RH advantage was observed because of the 
flexibility of the RH for creating distant associations. 
 
The coarse semantic coding hypothesis attempts to explain the language deficits seen 
after RH injuries. For example, if the brain is unable to access large semantic fields, and 
relations cannot be made between semantic concepts which are distantly connected, it 
will be difficult to interpret non-literal, figurative language and draw inferences from 
ambiguous information. Though no study has looked directly at how this theory explains 
sarcasm and deficits in sarcasm interpretation after ABI, it follows that in order to 
understand the meaning of statements which are not literally true, or have double 
meanings, wide semantic activation may be required in order to access the multiple 
meanings and then draw the accurate inferences. Thus, the RH would be differentially 
involved when processing non-literal, sarcastic statements. 
 
1.4.5 The suppression deficit hypothesis 
Finally, the suppression deficit hypothesis, proposed by Tompkins and Lehman (1998), 
arose from the work of Gernsbacher, Varner and Faust (1990). Gernsbacher and 
colleagues put forward the idea of a mechanism that suppresses information that is 
irrelevant to the interpretation of a word. They suggested that people who show poor 
comprehension skills are less able to suppress irrelevant information than people with 
better comprehension skills (Gernsbacher & Faust, 1991). This research led to Tompkins 
and Lehman (1998) suggesting that individuals with RH brain damage, who display 
characteristic language deficits, are experiencing a suppression deficit; they struggle to 
suppress alternate and eventually incompatible word meanings. 
 
Evidence for this theory comes primarily from studies with patients with brain damage. 
For example, Tompkins, Baumgaertner, Lehman and Fossett (1997) used ‘on-line’ 
computer based tasks to investigate the processing of words with multiple meanings 
(lexical ambiguities), e.g. ‘spade’. Participants with and without brain injury were asked 
to judge whether an auditorily presented probe word (e.g. cards) fitted with the meaning 
of a short sentence with a lexical ambiguity (e.g. ‘he dug with a spade’) and without a 
lexical ambiguity (e.g. ‘he dug with a shovel’). The ability to suppress the probe word 
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was measured by response times. Results showed that individuals with RH damage were 
slower to respond when there was a lexical ambiguity. This was interpreted to support the 
suppression deficit hypothesis as RH damaged patients found it more difficult to suppress 
irrelevant meanings of the probe word. 
 
Although no studies have directly attempted to explain sarcasm comprehension in 
relation to the suppression deficit hypothesis, the theory might predict that difficulty 
comprehending sarcasm, following brain injury, is the result of an inability to suppress 
the literal interpretation of a sarcastic comment and select the inferred, intended meaning. 
 
 
1.5 Research questions, hypotheses and predictions 
In an attempt to further explore the hypothesis that language has a role in modulating 
impulsive aggression (Miller et al., 2008), this study attempted to consider the 
relationship between language comprehension, and more specifically sarcasm 
comprehension, and aggression. The study aimed to address the following research 
questions: 
1.) Does TBI affect language comprehension (of both literal and sarcastic material)? 
2.) Does TBI differentially affect sarcastic language comprehension? 
3.) If TBI does differentially affect language, and in particular sarcasm, 
comprehension, does this link to aggressive behaviour? 
4.) Does reduced ability to comprehend sarcasm in a non-clinical, young adult group 
relate to increased self-rated aggression? 
 
These research questions were investigated in two experiments. Experiment One included 
a group of individuals with TBI and a group of healthy matched control participants. 
Experiment Two included young, healthy adults who were split into two groups (low and 
moderate aggression) by their scores on a self-report aggression measure, the Buss-Perry 
Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992; appendix 5). In each experiment, 
all participants completed a computer-based task that involved reading and listening to 
audio vignettes, and responding to questions which assessed factual information 
(referring to details of the vignette) and attitude information (referring to the intent of the 
speaker in the vignette), following the method that Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005) used. 
The audio vignettes were framed with either a sarcastic or non-sarcastic (i.e. literal) 
context. The two experiments were complementary in nature and have allowed us to 
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study a broad spectrum of aggression in individuals, from a clinical population that 
typically exhibits high aggression (i.e. TBI patients) to healthy young control participants 
on the low end of the aggression scale. The following predictions were made for each 
experiment: 
 
In Experiment One, a group of TBI participants was compared to a group of matched 
healthy control participants. We hypothesised that, across both groups, literal contexts 
would be facilitated (producing faster reaction times; RTs) compared to sarcastic 
contexts. Furthermore, it was hypothesised that factual questions would be facilitated 
(producing faster RTs) compared to attitude ones. In addition, we expected differences to 
emerge between the TBI group and the control group. In particular, we expected the TBI 
group to perform significantly slower and make more errors than the control group, and 
to have more impaired performance for sarcastic contexts and attitude questions 
compared to the healthy control group. Finally, we expected aggression scores to relate to 
difficulty on the sarcasm task; i.e. BPAQ scores (additionally the OAS-MNR for the TBI 
group) would correlate with RTs and errors on the sarcasm task. 
 
In Experiment Two, a group of self-rated low aggressive individuals was compared to a 
group of self-rated moderately aggressive individuals. We hypothesised that, similarly to 
Experiment One, across both groups, literal contexts would be facilitated (producing 
faster RTs) compared to sarcastic contexts. Additionally, it was hypothesised that factual 
questions would be facilitated (producing faster RTs) compared to attitude ones. We also 
expected that some differences may emerge between the low aggression group and the 
moderate aggression group. In particular, it was hypothesised that the moderate 
aggression group may be slower and make more errors than the low aggression group, 
and may also show decreased performance in sarcastic contexts and on attitude questions, 
compared to the low aggression group. 
 
1.5.1 Predictions from models of non-literal language processing 
The findings from the sarcasm experiment will be interpreted in the context of existing 
theories of non-literal language processing. Whilst it is not possible to directly test the 
predictions of the coarse semantic coding hypothesis and the suppression deficit 
hypothesis, as this would require an experimental design with distinct patient groups 
determined by laterality of injury, these two theories will be used as frameworks to 
understand the results. However, the predictions of the first three theories discussed 
above (standard pragmatic model, direct access model and graded salience model) can be 
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directly tested by the current experimental design as they concern non-literal language 
processing in general, rather than in relation to specific hemispheric processing. These 
three models/theories make different predictions about the processing of sarcastic 
comments compared to literal ones, as follows: 
 
The standard pragmatic model assumes that figurative language is processed by first 
accessing the literal interpretation, and only when that interpretation does not fit with the 
context is the non-literal interpretation activated. This model would therefore predict that 
responses to answering the questions in the sarcastic context would be slower compared 
to the literal context. 
 
The direct access model argues that non-literal meanings can be activated without the 
need to activate the literal meaning first if the context biases the non-literal meaning. 
Given that in the present studies, the sarcastic comments are incorporates in vignettes that 
support the sarcastic interpretation, this model, would predict similar performance when 
answering the questions in the sarcastic and literal contexts. 
 
Finally, according to the graded salience hypothesis, salient meanings are activated first 
regardless of whether they are literal or non-literal. The sarcastic remarks in the current 
experiments are considered non-salient since they are conversational in nature and not 
always associated with sarcasm (i.e. would not be interpreted sarcastically without 
prosodic cues and/or context) and therefore would not have a sarcastic interpretation 
stored in the mental lexicon. Therefore, this theory would predict increased response 
times when answering the questions in the sarcastic contexts, compared to the literal, as 
salient meanings are accessed before non-salient ones. 
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2. METHOD 
2. 1 Ethical clearance 
Ethical approval was obtained from the School of Psychology, University of Leeds (ref: 
14-0339, date: 19.12.14; appendix 2), for recruitment and testing of non-clinical 
participants. Ethical clearance was also obtained from an NHS research ethics committee 
(ref: 15/LO/1220, date: 15.7.15; appendix 3) and the Disabilities Trust (parent 
organization of the Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust; BIRT) research ethics committee 
(date: 22.09.15; appendix 4) for the recruitment and testing of participants with brain 
injury. As the sites being accessed for recruitment and testing purposes were non-NHS 
sites, the required management permissions were obtained from each BIRT service being 
accessed (there were two Yorkshire based sites). 
 
 
2.2 Experiment One 
2.2.1 Design 
Experiment One was designed to address the first three research questions, exploring the 
impact of TBI on comprehension of literal and sarcastic material and any links between 
language, and in particular sarcasm, comprehension and aggression. Experiment One 
followed a 2 (Group; TBI or control) x 2 (Context: literal or sarcastic) x 2 (Question 
Type: factual or attitude) x 2 (Question Order: first or second) mixed effects design to 
consider the research questions; Group was a between-subjects factor and Context, 
Question Type and Question Order were within-subjects factors. The dependent variables 
were the accuracy and reaction time (RT) data on the computer-based sarcasm 
experiment. 
 
2.2.2 Participants 
2.2.2.1 Power analyses 
A power analysis was conducted to calculate the minimum number of participants needed 
to achieve the necessary power and effect sizes. A total sample size of 28 participants (14 
in each group) (F(5,130)=2.28, p=.05) was calculated to be sufficient to obtain a power of 
.95, with an effect size of .25. This was calculated on the basis of two groups (TBI and 
control) and six measurements (sarcastic statement, neutral statement, factual question, 
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attitude question, order first, order second). According to Cohen (1988), an effect size of 
.1 is considered small, .3 is considered medium and .5 is considered large. The small-
medium effect size of .25 was used in this power analysis in line with effects seen in the 
literature (e.g. James & Young, 2013). 
 
2.2.2.2 TBI participants 
Seven individuals with TBI were recruited from brain injury rehabilitation units. The 
individuals were recruited only if they were medically stable and in the post-acute phase 
of their recovery, as deemed by not being in post-traumatic amnesia (PTA; the period 
from injury to the time that new memories can be consistently stored; Russell & Smith, 
1961). The individuals were all male native English speakers and were right handed (pre-
morbidly) according to the Briggs and Nebes (1975) handedness inventory. The 
participants had no lifetime pre-morbid history of language disorders, learning disability, 
autism-spectrum disorders, neurological disorders, personality disorder, and they had no 
significant mental health diagnoses in the five years prior to their injury, according to 
their self-report and review of medical records. In addition, none of the participants had 
any current personality disorder diagnosis or major mental health diagnoses (e.g. 
depression, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder), and none were aphasic (i.e. they had intact 
receptive and expressive language skills), according to the assessments conducted by the 
speech and language therapists upon admission to the neurorehabilitation units. All 
participants were considered by their clinical leads to have the mental capacity to consent 
to participate in the study. Demographic information for the TBI participants is presented 
in Table 1. 
 
2.2.2.3 Control participants 
Seven individuals without a TBI were recruited as age, education and gender matched 
control participants. Similarly the individuals were all male, right-handed, native English 
speakers, and did not have any current or lifetime history of language or developmental 
disorders, diagnosed personality disorder, neurological disorders or drug/alcohol 
addictions. None had current or recent-historical (past 5 years) mental health disorders, 
and none were taking psychiatric medication. The demographic information for the 
control participants is also presented in Table 1. 
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2.2.3 Screening tests  
All participants were administered the following screening tests; scores are displayed in 
Table 1: 
 Sixteen-question interview to obtain demographic information and to establish 
suitability for participation according to the inclusion criteria (appendix 6). 
 Handedness inventory (Briggs & Nebes, 1975; appendix 7): a 12-item 
questionnaire rating on a five-point scale preferred hand for use in various 
different tasks (-2 always left, -1 usually left, 0 no preference, +1 usually right, 
+2 always right). The scoring range is -24 - +24 and a score of +9 or more 
indicates right handedness. This was administered to assess for most probable 
language lateralisation, in an attempt to limit heterogeneity in the hemispheric 
lateralisation of language. 
 Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA, Nasreddine et al., 2005; appendix 8):  a 
brief screening test of global cognitive ability which was developed to identify 
mild cognitive impairment. It assesses various cognitive domains including 
orientation to time and place, visuospatial abilities, short term memory, attention 
and working memory, executive function and language (fluency, naming and 
repeating). The MoCA takes approximately ten minutes to complete and is 
administered in interview format. Scores of 26 and above are considered to be in 
the normal range. 
 Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992; appendix 5) 
to assess self-reported aggressive characteristics. This is a 29 item self-report 
measure of aggression tapping into physical aggression, verbal aggression, 
hostility and anger via questions about aggressive behaviours and feelings. All 29 
items are responded to on a five-point Likert scale where 1 = extremely 
uncharacteristic and 5 = extremely characteristic, and there are two reverse 
scoring items (numbers 9 and 16). The BPAQ is considered to have good 
psychometric properties (Buss & Perry, 1992; Harris, 1995, 1997). 
 
Table 1. Experiment One participant demographics 
Demographics & screening tests TBI (N=7) Control (N=7) 
Age (mean, SD) 36y 9m (9y 12m) 36y 9m (14y 2m) 
Gender ratio (male:female) 7:0 7:0 
Years in education (mean, SD) 14.14 (2.67) 15.8 (2) 
Handedness (range -24 – +24) 19.29 (5.06)  18.14 (5.15) 
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(mean, SD) 
MoCA (Max = 30) (mean, SD) 22.57 (3.51) 28.71 (0.95) 
BPAQ (Max = 145) (mean, SD) 70.14 (24.92) 59.14 (12.54) 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; BPAQ = Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
 
One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) found no significant group differences on age 
[F(1,12)=0, p=1, ηp2=.0], number of years in education [F(1,12)=1.72, p=.21, ηp2=.13], 
handedness [F(1,12)=.18, p=.68, ηp2=.01], and the BPAQ [F(1,12)=1.09, p=.32, 
ηp2=.08]. However, the two groups were found to differ significantly on the MoCA 
[F(1,12)=20.03, p<.01, ηp2=.63]. 
 
2.2.4 Neurocognitive and neurobehavioural data for TBI participants 
As a part of the assessment package at the neurorehabilitation units, comprehensive 
neurocognitive assessments were conducted and assessment information relevant for this 
study was gathered, where available, and is presented in Table 2. The following clinical 
information was obtained: 
 Date of injury to calculate time since injury at the point of my first meeting. 
 Cause of injury. 
 Rough location of injury. 
 Severity of injury; mild, moderate or severe (Ghajar, 2000), according to the 
Glasgow Coma Scale score (GCS; Teasdale & Jennett, 1974) or the length of 
post-traumatic amnesia (PTA). Where no GCS or PTA information was 
available, the injury severity was estimated by the assessing consultant based on 
other available clinical information. 
 Index scores from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 4th edition (WAIS-IV; 
Wechsler, 2008). The WAIS-IV is the up to date version of the most widely used 
test of intelligence and general cognitive function. The test comprises 15 subtests 
(10 core, 5 supplemental) which contribute towards 5 index scores; namely, a 
full-scale intelligence quotient (FSIQ) score, a verbal comprehension index 
(VCI), a perceptual reasoning index score (PRI), a working memory index score 
(WMI), and a processing speed index score (PSI). In the case of one participant 
there was no PSI score range (due to only partial assessment being possible), thus 
the group mean on this index is not a true group mean, only reflecting six 
participants. Scores on each of these indexes are scaled (in accordance with age) 
against a normal population mean of 100 and a standard deviation (SD) of 15.  
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 Estimate of pre-morbid IQ from the Test of Pre-morbid Function, UK version 
(TOPF UK; Wechsler, 2011). The TOPF UK comprises a list of 70 English 
words with atypical grapheme-phoneme translations which are read aloud by the 
participant. The ability to correctly pronounce irregular words is known to be 
stable even after brain injury and accurately predicts pre-morbid IQ, as a function 
of previously learnt vocabulary. The total number of points scored for correct 
pronunciation is converted to reflect pre-morbid functioning according to the 
WAIS-IV index scores (mean = 100, SD = 15). 
 The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald, Flanagan & 
Rollins, 2002) scores. This is a standardised clinical tool developed to assess 
social skills in clinical populations, including TBI, consisting of three parts: The 
Emotion Evaluation Test (EET), The Social Inference-Minimal (SI-M), and The 
Social Inference-Enriched (SI-E). The EET and the SI-M scores are reported 
below. The SI-E was not routinely administered in the neurorehabilitation 
settings sampled. The SI-M is particularly important for the present study as this 
assesses comprehension of sarcastic exchanges, as well as sincere exchanges. The 
sarcastic exchanges include simple and paradoxical sarcasm. In exchanges of 
simple sarcasm, the sarcasm can only be interpreted by identification of 
paralinguistic cues, not by the content of the speech. Whereas, in exchanges of 
paradoxical sarcasm, there are no paralinguistic cues indicative of sarcasm and 
the verbal exchanges only make sense if interpreted sarcastically. In cases where 
the TASIT was not routinely administered during the neurorehabilitation unit’s 
assessment process this was administered as part of the current study’s procedure. 
 
In addition to the structured cognitive assessment information obtained, as outlined 
above, neurobehavioural data was also obtained in relation to observed aggression. 
Levels of observed aggression were routinely monitored and recorded, using the Overt 
Aggression Scale - Modified for Neurorehabilitation (OAS-MNR; Alderman et al., 1997; 
appendix 1), as part of the structured assessment and rehabilitation programme at the 
BIRT neurorehabilitation units. For the purpose of this study, the total OAS-MNR scores 
were collected for the four week period prior to the first testing session in addition to the 
four week period following that first meeting. For the two recently discharged 
individuals, the scores of their final 8 weeks in the units were used (it is of note that no 
aggressive behaviours were recorded for either of these individuals in the last 3 months, 
or longer, of their stays, so these scores can be considered an accurate general reflection 
of aggression rather than simply being related to imminent discharge). Any observed 
aggressive behaviour was coded as one of four categories: verbal aggression (VA), 
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physical aggression against objects (PO), physical aggression against the self (PS) and 
physical aggression against other people (PP). A weighted (w) score was calculated as per 
the set numerical values ascribed to each type of behaviour within each category (i.e. 1-4 
as per the descriptions seen in appendix 1), which were then multiplied in line with the 
severity of the aggression type (i.e. multiplied by 1 for VA, multiplied by 2 for PO, 
multiplied by 3 for PS, and multiplied by 4 for PP). An overall weighted physical 
aggression score (wPA) was calculated as a sum of the three physical categories, and an 
overall weighted aggression total (wA) was also calculated to reflect overall physical and 
verbal aggression.  
 
The injury information, cognitive assessment information and behavioural data for the 
TBI participants are displayed in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Experiment One TBI participant clinical information 
Assessment tool  TBI participants 
Time since injury (mean, SD) 2y 2m (2y) 
Severity of injury  
    Severe (N) 7 
    Moderate (N) 0 
    Mild (N) 0 
Cause of injury  
    RTA  (N) 4 
    Fall  (N) 1 
    Assault (N) 2 
Broad location of injury  
    LH (N) 1 
    RH (N) 2 
    Bilateral (N) 4 
WAIS-IV (mean=100, 1 SD=15)  
    VCI (mean, SD) 81.29 (8.71) 
    PRI (mean, SD) 85.00 (17.86) 
    WMI (mean, SD) 85.86 (16.2) 
    PSI (mean, SD) 73.83 13.29) 
    FSIQ (mean, SD) 77.00 (14.24) 
TOPF (mean=100, 1 SD=15)  
    Estimated pre-morbid VCI (mean, SD) 91.57 (5.44) 
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    Estimated pre-morbid PRI (mean, SD) 95 (6.95) 
    Estimated pre-morbid WMI (mean, SD) 92.71 (7.99) 
    Estimated pre-morbid PSI (mean, SD) 93 (5.29) 
    Estimated pre-morbid FSIQ (mean, SD) 91.57 (7.48) 
TASIT   
    Part 1 (max=28) (mean, SD) 18.86 (4.81) 
    Part 2 (max= 60) (mean, SD) 47 (3.92) 
OAS-MNR (total score over an 8 week 
period) 
 
    wVA (mean, SD) 17.86 (24.07) 
    wPO (mean, SD) 2.26 (3.35) 
    wPS (mean, SD) 0 
    wPP (mean, SD) 7.43 (14.68) 
    wPA (mean, SD) 9.71 (15.51) 
    wA (mean, SD) 27.57 (39.53) 
RTA = road traffic accident; WAIS-IV = Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 4th edition; 
VCI = verbal comprehension index; PRI = perceptual reasoning index; WMI = working 
memory index; PSI = processing speed index; FSIQ = full-scale intelligence quotient; 
TOPF = Test of Premorbid Functioning; TASIT = The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test; OAS-MNR = Observed Aggression Scale-Modified for Neurorehabilitation; wVA = 
weighted verbal aggression; wPO = weighted physical aggression against objects; wPS = 
weighted physical aggression against self; wPP = weighted physical aggression against 
other people; wPA = weighted physical aggression (overall); wA = weighted aggression 
(overall). 
 
2.2.5 Materials 
2.2.5.1 Sarcasm experiment 
The sarcasm experiment is a test of sarcasm comprehension based on a paradigm 
originally developed by Ackerman (1981) and adapted and used in research by Shamay-
Tsoory et al. (2005). The experiment involves reading and hearing short stories with an 
exchange between two characters in which either a sarcastic or a sincere comment is 
made. This is followed by two questions to elicit the understanding of the scenario 
(factual question) and the beliefs of the individual (attitude question). The main 
differences between the current paradigm and that of Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005), is that 
the current study developed and used significantly more stimuli (60 compared to 16), 
there were example and practice phases (not evident in the Shamay-Tsoory et al. study) 
and alongside auditory presentation of stimuli, as in Shamay-Tsoory et al.’s study, the 
stimuli were also presented in writing. 
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2.2.5.1.1 Description and development of the materials 
Thirty four different scenario themes were developed, each with a sarcastic and a non-
sarcastic (literal) version, creating 68 individual scenarios in total. All the scenarios 
featured two main characters, in a variety of social, family and work contexts, and began 
with one to two sentences to provide a brief context, followed by a spoken comment from 
one character directed to and about the other. There was a consistent theme between the 
two scenario versions (sarcastic and literal) though the context was altered slightly to 
appropriately set up the sarcastic or literal comment. The words used in the spoken 
comment remained the same regardless of context, though the prosody and intonation 
changed in accordance with whether it was sarcastic or literal. In the sarcastic versions, 
the comment was contextually incongruent and had an alternate implied meaning. On the 
other hand, in the literal versions the comment was congruent with the context and the 
literal meaning was implied. The comment always referred to the other character 
personally, rather than to a situation, an item or another person. In the sarcastic scenarios 
the comments always communicated negative sarcasm, i.e. when a positive comment is 
used to communicate something negative. In the literal versions, the same positive 
comment was used to literally communicate something positive (see Table 3 for examples 
of the experimental stimuli). 
 
Before the scenarios were voice recorded, a group of 20 (5 males, mean age = 30.25, SD 
= 8.95) healthy, adult, native English-speaking volunteers rated how sarcastic the 
scenarios were in their written form. This was done through an online survey which the 
volunteers could complete by following a website link (using the Bristol Online Surveys 
platform. The volunteers rated on a Likert scale of 1-7 (1 = not at all sarcastic, 7 = very 
sarcastic) how sarcastic they thought each scenario was (including both the sarcastic and 
literal versions). On the whole, the sarcastic scenarios were rated as highly sarcastic (M = 
6.29, SD = 0.6), and the literal scenarios as not at all sarcastic (M = 1.51, SD = 0.44). 
Statistical analysis confirmed the ratings of the sarcastic and the literal statements to be 
significantly different from each other [t(60)=35.84, p<.01], as intended. Two outliers 
were identified and adapted in line with feedback obtained from free response boxes on 
the online survey. 
 
Once the scenarios were finalised, they were recorded by a female actor and performing 
arts student from the University of Leeds, using the computer program Audacity 1.3 Beta 
(Audacity Team, 2008), and they were edited into their final form. The recordings were 
made in a generic (non-regional specific) English accent. The sarcastic comments 
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followed traditional prosodic patterns seen in sarcasm including slower tempo, lower 
pitch and louder intensity (Rockwell, 2000). The literal comments had a contextually 
congruent prosody. These audio recordings were then rated for their perceived level of 
sarcasm. As audio files could not be incorporated into an online survey, these were rated 
manually by playing clips to 14 (5 male, mean age = 34.43, SD = 12.74) healthy adult 
native English-speaking volunteers and asking them to rate the perceived level of sarcasm 
on the same 1-7 Likert scale (1 = not at all sarcastic, 7 = very sarcastic) as above. On the 
whole the sarcastic scenarios were rated as highly sarcastic (M = 6.37, SD = 0.29), and 
the literal scenarios as not at all sarcastic (M = 1.75, SD = 0.29). There were no outliers 
and on statistical analysis the ratings of the sarcastic and literal scenarios were 
significantly different from each other [t(64)=63.86, p<.01], as intended. 
 
The finalised scenarios varied in length between 21 and 35 words, with a mean of 28.5 
words (SD = 3.69), and there was no statistically significant difference between the 
sarcastic (M = 28.65, SD = 3.6) and the literal (M = 28.35, SD = 3.83) versions 
[t(66)=0.33, p=.75]. In terms of the running times of the audio recordings, the scenarios 
varied between 7 and 14.36 seconds, with a mean of 10.32 seconds (SD = 1.56). On 
analysis, there were no statistically significant differences between the mean running 
times of the sarcastic (M = 10.47, SD = 1.62) and the literal (M = 10.18, SD = 1.52) 
scenarios either [t(66)=.76, p=.45]. In terms of the content/themes of the scenarios, there 
was an equal gender split between the scenarios, a mix of relationships (friendships, 
spouses, working relationships, family relationships) and a mix of contexts (work, leisure, 
home, sport). 
 
Each scenario was followed by two questions that were presented one after the other; a 
factual question and an attitude question in a pseudo-random order. The questions 
required a yes or no answer and participants responded by pressing the mouse buttons 
(left mouse button = yes, right mouse button = no). The computer mouse had labels on as 
reminders. The factual question assessed the understanding of the story generally and the 
attitude question assessed the understanding of the spoken comment i.e. the speaker’s 
beliefs and intentions. The order in which the questions were presented was pseudo-
randomised to avoid being able to predict the following question, with half of the 
scenarios having factual questions first and half having attitude questions first. In 
addition, half of the questions were positively phrased (e.g. Did Ryan play well?) and half 
negatively (e.g. Did Ryan play badly?). The pairings of positively and negatively phrased 
questions was also pseudo-randomised, with an equal split between positive-positive, 
negative-negative, positive-negative and negative-positive question pairs to avoid 
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strategies in being able to predict the question that followed and thus pre-empt the 
answer. The questions were only displayed visually for the participants to read as 
auditory information was not deemed necessary. 
 
The experimental stimuli are presented in full in appendix 9, and examples of four of the 
different scenario combinations are given in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Examples of the experimental paradigm stimuli combinations 
Combination Scenario Question 1 Question 2 
Sarcastic 
Q1: Att-Neg-Yes 
Q2: Fac-Pos-No 
Liz was playing tennis with a 
friend and kept hitting shots 
out of the court. Her friend 
said to her “You’re playing 
really well today Liz!” 
Did Liz’s 
friend think 
Liz was 
playing badly? 
Was Liz 
playing tennis 
well? 
 
Literal 
Q1: Fac-Neg-No 
Q2: Att-Neg-No 
Liz was playing tennis with a 
friend and kept hitting 
winning shots. Her friend 
said to her “You’re playing 
really well today Liz!” 
Was Liz 
playing tennis 
badly? 
 
Did Liz’s 
friend think 
Liz was 
playing badly? 
Sarcastic 
Q1: Att-Pos-No 
Q2: Fac-Neg-Yes 
Ian was attempting some 
DIY plumbing. His girlfriend 
came home to see the 
bathroom flooded. She said 
to him “Nice work. I see 
those DIY lessons came in 
handy!” 
Did Ian’s 
girlfriend think 
Ian had done a 
good job? 
Had Ian done a 
bad job? 
 
Literal 
Q1: Fac-Pos-Yes 
Q2: Att-Pos-Yes 
Ian was attempting some 
DIY plumbing. His girlfriend 
came home to see a new 
bathroom fitted. She said to 
him “Nice work. I see those 
DIY lessons came in handy!” 
Had Ian done a 
good job? 
 
Did Ian’s 
girlfriend think 
Ian had done a 
good job? 
 
Q1 = Question one; Q2 = Question two; Fac = Factual; Att = Attitude; Pos = Positive; 
Neg = Negative. 
 
51 
 
2.2.5.1.2 Building the experiment 
The software package E-Studio2 (Schneider, Eschman & Zuccolotto, 2002) was used to 
build the experiment into a computer-based paradigm with four blocks; an example 
block, practice block and two separate experimental blocks. The example block consisted 
of four scenarios and the two corresponding questions (factual and attitude) for each 
scenario. As this was an example and learning exercise only, the participant did not have 
to respond with the mouse and was instead encouraged to say what they thought the 
answer might be and the correct answer was provided on the computer screen after each 
question. In the practice block, there were four new scenarios and the participant was 
encouraged to respond to the questions with the mouse and was not given the correct 
answers (akin to the experimental phases). The practice session was repeated if necessary 
until it was clear to the participants what the task required. 
 
The two experimental blocks each contained 30 scenario-question combinations and each 
had a short one minute break programmed half way through (after the first 15 scenario-
question combinations). The two versions (sarcastic and literal) of the same scenario were 
never presented in the same block. Each scenario was presented auditorily through the 
computer speakers and visually on the screen for a maximum of 18000ms. After hearing 
and reading the scenario the participant could press a keyboard or mouse key when they 
were ready for the questions, or the screen would time out and automatically move on to 
the questions. After a delay of 1500ms, the first question appeared on the screen for a 
maximum of 15000ms. Once participants responded (or the screen timed out), and after a 
delay of 1500ms, the second question was presented on the screen for a maximum of 
15000ms. After participants responded to the second question (or the screen timed out), 
there was a delay of 1500ms before the next scenario was presented visually and 
auditorily. Accuracy and reaction time (ms) data was recorded by the computer. The 
experiment took approximately 40-50 minutes to complete. An example of the sequence 
of screen displays of one scenario-question combination is represented in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Example of one scenario-question sequence 
 
(1500ms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instructions (only shown at beginning of each block) 
 
 
(Press to continue) 
 
 
 
Blank screen 
 
 
 
(1500ms) 
 
 
 
Scenario 
 
 
 
(Max 18000ms) 
 
 
 
Blank screen 
 
 
 
Question 1 
 
 
 
(Max 15000ms) 
 
 
 
(1500ms) 
 
 
 
Blank screen 
 
 
 
Question 2 
 
 
 
(Max 15000ms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrea and Ross were on 
holiday in France. Andrea 
was attempting to ask 
directions in French but was 
struggling. Afterwards, Ross 
said to her “You’re 
practically fluent Andrea!” 
 
 
Was Andrea bad at speaking 
French? 
 
 
 
 
You will be shown short stories, 
followed by two questions. 
….. 
Press the LEFT mouse button if 
the answer is YES 
Press the RIGHT mouse button 
if the answer is NO 
….. 
Press any key to continue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Did Ross think that Andrea 
was bad at speaking French? 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
2.2.5.2 Sarcasm questions 
After the computer-based experiment, the participants were asked two questions about 
their use of sarcasm (appendix 16). They were asked to rate how sarcastic they would 
describe themselves on a 0-10 scale (0 = not at all sarcastic, 10 = extremely sarcastic), 
and how frequently they use sarcasm in day to day conversations on a 1-7 scale (1 = 
never, 2 = extremely rarely, 3 = rarely, 4 = not very often, 5 = often, 6 = very often, 7 = 
extremely often). Previous studies have suggested that frequent use of sarcasm in one’s 
own communication improves the ability to detect sarcasm in others’ speech (Ivanko, 
Pexman & Olineck, 2004) and a similar frequency question was asked in Woodland and 
Voyer’s (2011) study. 
 
2.2.6 Procedure 
Data collection with the healthy control participants was completed in one session that 
lasted approximately one hour.  
 
With each TBI participant the data collection process took approximately two to three 
hours, spread over two to four sessions, depending on which clinical assessments were to 
be administered, in addition to the individual’s level of concentration, attention and 
fatigue. For the five TBI participants residing in neurorehabilitation units the data 
collection took place in quiet assessment rooms at the units. For the two participants who 
had recently been discharged from the neurorehabilitation units, data collection took 
place in a quiet meeting room at the University of Leeds for one individual, and for the 
other in a quiet meeting room at their place of work. 
 
Initially, the study was explained to all participants and they were given an information 
sheet (TBI appendix 10; control appendix 11) and the chance to ask any questions about 
the study they may have. Participants then completed an informed consent form (TBI 
appendix 12; control appendix 13). Following this, screening tests were administered in 
the following order: inclusion criteria interview, handedness inventory, MoCA. All 
participants were then asked to complete the BPAQ. The handedness inventory and the 
BPAQ were completed independently by most participants, though for some of the TBI 
participants the questions were read out and the participant responded verbally, with the 
researcher making note of the responses. 
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Next, the participants completed the computer-based sarcasm experiment. A Toshiba 
laptop with 15½ inch screen with internal speakers was used. A computer mouse was 
plugged in which had “yes” and “no” stickers on the left and right keys respectively. The 
E-prime software recorded the response accuracy and reaction times (in ms). In total, this 
process took between 40-50 minutes to complete. A script was developed to ensure 
consistency when giving instructions (appendix 14). After completing the experiment, all 
participants were asked to answer the two sarcasm questions (appendix 15). 
 
With regards to the TASIT, some TBI participants had already completed Part 1 or Part 1 
and Part 2 throughout their assessment phase at the neurorehabilitation units, whereas 
others had not previously done any part of it. Relevant sections were therefore 
administered. For some participants this was completed before the sarcasm experiment 
stage and for some afterwards, a decision made based on time available. If the TASIT 
was administered, this was always done during a different testing session to the sarcasm 
experiment. 
 
 
2.3 Experiment Two 
2.3.1 Design 
Experiment Two addressed the final research question and aimed to explore links 
between sarcasm comprehension and self-rated aggression in a non-clinical group of low 
and moderately aggressive young adults. In order to address this research question, 
Experiment Two followed a 2 (Group: low or moderate aggression) x 2 (Context: literal 
or sarcastic) x 2 (Question Type: factual or attitude) x 2 (Question Order: first or second) 
mixed effects design; Group was a between-subjects factor and Context, Question Type 
and Question Order were within-subjects factors. The dependent variables were the 
accuracy and reaction time data from the computer-based sarcasm experiment. 
 
2.3.2 Participants 
Given that the same design was used as in Experiment One, the same power analysis 
calculations (see section 2.2.2.1) applied to Experiment Two. Again, a small-medium 
effect size was opted for, in line with findings in the non-clinical literature (e.g. Phillips et 
al., 2015). More participants were recruited than the calculated total of 28, in accordance 
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with previous literature, and in an attempt to increase the possibility of capturing any 
small effect, if one was indeed present. 
 
Forty healthy participants (13 male, mean age 23y 3mo, SD=5y 2mo) were recruited for 
Experiment Two. Recruitment and data collection was supported by an undergraduate 
psychology student at the University of Leeds who used this data set for their final year 
research dissertation. All participants were native English speakers and were right handed 
according to the Briggs and Nebes (1975) handedness inventory. As gathered by self-
report, the participants had no diagnosed language disorders, learning disability, 
neurological disorders or acquired brain injury. They did not report alcohol or drug 
problems or any significant mental health diagnoses, nor were they taking any psychiatric 
medication. 
 
The 40 participants were split in two groups (low aggression vs moderate aggression), at 
the median point, according to the self-reported BPAQ aggression scores. The 
demographic information for the two groups is displayed in Table 4. One-way ANOVAs 
demonstrated no significant group differences on handedness [F(1,38)=2.05, p=.16, 
ηp2=.05], number of years in education [F(1,38)=2.46, p=.12, ηp2=.06], age [F(1,38)=.1, 
p=.76, ηp2=.01], or the MoCA [F(1,38)=.05, p=.82, ηp2=.01]. The two groups differed 
significantly in their BPAQ scores [F(1,38)=81.01, p<.01, ηp2=.68]. 
 
Table 4. Experiment Two participant demographics 
Demographics & screening tests  Low aggression  
(N=20) 
Moderate aggression  
(N=20) 
Age (mean, SD) 23y 5mo (5y 10mo) 23y 1mo (4y 7mo) 
Gender ratio (male:female) 6:14 7:13 
Years in education (mean, SD) 15.10 (1.21) 15.6 (0.75) 
Handedness score (range -24 – +24) 
(mean, SD) 
20.85 (2.92) 19.35 (3.66) 
MoCA score (Max = 30) (mean, SD) 28.35 (1.46) 28.45 (1.23) 
BPAQ score (Max = 145) (mean, SD) 48.55 (6.85) 73.2 (10.15) 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; BPAQ = Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
 
2.3.3 Screening tests and materials 
The same screening tests were administered and materials used as in Experiment One. 
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2.3.4 Procedure 
A similar procedure to that in Experiment One was used. Participants volunteered to 
participate in the study mostly through a research participation scheme as part of the 
requirements of the University of Leeds psychology undergraduate degree course, and 
these participants received research credits in return for their participation. Additional 
participants were recruited through word of mouth or a research participation emailing 
list, and these participants received a small cash payment for their time. 
 
Since there were two researchers administering the testing session, a script was developed 
to ensure consistency (appendix 14). As in Experiment One, the procedure was verbally 
explained and the participants were given an information sheet (appendix 11) prior to 
obtaining their informed consent (appendix 13) to participate. The screening 
questionnaire was then administered, followed by the handedness questionnaire, the 
MoCA and the BPAQ. Participants then completed the sarcasm experiment as in 
Experiment One. This was administered in the same testing room in the School of 
Psychology, University of Leeds for each participant, using a computer with two external 
speakers placed either side of the 20 inch screen. The computer mouse had stickers 
indicating “yes” and “no” on the left and right keys respectively. Finally, participants 
answered the two sarcasm questions. The whole procedure was completed in one session 
that lasted approximately one hour in total. 
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3. RESULTS 
3.1 Experiment One 
Experiment One compared the performance of individuals with TBI with a matched 
control group to explore comprehension of literal and sarcastic material, and whether this 
has a role in the modulation of aggression. In this section, firstly, the scores from the 
Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA), the aggression questionnaire (BPAQ), and the 
two sarcasm questions are considered. Secondly, the reaction time (RT) and error data 
from the sarcasm experiment is presented, and statistically analysed using parametric 
statistics. Finally, for the TBI group only, the TASIT data is considered and correlational 
analyses are presented in order to explore the relationships between the various clinical 
measures used and results from the sarcasm experiment. 
 
Table 5. Experiment One TBI and control participant MoCA, BPAQ and sarcasm 
scores 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; BPAQ = Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
 
Table 5 presents the results of the MoCA, the BPAQ, and the sarcasm questions for the 
two groups. The above data was analysed with one-way Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs). There were significant differences only in the MoCA scores [F(1,12)=20.03, 
p<.01, ηp2=.63] between the two participant groups. There were no statistically 
significant differences on the BPAQ [F(1,12)=1.09, p=.32, ηp2=.08], the self-rated 
sarcasm identity score [F(1,12)=0.14, p=.71, ηp2=.12], or the self-rated sarcasm 
frequency [F(1,12)=.06, p=.81, ηp2=.01], showing that the TBI group and their matched 
control group did not differ significantly in self-rated aggression scores or subjective 
evaluations of how sarcastic they consider themselves to be. 
 
3.1.1 Sarcasm experiment data preparation 
A set of instructions were developed to assist the data preparation process (appendix 15). 
In order to prepare the sarcasm experiment data for statistical analysis, errors and outliers 
Characteristic TBI (N=7) Control (N=7) 
MoCA (Max=30) (mean, SD) 22.57 (3.51) 28.71 (0.95) 
BPAQ (Max=145) (mean, SD) 70.14 (24.92) 59.14 (12.54) 
Self-rated sarcasm identity score 
(0-10) (mean, SD) 
5.79 (3.16) 6.29 (1.5) 
Self-rated sarcasm frequency (1-7) 
(mean, SD) 
4.86 (1.21) 4.71 (.95) 
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were removed from the data set. Errors were removed first and this was completed in two 
stages. Firstly, if there were any errors in response to factual questions, these were 
removed along with the associated attitude question, regardless of whether the attitude 
question had been answered correctly or incorrectly. This was to allow for more robust 
analysis of the attitude data, since an incorrect response on the factual question suggested 
not grasping the factual information in the story and thus limited the validity of the 
attitude question (see also Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005, for a similar approach). Secondly, 
any errors on attitude questions where there was not an associated error on the factual 
question, as these had been removed in the first step, were removed. Once all errors were 
removed, outliers in the RT data were calculated as per two standard deviations above or 
below each participant’s mean per condition (Context and Question Type), and were 
removed from the data set.  
 
In the TBI participant data set, there were 11.9% errors made on factual questions, errors 
made on attitude questions when there were factual errors comprised 6.67%, and errors 
made on attitude question when the factual question was correct comprised 5.48%. 
Outliers comprised 4.32% of the remaining correct responses. For the control 
participants’ data, errors on factual questions comprised 2.14%, errors made on attitude 
questions when there were factual errors comprised 0.48% and errors made on attitude 
questions when the factual question was correct made up 1.67% of the data. Of the 
correct responses, outliers comprised 4.85%. 
 
The RT data was examined first, followed by the error data. 
 
3.1.2 Reaction time analysis 
3.1.2.1 Descriptive statistics and checks prior to analysis 
Firstly, descriptive statistics were performed in order to obtain a greater understanding of 
the data. These can be seen in Table 6. Secondly, in order to ensure the data was suitable 
for parametric analysis, the parametric assumptions were checked. Outliers were 
considered initially. There were four outliers in the data, as assessed by inspection of a 
boxplot for values greater than 1.5 box-lengths from the edge of the box. Due to the data 
collection method (computer collected RT data) these outliers were considered genuinely 
unusual values, rather than data entry or measurement errors. Due to small sample size it 
was decided to retain these data points rather than remove them, and this will be taken 
into consideration in the interpretation of the results. 
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Next, the distribution of the data was considered. The assumption of normality was 
satisfied as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test; all conditions but one did not reach 
statistical significance at the p<.05 level, whereas one condition did reach statistical 
significance at the p<.05 level, but not at the p<.01 level. Taking a conservative stance, 
this was considered to still meet the assumption of normality given the mixed effects 
ANOVA being relatively robust to violations of normality. In addition, to assess for 
normal distribution, skewness and kurtosis scores were calculated and are displayed in 
Table 6. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores were calculated, which fell within the acceptable 
range (+/- 2.58) on all levels. 
 
Table 6. Experiment One TBI and control participant RT (ms) data descriptive 
statistics 
 
Finally, there was homogeneity of variances, as indicated by Levene's test for equality of 
variances (p>.05). 
 
Level Mean RT (SD) Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
TBI    
     Literal Factual Q1 2119.94 (675.06) .47 (.79) .52 (1.59) 
     Literal Factual Q2 2063.4 (528.87) -.36 (.79) -1.18 (1.59) 
     Literal Attitude Q1 2795.89 (574.07) -.26 (.79) -1.12 (1.59) 
     Literal Attitude Q2 2728.02 (705.41) .77 (.79) .92 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q1 2203.64 (532.5) -.06 (.79) -1.88 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q2 2135.23 (628.5) .92 (.79) 1.72 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q1 3016.16 (703.54) .29 (.79) .94 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q2 3070.83 (709.03) 1.01 (.79) 1.32 (1.59) 
Control    
     Literal Factual Q1 1409.13 (334.32) .46 (.79) -1.67 (1.59) 
     Literal Factual Q2 1302.01 (355.21) .64 (.79) -1.25 (1.59) 
     Literal Attitude Q1 1992.85 (675.55) 1.15 (.79) .79 (1.59) 
     Literal Attitude Q2 1888.03 (533.14) .77 (.79) -1.4 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q1 1602.83 (417.18) .29 (.79) -1.24 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q2 1364.25 (249.26) .25 (.79) -2.17 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q1 2225.65 (894.62) 1.77 (.79) 3.22 (1.59) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q2 2131.22 (593.49) .31 (.79) -2.23 (1.59) 
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3.1.2.2 Statistical analyses 
As the parametric assumptions were met, a mixed effects ANOVA was carried out. The 
RT data was subjected to 2 (Group: TBI or control) x 2 (Context: literal or sarcastic) x 2 
(Question Type: factual or attitude) x 2 (Question Order: first or second) mixed effects 
repeated measures ANOVA, for participants (F1) and items (F2). Group was a between 
effects factor, while Context, Question Type and Question Order were within effects 
repeated measures factors. All significant main effects and interactions were investigated 
further with Newman-Keuls (p<.05) post-hoc tests. Additional Analyses of Covariance 
(ANCOVAs) were carried out to explore the same conditions as above, whilst controlling 
for group differences in cognitive ability, according to the MoCA. 
 
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA revealed significant main effects of Group [F1(1,12)=7.27, 
p<.05, ηp2=.38; F2(1,224)=329.79, p<.01, ηp2=.6], Context [F1(1,12)=24.57, p<.01, 
ηp2=.67; F2(1,224)=20.42, p<.01, ηp2=.08], and Question Type [F1(1,12)=78.86, p<.01, 
ηp2=.87; F2(1,224)=283.65, p<.01, ηp2=.56]. There was no significant main effect of 
Question Order. In addition, a significant Context x Question Type interaction was found 
[F1(1,12)=5.83, p<.05, ηp2=.33; F2(1,224)=4.19, p<.05, ηp2=.02]. This RT data is 
displayed in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Mean reaction time data (with standard error) for TBI and control 
participants 
 
Post-hoc analyses using Newman-Keuls (p<.05) revealed the following differences: for 
the Group main effect TBI participants were significantly slower than control participants 
(p<.05), for the Context main effect RTs were significantly slower in the sarcastic 
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compared to the literal context (p<.01), and for the Question Type main effect RTs were 
significantly slower on attitude compared to factual questions (p<.01). The significant 
Context x Question Type interaction indicated that RTs were faster in the literal factual 
condition compared to literal attitude (p<.01), sarcastic factual (p<.05) and sarcastic 
attitude (p<.01) and were the slowest in the sarcastic attitude condition compared to 
sarcastic factual, literal attitude and literal factual conditions (all p<.01). As there was no 
significant interaction with group this suggested the two groups performed similarly. 
 
 As there was a significant difference between the groups on MoCA scores, a further 
analysis was carried out factoring in these scores as a covariate. A 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 
ANCOVA demonstrated that when group differences in MoCA scores were accounted 
for, the significant main effect of Group was lost [F(1,11)=2.21, p=.17, ηp2=.17]. There 
was, however, still a main effect of Context [F(1,11)=4.84, p=.05, ηp2=.31] and a new 
main effect of Question Order [F(1,11)=10.27, p<.01, ηp2=.48]. Importantly there were 
also significant Context x Group [F(1,11)=4.69, p=.05, ηp2=.3] and Question Order x 
Group [F(1,11)=9.97, p<.01, ηp2=.48] interactions, and the Context x Question Type x 
Group interaction nearly reached statistical significance [F(1,11)=4.49, p=.06, ηp2=.29]. 
 
Post-hoc Newman-Keuls (p<.05) analyses of the main effects seen in the above 
ANCOVA demonstrated, regarding Context, significantly slower RTs in the sarcastic 
than the literal context (p<.01), and with regards to Question Order, a trend for faster RTs 
on the second question (p=.06). The post-hoc analysis of the significant Context x Group 
interaction showed that both TBI (p<.05) and control participants (p<.01) took longer to 
respond to sarcastic contexts than literal contexts. With regards to the significant 
Question Order x Group interaction, post-hoc analysis showed that the control 
participants were significantly faster on the second question compared to the first (p<.05); 
however, this was not the case for TBI participants as there was no significant difference 
in RT between questions that appeared first and those that appeared second (p=.56). 
Considering the trend for the Context x Question Type x Group interaction, a Newman-
Keuls (p<.05) analysis demonstrated that for the control participants, the literal factual 
condition was always the most favourable (yielding faster RTs) in comparison to the 
literal attitude, sarcastic attitude (both p<.01) and the sarcastic factual (p<.05) conditions. 
However, for the TBI participants there was no significant difference on factual question 
RTs between the literal and the sarcastic contexts (p=.2), whilst the RTs on attitude 
questions were significantly faster in the literal context than the sarcastic (p<.01). In both 
the literal and the sarcastic contexts, RTs were faster on factual questions than attitude 
questions for TBI and control participants (all p<.01). 
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 3.1.2.2.1 Additional reaction time analysis 
At the analysis stage it became apparent that an oversight during the development of the 
experiment meant that the lengths of the two questions (factual and attitude) were 
significantly different in word count; attitude questions had significantly more words 
(M=8.77, SD=1.5) than factual questions (M=5.55, SD=1.38) [F(1,118)=149.1, p<.01], 
which could have explained any main effects or interactions of Question Type in the 
previous analyses. In an attempt to establish whether any effects of Question Type seen in 
the above full data analyses were influenced by length of question (and the associated 
additional reading time), or rather by something beyond this (e.g. related to social 
cognition), a sample of the vignettes was taken where the questions did not differ 
significantly in word count. Data from 23 factual questions (12 sarcastic, 11 literal; 
reflecting 38% of all factual questions) (word count M=6.83, SD=.58) and 23 attitude 
questions (11 sarcastic, 12 literal; reflecting 38% of all attitude questions) (word count 
M=7.22, SD=.95), which were not significantly different [F(1,44)=2.85, p=.1], were 
analysed and are presented in Figure 3. 
 
This smaller data set was considered for the same parametric analyses as conducted on 
the full data set. The assumption of normality was satisfied (according to skewness and 
kurtosis scores, and the Shapiro-Wilk test) as was the assumption of homogeneity of 
variance (according to the Leneve’s test). 
 
The same analyses were run as above; a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA and ANCOVA with 
MoCA scores as a covariate. The ANOVA reported results consistent with the main 
analysis reported above; main effects of Group [F(1,12)=8.52, p<.05, ηp2=.42] and 
Question Type [F(1,12)=70.83, p<.01, ηp2=.86], a trend for a main effect of Context 
[F(1,12)=3.3, p=.09, ηp2=.22], and no significant main effect of Question Order. A 
Question Type x Question Order interaction was seen [F(1,12)=16.94, p<.01, ηp2=.59]. 
 
The ANCOVA with MoCA as covariate for this smaller analysis also produced results 
similar to the ANCOVA of the full data set. There was no main effect of Group, as 
before, and there were still significant main effects of Context [F(1,11)=12.55, p<.01, 
ηp2=.53] and Question Order [F(1,11)=6.86, p<.05, ηp2=.38], and significant interactions 
of Context x Group [F(1,11)=6.54, p<.05, ηp2=.37], and Question Order x Group 
[F(1,11)=9.66, p<.01, ηp2=.47]. Furthermore, there were significant interactions of 
Context x Question Type x Question Order [F(1,11)=8.12, p<.05, ηp2=.43] and Context x 
Question Type x Question Order x Group [F(1,11)=5.03, p<.05, ηp2=.31]. 
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Overall, the findings for this subset of the full data, in which factual and attitude 
questions were controlled for length, confirmed the findings of the full analysis, showing 
that attitude questions indeed take longer to process and respond to than factual questions, 
suggesting different cognitive processes are involved in processing and responding to 
factual and attitude questions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean reaction time data (with standard error) for TBI and control 
participants, on a smaller subset of questions statistically similar in length 
 
3.1.3 Error analysis 
3.1.3.1 Descriptive statistics and checks prior to analysis 
The error data was explored and considered for statistical analysis. Error rates are 
presented in Figure 4. The attitude question errors reflect a combination of errors made 
both when there were and were not factual errors as well. To help understand the pattern 
of errors made by each participant in each group, overall numbers and percentages of 
errors made are displayed in Table 7. In Table 7 the error rates have been collapsed 
across the within-subjects factor ‘Question Order’ as there were very few errors, and on 
initial visual inspection of the data there was little difference evident across this factor. 
On visual inspection of this data it is clear that error rates were very low for the control 
group, suggesting they performed at or just below ceiling level. 
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Figure 4. Percentage of factual and total attitude errors (with standard error), for 
TBI and control participants 
 
 
Table 7. Experiment One total number (and percentage) of literal and sarcastic 
errors for each TBI and control participant 
 
Literal Sarcastic 
 TBI 
participant Factual Attitude Factual Attitude 
Total 
errors 
    P01 2 (6.67%) 3 (10%) 0 0 5 
    P02 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 3 (10%) 1 (3.33%) 6 
    P03 4 (13.33%) 7 (23.33%) 3 (10%) 7 (23.33%) 21 
    P04 10 (33.33%) 12 (40%) 0 0 22 
    P05 4 (13.33%) 1 (3.33%) 4 (13.33%) 4 (13.33%) 13 
    P06 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 2 (6.67%) 0 6 
    P07 10 (33.33%) 7 (23.33%) 5 (16.67%) 6 (20%) 28 
Control 
participant 
         C01 0 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 2 (6.67%) 4 
    C02 1  (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 0 2 
    C03 0 0 1 (3.33%) 0 1 
    C04 0 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 3 
    C05 0 0 1 (3.33%) 0 1 
    C06 0 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 0 2 
    C07 2 (6.67%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 1 (3.33%) 5 
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The error data was considered for parametric analysis, as conducted on the RT data. On 
initial exploration of the data, when separated by the three within-subjects factors, there 
were seven outliers and the data from both groups did not satisfy assumptions of 
normality. When the ‘Question Order’ factor was collapsed and data were explored 
according to the two remaining within-subjects factors, there were still two outliers on 
inspection of box-plots and whilst the TBI group was normally distributed, the control 
group was not. Log transformation of the control data was unsuccessful due to so few 
errors in this group. Collapsing again across ‘Question Type’ meant both groups’ data 
met assumptions of normality. T-test analysis (with unequal variances assumed) 
demonstrated that the TBI group made significantly more errors in the literal context than 
the control group did [t(6.24)=2.88, p<.05], whereas the difference between the groups on 
the number of sarcastic errors did not reach statistical significance [t(6.53)=1.98, p=.09]. 
Looking at number of errors overall (collapsed also across Context), t-test analysis (with 
unequal variances assumed) confirmed that the TBI group made significantly more errors 
(M=14.43, SD=9.29) than the control group (M=2.57, SD=1.51) [t(6.62)=3.33, p<.05]. 
 
Further t-tests for the TBI group demonstrated that there were no significant differences 
between the number of errors made between literal and sarcastic contexts, and no 
significant differences between the factual and the attitude questions. It is likely that the 
statistical power of any analysis is limited by the small sample size. In addition, on visual 
inspection of the TBI group error data (Table 7), there is clear variability in performance. 
There appears to be an overall pattern towards participants making more literal errors 
than sarcastic; this being the case for five TBI participants with only two showing the 
opposite pattern. Interestingly, one participant (P04) seemed to perform markedly 
different as they made 22 literal errors and no sarcastic errors at all. However, these 
patterns could not be further supported by statistical analysis. 
 
3.1.4 TBI group clinical data and correlations  
3.1.4.1 TASIT scores 
In order to gain more insight into the performance of the TBI group on additional 
measures of social inference, and particularly sarcasm comprehension, the TASIT scores 
were compared with the mean scores of the healthy sample used in the development of 
the TASIT (taken from Table 2 and Table 4 of the test manual; McDonald et al., 2002). In 
the current study, six members of the TBI group received form A of the TASIT and one 
participant received form B (due to past unsuccessful attempts at administering form A 
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rendering it invalid), thus six form A means and one form B mean were used from the 
McDonald et al. healthy comparison group. On the EET, the TBI group scored 
significantly worse (M=18.86, SD=4.81) than the healthy comparison group (M=24.76, 
SD=.27) [F(1,12)=10.5, p<.01, ηp2=.47], suggesting the TBI group experience difficulty 
with emotional evaluation compared to a healthy comparison group. Similarly, the TBI 
group performed significantly worse on the SI-M (M=47, SD=3.92) than the healthy 
comparison group (M=53.93, SD=.46) [F(1,12)=21.65, p<.01, ηp2=.64], suggesting they 
also experience difficulty making social inferences in the context of sarcastic exchanges. 
Thus, the above data suggests that significant difficulty is experienced by TBI 
participants on emotion evaluation and drawing social inferences, in comparison to a 
healthy (albeit non-matched) comparison group. These findings mirror the significant 
group differences in errors found in the sarcasm experiment above. 
 
In an effort to further explore the nuances of the TASIT performance, and get a sense of 
the individual performances of the TBI participants, the scores from the SI-M subtest of 
the TASIT, broken down by the type of exchange, are displayed in Table 8.  
 
Table 8. Experiment One TASIT SI-M scores for each TBI participant, comparing 
sincere exchanges with simple sarcastic exchanges and paradoxical sarcastic 
exchanges 
Participant number 
Sincere 
(Max=20) 
Simple sarcasm 
(Max=20) 
Paradoxical 
sarcasm (Max=20) 
P01 13 18 16 
P02 20 12 14 
P03 17 14 14 
P04 6 17 17 
P05 11 18 20 
P06 17 17 16 
P07 14 20 18 
Mean (SD) 14 (4.62) 16.57 (2.7) 16.43 (2.15) 
 
As can be seen in Table 8, the means for simple and paradoxical sarcasm are very similar, 
suggesting similar performance across these two forms of sarcasm. Whereas, the mean 
for the sincere exchanges is lower than the means for both of the sarcastic exchanges, a 
pattern similar to that found in the error analysis of the current sarcasm experiment (as 
more literal errors were made than sarcastic). However, despite these visible numerical 
differences, no statistically significant differences were seen between the scores on the 
67 
 
sincere exchanges and either the simple sarcasm [t(6)=-1.04, p=.34] or the paradoxical 
sarcasm [t(6)=-1.03, p=.34]. 
 
The performance of the TBI group in the current study was also compared to the 
performance of the TBI group and the healthy, matched, non-TBI comparison group used 
in the development of the TASIT (taken from Table 8 of the test manual, McDonald et 
al., 2002), on form A only (as only these were available). Interestingly, on sincere 
exchanges, the TBI group from the current study performed significantly worse (M=14, 
SD=4.62) than the McDonald et al. TBI group (M=18.25, SD=1.86) [F(1,12)=5.93, 
p<.05, ηp2=.33], whereas they did not perform significantly differently to the non-TBI 
group (M=16.08, SD=3.48) [F(1,12)=1.42, p=.26, ηp2=.11], (n.b. the McDonald et al. 
non-TBI group actually performed slightly worse than their TBI group on the sincere 
exchanges). Therefore, the difficulties seen on literal items by the current TBI group on 
the on-line sarcasm experiment, are also apparent via difficulties on the sincere (literal) 
items of the TASIT. The fact that these difficulties were not observed for the TBI 
participants tested by McDonald et al. suggests this may be a difficulty unique to the TBI 
group of our study, and could possibly relate to the degree of severity of injury and 
impairment with which they presented. 
 
With regards to the sarcastic exchanges, looking at a combination of both the simple and 
paradoxical sarcasm, the opposite pattern is revealed; the TBI group in the current study 
performed statistically similarly (M=33, SD=4.58) to the McDonald et al. TBI group 
(M=30.75, SD=9.07) [F(1,12)=1.68, p=.22, ηp2=.12], and significantly worse than the 
McDonald et al. non-TBI group (M=38.58, SD=2.81) [F(1,12)=10.38, p<.01, ηp2=.45]. 
This suggests sarcasm comprehension, as judged by the TASIT SI-M, is similar across 
these two TBI groups, both being impaired in comparison to healthy control participants. 
 
3.1.4.2 Correlation analyses 
In order to further explore any relationships between the performance of the TBI group 
on the sarcasm experiment and other clinical factors, and to specifically consider the third 
research question exploring links between sarcasm comprehension and aggression, 
correlation analyses were carried out. As described above, the TBI error data was 
normally distributed when collapsed across Question Order, and explored across the two 
factors Context and Question Type. There were, however, still outliers in this data set 
which, due to small sample size, were not removed. Therefore, given the small sample 
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size and presence of outliers, findings are to be interpreted with caution. Figure 5 and 
Figure 6 plot the number of errors made in each condition of the sarcasm experiment 
against the TASIT SI-M and EET scores, respectively. 
 
 
  
Figure 5. Relationship between number of errors on the sarcasm experiment and 
performance on the TASIT Social Inference – Minimal (SI-M) subtest, for TBI 
participants 
 
As displayed in the left hand scattergram in Figure 5,  moderate-strong, positive, non-
statistically significant relationships were found between TASIT SI-M score and the 
number of sarcastic attitude errors [r(5)=.32, p=.47], and TASIT SI-M score and the 
number of sarcastic factual errors [r(5)=.67, p=.1]. On the other hand, as displayed in the 
right hand scattergram of Figure 5, negative, non-significant relationships were seen 
between SI-M score and the number of literal factual errors [r(5)=-.17, p=.72] and 
between SI-M score and the number of literal attitude errors [r(5)=-.58, p=.17], with the 
former reflecting a weak relationship and the latter reflecting a strong relationship. Whilst 
the latter correlation does not reach statistical relationship, the strong correlation 
coefficient suggests that 33.64% of the variance is shared between TASIT SI-M score and 
number of literal attitude errors. 
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Figure 6. Relationship between number of errors on the sarcasm experiment and 
performance on the TASIT Emotion Evaluation Test (EET), for TBI participants 
 
 
With regards to the TASIT EET (data displayed in Figure 6), as performance improved 
(i.e. higher score) the number of errors in the literal attitude condition decreased 
statistically significantly [r(5)=-.77, p< .05], and the r value suggests this is a strong 
relationship, where there is 59.29% shared variance. Similarly, a negative correlation was 
seen between EET score and number of literal factual errors [r(5)=-.48, p=.28], and 
whilst this reflects a moderate relationship it was not statistically significant. In addition, 
a moderate, non-significant, negative relationship was found between EET and sarcastic 
attitude errors [r(5)=-.41, p=.36], and a weak, non-significant, negative relationship was 
seen between EET and sarcastic factual errors [r(5)=.1, p=.83].  These findings may 
suggest that there is a link between the identification of emotion and the interpretation of 
literal information, in particular from another person’s perspective (as implied from the 
attitude questions). 
 
In Figure 7, below, the number of errors in each condition was plotted against the 
observed aggression scores (OAS-MNR). These correlations reveal that as observed 
aggressive behaviour increases, sarcastic errors decrease on both factual [r(5)=-.7, p=.08] 
and attitude questions [r(5)=-.27, p=.55], though both non-significantly. In contrast, as 
observed aggressive behaviour increases, literal errors increase; a moderate positive, but 
non-significant correlation is seen with literal factual question errors [r(5)=.48, p=.28], 
and a strong, statistically significant positive correlation is observed between OAS-MNR 
and literal attitude question errors [r(5)=.81, p<.05]. Whilst this is a small sample, with 
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the potential influence of extreme data points skewing the strength of the relationships, 
the patterns may suggest that aggressive behaviour relates to the ability to interpret literal 
information from others’ perspectives. 
 
 
  
 
Figure 7. Relationship between number of errors on the sarcasm experiment and 
observed aggression as per the OAS-MNR, for TBI participants 
 
Further correlational analyses were conducted to explore additional factors potentially 
related to observed levels of aggression. Whilst a moderate negative correlation was 
found between OAS-MNR scores and self-rated aggression (via the BPAQ), this was not 
statistically significant [r(5)=-.36, p=.42] and most likely skewed by presence of outliers, 
as apparent from inspection of the scattergram (see Figure 8). Similarly, moderate, yet 
non-significant, negative correlations were found between OAS-MNR scores and the 
WAIS-IV index scores Verbal Comprehension Index (VCI) [r(5)=-.40, p=.37] and Full 
Scale IQ (FSIQ) [r(5)=-.31, p=.5], and again scattergrams (see Figure 9) suggested these 
relationships may be influenced by extreme data points. Whilst these relationships must 
be interpreted with caution, outliers were not removed due to small sample size and 
anticipated variability in performance due to heterogeneity expected within any TBI 
sample. 
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Figure 8. Relationship between self-rated aggression as per the BPAQ, and observed 
aggression as per the OAS-MNR, for TBI participants 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Relationship between WAIS-IV Verbal Comprehension Index and Full 
Scale IQ, and observed aggression as per the OAS-MNR, for TBI participants 
 
 
Finally, OAS-MNR scores were plotted against TASIT SI-M and EET scores. As 
demonstrated in Figure 10, negative correlations were produced between the TASIT 
scores and OAS-MNR scores; as TASIT SI-M and EET scores worsen, observed 
aggressive behaviour increases. Both correlations demonstrated strong relationships, and 
whilst the negative correlation with the TASIT EET is not statistically significant [r(5)= -
.58, p= .18], the negative correlation with the TASIT SI-M subtest is statistically 
significant [r(5)= .91, p< .01], suggesting a link between aggressive behaviour and 
making social inferences. 
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Figure 10. Relationship between TASIT Social Inference-Minimal (SI-M) subtest 
and Emotion Evaluation Test (EET) scores, and observed aggression as per the 
OAS-MNR, for TBI participants 
 
3.1.5 Experiment One summary 
In summary, the RT analysis showed that TBI participants performed slower than control 
participants, but this difference was predicted by the difference in overall cognitive 
ability (according to the MoCA). When difference in cognitive ability was statistically 
controlled for, overall RTs were significantly slower when responding to questions in the 
sarcastic context compared to the literal. Whilst the control and TBI groups both 
performed faster on attitude questions in the literal context compared to sarcastic, only 
the control group showed a similar benefit of context on factual questions (performing 
significantly faster in the literal context); the TBI group RTs did not significantly differ 
on factual questions between the two contexts. In terms of the order in which the 
questions were presented, control participants showed a benefit for questions appearing 
second, demonstrated by significantly faster RTs, whereas TBI participants did not show 
such priming effects as their RTs across the first and second question did not statistically 
differ.  
 
The error analysis revealed that TBI participants made more errors overall than control 
participants. Whilst the TBI group did not make statistically more sarcastic errors than the 
control group, they did make statistically more literal errors. Though the within group 
analysis of the TBI group data found no statistical difference in the number of errors 
between the sarcastic and literal contexts, the high number of literal errors made by TBI 
participants was unexpected. Interestingly, this finding was in line with the errors made 
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on the sincere (literal) exchanges in the TASIT SI-M, indicating that literal language 
comprehension may be compromised in TBI.  Near-ceiling performance of the control 
group limited further statistical analysis of errors on the task. 
 
With regards to the TBI group, observed aggressive behaviour, as per the OAS-MNR, 
was significantly positively correlated with number of literal attitude question errors, 
suggesting more aggressive behaviour is related to difficulty interpreting literal 
information from another person’s perspective. This was the only statistically significant 
relationship between performance on the sarcasm test and aggressive behaviour (self-
rated or observed), most likely due to small sample size. However, scores on the TASIT 
SI-M did significantly negatively correlate with OAS-MNR, suggesting aggressive 
behaviour and poor social inference skills are related. In addition, the number of literal 
attitude errors on the sarcasm task significantly negatively correlated with TASIT EET 
score, suggesting a relationship between interpreting literal information from another 
person’s perspective and the ability to identify others’ emotional states. 
 
 
 
3.2 Experiment Two 
Experiment Two was designed to address the fourth research question investigating 
differences in sarcasm comprehension between healthy participants who rate themselves 
as low aggressive and moderately aggressive. Firstly, the MoCA, BPAQ and sarcasm 
question scores are considered. Then, the sarcasm experiment RT and error data are 
displayed and statistically analysed. 
 
The 40 healthy, young adults who participated were ranked by their BPAQ score and split 
into two groups at the median point, creating a low aggression and a moderate aggression 
group, each with 20 participants. The term ‘moderate’ was used as, on the whole, this 
group’s mean (73.2; see Table 9) was not particularly high, being similar to the average 
scores obtained from a healthy sample in the development of the measure (men = 77.8, 
women = 68.2; Buss & Perry, 1992). However, the moderate aggression group did 
include some higher scoring individuals, as reflected by the standard deviation (10.15, see 
Table 9). 
 
Table 9 presents the results from the screening tests, and sarcasm questions, for the low 
and moderate aggression groups. In addition, in order to take any gender differences into 
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consideration, the scores on the BPAQ and sarcasm questions are outlined for males and 
females. 
 
Table 9. Experiment Two low and moderate aggression groups’ MoCA, BPAQ and 
sarcasm scores, mean (SD) 
MoCA = Montreal Cognitive Assessment; BPAQ = Buss Perry Aggression Questionnaire 
 
The data above was analysed with one-way ANOVAs comparing the scores between the 
two groups. The ANOVA confirmed that there was no significant difference between the 
groups on the MoCA [F(1,38)=.05, p=.82, ηp2=.01]. The ANOVA also confirmed that 
the median split by BPAQ score created two distinct groups as the BPAQ scores differed 
significantly between the groups [F(1,38)=81.01, p<.01, ηp2=.68]. There were no 
significant differences on the BPAQ between males and females in the low aggression 
group [F(1,38)=.81, p=.38, ηp2=.04) and the moderate aggression group [F(1,38)=.09, 
p=.77, ηp2=.01]. Even when all male participants were compared to all female 
participants (collapsing across the low and moderate aggression groups) their BPAQ 
scores did not differ significantly (males: M=63.31, SD=13.63; females: 59.71, 
SD=15.91; [F(1,38)=.49, p=.49, ηp2=.01]). Thus, given the absence of any significant 
differences between male and female participants, and the smaller number of male 
participants compared to female participants, the low and moderate aggression groups 
were not further divided by gender. 
 
There was no significant difference between the groups on the sarcasm frequency score 
[F(1,38)=2.45, p=.13, ηp2=.02]. The sarcasm identity scores approached significance 
Characteristic Low aggression  
(N=20; Female=14, Male=6) 
Moderate aggression  
(N=20; Female=13, Male=7) 
MoCA (Max=30) 28.35 (1.46) 28.45 (1.23) 
BPAQ (Max=145) 48.55 (6.85) 73.2 (10.15) 
     Female  50.67 (4.27)  72.69 (11.52) 
     Male 47.64 (7.65)  74.14 (7.71) 
Self-rated sarcasm 
identity score (0-10) 
5.65 (2.41) 6.9 (1.8) 
     Female 5.5 (1.29) 7.15 (1.86) 
     Male 6 (2.28) 6.43 (1.72) 
Self-rated sarcasm 
frequency score (1-7) 
5.2 (1.15) 5.5 (1.05) 
     Female 5.14 (2.53) 5.62 (1.04) 
     Male  5.33 (0.82) 5.29 (1.11) 
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[F(1,38)=3.45, p=.07, ηp2=.08], with higher scores in the moderate aggression group, 
suggesting that the more people rated themselves as aggressive, the more they identified 
as being sarcastic. The BPAQ scores across both groups were correlated with the sarcasm 
identity and frequency scores. Whilst sarcasm frequency rating and BPAQ score did not 
show a statistically significant relationship, BPAQ scores correlated positively and 
significantly with sarcasm identity ratings [r(38)=.34, p<.05], suggesting that aggression 
and sarcasm are related. This significant relationship is displayed in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11. Relationship between BPAQ and sarcasm identity score, both groups 
combined 
 
3.2.1 Sarcasm experiment data preparation 
The data collected by the University of Leeds psychology undergraduate student was 
prepared for statistical analysis by this same individual. The step by step instructions 
developed by the lead researcher, with guidance from the lead supervisor (appendix 15), 
were used to ensure accuracy and consistency in the process. The data preparation 
process involved errors and outliers being removed in the same manner as described in 
Experiment One. 
 
In terms of errors, for the low aggression group, errors made on factual questions 
comprised 2.92%, errors made on attitude questions when there were factual errors 
comprised 0.58%, and errors made on attitude question when the factual question was 
correct comprised 1.75%. Outliers comprised 4.84% of the remaining correct responses. 
For the moderate aggression group, errors made on factual questions comprised 1.75%, 
errors made on attitude questions when there were factual errors comprised 0.5%, and 
errors made on attitude question when the factual question was correct comprised 1.08%. 
Outliers comprised 4.28% of the remaining correct responses. 
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3.2.2 Reaction time analysis 
3.2.2.1 Descriptive statistics and checks prior to analysis 
The following steps were carried out by the lead researcher of the current study, not by 
the undergraduate student who assisted data collection. 
 
In order to ensure the data was suitable for parametric analysis, the parametric 
assumptions were checked. Box-plots were examined for outliers, and none were found. 
Next, the distribution of the data was considered. The assumption of normality was first 
assessed by the Shapiro-Wilk test. Within the low aggression group, all but one condition 
satisfied this assumption (p>.05), and one condition was significant (p<.01). Within the 
moderate aggression group, four conditions satisfied the assumption and four were 
significant at the p<.05 level, but not the p<.01 level. Since not all the findings of this test 
fully satisfied the assumption of normality, skewness and kurtosis scores were examined 
also. These values are displayed in Table 10. Skewness and kurtosis Z scores were 
calculated, which fell within the acceptable range (+/- 2.58) on all levels, thus suggesting 
normality of distributions. 
 
Table 10. Experiment Two low and moderate aggression groups RT (ms) data 
descriptive statistics 
Group 
     Condition (Within- 
     subjects factor) 
Mean RT (SD) Skewness (SE) Kurtosis (SE) 
Low aggression    
     Literal Factual Q1 1402.12 (395.02) .53 (.51) -.93 (.99) 
     Literal Factual Q2 1375.65 (385.95) .22 (.51) -.9 (.99) 
     Literal Attitude Q1 1786.70 (383.22) .41 (.51) -1.18 (.99) 
     Literal Attitude Q2 1608.74 (419.78) .68 (.51) -.55 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q1 1528.62 (387.24) .27 (.51) -1.24 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q2 1396.82 (286.92) .17 (.51) -1.01 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q1 1774.54 (413.02) .49 (.51) -.89 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q2 1623.74 (405.75) .9 (.51) -.4 (.99) 
Moderate aggression    
     Literal Factual Q1 1456.88 (391.25) .57 (.51) -.86 (.99) 
     Literal Factual Q2 1406.33 (347.68) .71 (.51) .08 (.99) 
     Literal Attitude Q1 1905.47 (678.26) .8 (.51) -.71 (.99) 
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To assess the homogeneity of variance assumption, Levene’s test was considered. Three 
within-subjects factors violated this assumption, suggesting there were unequal variances 
between the two groups on the ‘literal attitude question one’ (p<.01), ‘sarcastic attitude 
question one’ (p<.05), and ‘sarcastic attitude question two’ (p<.01) factors. 
 
As the assumption of homogeneity of variance was violated, and the outcomes of the 
assumption of normality tests were inconsistent, the data were transformed. Because of 
the positive skew of the data, a Log 10 transformation was carried out. After 
transformation, the parametric assumptions were checked again. Firstly, there remained 
no outliers. Secondly, normality was still satisfied as per the skewness and kurtosis scores 
(as before the transformation) and all but one condition satisfied the Shapiro-Wilk test at 
the p<.05 level, and one condition at the p<.01 level, thus confirming the transformation 
had been successful at reducing the abnormality of the distribution. With regards to the 
homogeneity of variance assumption, Levene’s test results on this transformed data 
showed that whilst three within-subjects factors remained significant at the p<.05 level, 
they were no longer significant at the p<.01 level. Thus, the transformation had 
successfully reduced the heterogeneity of variances between the groups. Parametric 
analysis of the transformed RT data was then conducted. 
 
3.2.2.2 Statistical analysis 
The raw (non-transformed) RT data is presented in Figure 12. The transformed RT data 
was subjected to a 2 (Group: low aggression or moderate aggression) x 2 (Context: literal 
or sarcastic) x 2 (Question Type: factual or attitude) x 2 (Question Order: first or second) 
mixed effects ANOVA for participants (F1) and items (F2). All significant main effects 
and interactions were investigated further with Newman-Keuls post-hoc tests (p<.05).  
  
     Literal Attitude Q2 1771.80 (529.43) .91 (.51) -.26 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q1 1622.94 (387.68) .3 (.51) -1.47 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Factual Q2 1440.93 (341.96) .4 (.51) -.63 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q1 1916.11 (726.81) .69 (.51) -.85 (.99) 
     Sarcastic Attitude Q2 1797.32 (693.54) .59 (.51) -.88 (.99) 
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Figure 12. Mean reaction time data (with standard error) for the low and moderate 
aggression groups 
 
The ANOVA for the transformed RT data revealed no main effect of group or group 
interactions. Main effects of Context [F1(1,38)=7.17, p<.05, ηp2=.16; F2(1,224)=2.44, 
p=.12, ηp2=.01], Question Type [F1(1,38)=51.56, p<.01, ηp2=.58; F2(1,224)=122.9, 
p<.01, ηp2=.35], and Question Order [F1(1,38)=32.59, p<.01, ηp2=.46; F2(1,224)=18.27, 
p<.01, ηp2=.08], were observed, along with a two-way significant interaction of Context x 
Question Type [F1(1,38)=22.31, p<.01, ηp2=.37; F2(1,224)=2.17, p=.15, ηp2=.01],  and a 
significant three-way interaction of Context x Question Type x Question Order 
[F1(1,38)=5.11, p<.05, ηp2=.12; F2(1,224)=1.38, p=.24, ηp2=.01]. 
 
Newman-Keuls (p<.05) post-hoc analyses demonstrated the following in relation to the 
main effects and interactions. With regards to Context, RTs were faster in the literal than 
the sarcastic condition (p<.01). Looking at Question Type, RTs were faster for factual 
than attitude questions (p<.01). Finally, considering Question Order, RTs were faster for 
questions coming second than those coming first (p<.01). In terms of the Context x 
Question Type interaction, RTs were faster on factual questions in the literal context 
(p<.01), and there was no difference in RTs on attitude questions between the two 
contexts. In terms of the three-way interaction of Context x Question Type x Question 
Order, on factual questions in the literal context there was no significant difference in 
RTs between the questions ordered first or second. On attitude questions in the literal 
context, factual questions in the sarcastic context and attitude questions in the sarcastic 
context, RTs were significantly faster for the questions ordered second (all p<.01). 
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3.2.2.2.1 Additional reaction time analysis 
As was the case for Experiment One, additional analyses were conducted on a subset of 
the vignettes for which the word count of factual and attitude questions were statistically 
similar, in an attempt to control for any effects of question length and therefore reading 
time. As in Experiment One, the data from the sample of 23 attitude and 23 factual 
questions were looked at. 
 
This smaller data set was considered for parametric analysis. As in the larger analysis, 
outliers were present (three data values greater than 1.5 box-lengths from the edge of the 
box) and the data set violated both the normality assumption (both according to skewness 
and kurtosis scores, and the Shapiro-Wilk test), and also the homogeneity of variance 
assumption (according to the Levene’s test). Consequently, the data were Log 
transformed in line with the procedure in the full data set analysis. Once the data was Log 
transformed outliers were no longer present and the assumption of normality was fully 
satisfied (according to skewness and kurtosis scores, and the Shapiro-Wilk test). With 
regards to the homogeneity of variance, the Levene’s test results suggested the data 
transformation was successful in reducing the heterogeneity of the variance, with all but 
one within-subject factors being non-significant at the p<.05 level, and one factor 
significant at the p<.05 level but not the p<.01 level. This transformed data was therefore 
considered suitable for parametric analysis. The raw (non-transformed) data is presented 
in Figure 13. 
 
The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA yielded no main effect of Group (as was 
found in the main analysis) but main effects of Context [F(1,38)=21.16, p<.01, ηp2=.36], 
Question Type [F(1,38)=91.08, p<.01, ηp2=.71], and Question Order [F(1,38)=38.88, 
p<.01, ηp2=.51]. In addition, a significant interaction of Context x Question Type 
[F(1,38)=33.63, p<.01, ηp2=.47] was seen as well as a Question Type x Question Order 
interaction [F(1,38)=4.63, p<.05, ηp2=.11]. Finally, a significant three way interaction of 
Context x Question Type x Question Order was produced [F(1,38)=24.24, p<.01, 
ηp2=.39]. 
 
Overall, then, the findings in this subset of the data largely mirrored the findings of the 
analyses of the full data, confirming further the differences observed between the factual 
and attitude questions in the full analyses. 
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Figure 13. Mean reaction time data (with standard error) for low and moderate 
aggression groups, on a smaller subset of questions statistically similar in length 
 
3.2.3 Error analysis 
The error rates across Context, Question Type and Question Order for both the low and 
moderate aggression groups are displayed in Figure 14. As can be seen, error rates overall 
were very low, in line with the low error rates seen for the control group of Experiment 
One. The error data was considered for suitability for parametric analysis; on initial 
inspection outliers were present and data was non-normally distributed. The data was 
collapsed across the Question Order factor and still did not meet parametric assumptions. 
Due to many zero data points (where no errors were made), the data were not suitable for 
transformation. As a result of the violation of parametric assumptions, non-parametric 
Mann-Whitney U tests and Wilcoxon signed-rank tests were conducted to look for 
differences between the groups and on the within-subjects factors, respectively. 
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Figure 14. Percentage of factual and total attitude errors (with standard error), for 
low and moderate aggression groups 
 
The Mann-Whitney U test found no significant differences in the number of errors made 
overall (collapsed across Context, Question Type and Question Order) between the low 
and moderate aggression groups [U=161.5, p=.29]. There were also no significant 
differences between the groups on total number of literal errors made [U=151.5, p=.16], 
total sarcastic errors made [U=186.5, p=.7], total factual question errors [U=163.5, p=.3] 
or total attitude question errors [U=166.5, p=.33]. Within the low aggression group, the 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test found no significant differences between the number of errors 
made in the sarcastic context and the literal context [Z=-.44, p=.66], or between the 
factual questions and the attitude questions [Z=-1.25, p=.21]. Within the moderate 
aggression group, again there were no significant differences in errors made between the 
two contexts [Z=-1.41, p=.16] or between the two question types [Z=-.36, p=.72]. 
 
 
3.2.4 Experiment Two summary 
Overall, then, the RT analysis revealed that across both low and moderate aggression 
groups, RTs were faster in the literal context, on factual questions and on questions being 
presented second in order. There were no statistically significant differences in error rates 
between the contexts or question types. Finally, no between group differences were 
observed on the RT analysis or error analysis.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
The present study set out to explore the dimensions of language processing that may have 
a role in the modulation of impulsive aggression (Miller et al., 2008). Although verbal 
ability has been linked to aggression both in clinical (Alderman, 2007; James & Young, 
2013) and non-clinical groups (Stanford et al., 1997), no research to date had considered 
the specific role of sarcasm, or even non-literal language more generally, on aggression 
recognition and modulation. This study has focused specifically on the role of sarcasm 
because of the importance sarcasm plays in the communication and modulation of 
emotion, particularly anger (Gibbs et al., 2002). This was investigated in two separate 
experimental phases by comparing performance on a test of sarcasm comprehension 
between 1) individuals with TBI (and who, as a group, typically exhibit difficulties with 
processing of non-literal language and who often display impulsive aggression) with 
healthy, matched control participants, and 2) healthy, young adults who score in the low 
range on a self-rated aggression measure with healthy, young adults who score in the 
moderate range. The main findings of each experiment will be discussed in turn, in the 
context of existing research findings, followed by a more general discussion combining 
the two sets of findings, along with a consideration of study limitations, implications and 
future directions. 
 
 
4.1 Experiment One 
Experiment One found slower reaction times (RTs) on sarcastic compared to literal 
vignettes, and on attitude (accessing the speaker’s implied meaning) rather than factual 
questions (accessing information about the facts of the story). These findings supported 
the hypotheses that, across both groups, literal contexts would be facilitated (producing 
faster RTs) compared to sarcastic contexts, and factual questions would be facilitated 
(producing faster RTs) compared to attitude questions. These findings will be discussed 
in more detail, alongside the findings from Experiment Two, in the general discussion 
section below. 
 
With regards to the performance between the two groups, and in an attempt to address the 
first and second research questions regarding the role of TBI on language comprehension, 
and specifically sarcasm comprehension, significant differences were observed. TBI 
participants performed significantly worse than controls on the on-line sarcasm 
experiment; they were slower and made more errors, as hypothesised. When group 
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differences in the MoCA, a brief measure of general cognitive functioning, were 
controlled for through analysis of covariance in the RT analysis, significant interactions 
with group remained. In particular, only healthy control participants benefited from 
seeing a question second, while TBI participants did not show any facilitation for 
questions presented second, possibly indicating lack of priming or difficulties realising 
that the two questions were linked. Furthermore, while control participants showed clear 
facilitation for factual questions in literal contexts, TBI participants did not show any 
differences for factual questions presented in literal or sarcastic contexts, indicating that 
they may not fully use contextual information to their advantage. With regards to errors, 
TBI participants displayed significantly more errors overall than the control participants, 
as hypothesised. Interestingly, however, the TBI group did not make more errors in 
sarcastic contexts compared to the literal contexts; rather they appeared to make more 
errors in literal than sarcastic contexts, though this difference was not substantiated by 
within-group statistical analysis. The TBI group did, however make significantly more 
literal errors than the control group. This finding will be discussed in more detail below. 
Finally, no group differences were seen in errors across the two question types; TBI 
participants did not show worse performance than control participants on attitude 
questions compared to factual, as hypothesized. Thus, in terms of the comprehension of 
sarcastic material, the findings of the present study suggest that when overall differences 
in cognitive function were controlled for, there were some similarities between the TBI 
and control participant groups, as well as some striking differences. 
 
Looking at the similarities in performance first, both the TBI and the control group took 
longer to process sarcasm compared to literal information, and made a statistically similar 
number of errors in sarcastic contexts. These findings were contrary to the expected 
result, based on existing research which demonstrated that individuals with TBI 
experience difficulties comprehending sarcasm compared to control participants (e.g. 
Giora et al., 2000; McDonald et al., 2003; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). It is possible that 
the sarcastic material in the present study was more clearly sarcastic, and thus easier to 
identify as sarcasm indeed. After all, there were clear prosodic and contextual cues aiding 
comprehension. Additionally, though the current study used a paradigm based on 
Shamay-Tsoory et al. (2005), the current paradigm used both visual display of the stimuli 
(i.e. in writing) as well as auditory presentation; Shamay-Tsoory only used auditory 
presentation. Thus, the additional aids in the present study could have assisted with the 
identification of the sarcasm. Alternatively, these findings may suggest that 
comprehension of sarcasm was not impaired for the participants in the current sample. 
After all, the sample size was small and location of injury was not considered in the 
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inclusion criteria. With regards to injury location, past research has associated sarcasm 
comprehension difficulties with frontal lobe and right hemisphere injury (Giora et al., 
2000; Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2005). Although some of the participants in the TBI group 
had frontal lobe injuries and right hemisphere injuries only, there were also bilateral and 
specific left hemisphere injuries, thus creating a relatively heterogeneous group in terms 
of injury profile. 
 
This being said, however, looking at the performance of the TBI group on The Awareness 
of Social Inference Test (TASIT; McDonald et al., 2002), the participants do clearly show 
difficulties. Although the TASIT was not administered to the control participants in this 
study, the means of the control participants presented in the TASIT manual (McDonald et 
al., 2002) have been used as comparison means. When an analysis was run on these 
figures, the TBI group performed significantly worse than the TASIT healthy control 
participants on both the Emotion Evaluation Test (EET) and the Social Inference-
Minimal (SI-M) subtest, a test exploring the perception of social exchanges, many of 
which incorporate sarcasm. Therefore, it may be that the sarcasm tested in the current 
study (direct negative sarcasm), with multiple cues provided (prosodic and contextual), 
did not challenge the current TBI participants to the same extent that the sarcasm in the 
TASIT SI-M did. Performance on the SI-M involves multiple complex cognitive 
processes including recognition of emotion, interpretation of paralinguistic cues, 
comprehension of spoken language and knowledge of social customs (McDonald et al., 
2003). In addition, there are two forms of sarcasm tested in the SI-M; simple and 
paradoxical sarcasm. Simple sarcasm relies on paralinguistic cues alone (e.g. tone of 
voice, prosody, body language, facial expression) to indicate sarcasm, without which the 
spoken remark could be interpreted and make sense literally. In contrast, in the 
paradoxical sarcasm there were no paralinguistic cues to indicate sarcasm, only a 
mismatch between context and content of the speech, thus only on detection of this 
incongruence would sarcasm be inferred and the sentence make sense. The sarcasm 
experiment developed for this study could be considered a combination of both simple 
and paradoxical sarcasm, i.e. paralinguistic cues (sarcastic prosody) and contextual mis-
match (comment incongruent with context) were both present. Therefore, the fact that the 
experimental paradigm developed in the present study did not elicit sarcasm 
comprehension difficulties in the TBI group, when the results of the TASIT did, may 
suggest that a combination of cues supports the identification of sarcasm. In addition, the 
results showed that the TBI group performed similarly on the simple and paradoxical 
sarcasm items of the TASIT SI-M, suggesting that neither paralinguistic cues nor context-
comment incongruity alone are differentially more important than the other. Whilst some 
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studies have suggested that prosody alone may be sufficient to accurately infer sarcasm 
(e.g. Voyer et al., 2008), the current findings do not support this. In fact, they support 
studies which favour the mutually supportive roles of prosody and context (Bryant & Fox 
Tree, 2002; Woodland & Voyer, 2011) in the identification and interpretation of sarcasm. 
 
However, the finding from the sarcasm experiment that TBI participants made 
significantly more errors in the literal context compared to the control participants, does 
raise further questions about interpretation of social exchanges, and of prosodic cues 
more specifically. Considering the nature of the literal remarks, they were all positively 
framed and spoken sincerely, for example “nice parking!”, “looks great, perfect fit!” and 
“you could play professionally in goal!”, and they were congruent with the preceding 
context. The analysis did not indicate a significant difference between the literal errors 
made on factual and attitude questions, suggesting that difficulty was experienced 
similarly when interpreting the facts of a literal situation and the intentions of the speaker. 
It could be that the literal/sincere social exchanges created more ambiguity for the TBI 
participants, in contrast to the clearly sarcastic exchanges, leading to misinterpretation of 
information. 
 
It is considered noteworthy at this point to comment on the validity of the experimental 
stimuli. During the development of the experimental materials, the audio recordings of 
the literal vignettes were rated as not at all sarcastic and were found to be significantly 
different from the sarcastic vignettes, suggesting that they did indeed reflect literal 
statements. Also, since this pattern of errors was only observed in the TBI group and not 
the control group, this does suggest a specific difficulty unique to the TBI group, rather 
than being a product of misleading stimuli. Furthermore, difficulty inferring literal 
meanings was also observed for the TBI group on the TASIT SI-M sincere exchanges. 
The mean score for the TBI group on the sincere (literal) items was actually lower than 
the sarcastic items, mirroring the findings of the sarcasm experiment. Interestingly, the 
current study’s TBI group performed significantly worse on the sincere items than the 
McDonald et al. (2002) TBI group (data taken from the TASIT manual). Again this 
points to a specific difficulty in comprehending and judging sincere/literal conversational 
exchanges, unique to the current TBI group. 
 
Having looked closely at the performance of each participant in the TBI group, it was 
apparent that the majority of participants (5 of 7) made more literal errors than sarcastic 
errors (collapsing across attitude and factual questions). Whilst for two participants this 
difference was not striking, three participants had five or more additional literal errors 
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than sarcastic errors, one of whom, in particular, performed very differently to the rest of 
the group, making 22 literal errors and no sarcastic errors. Although it is possible that this 
one participant’s data skewed the sample such that this effect appeared much larger, since 
error rates were relatively low on this task, the fact remains that the majority of the TBI 
group made more literal compared to sarcastic errors, revealing possible problems with 
the interpretation of prosodic and contextual cues. 
 
Although there was no formal way of exploring the nature of the errors made, anecdotally 
it was apparent to the investigator that for some of the individuals a lot of the literal 
material was being incorrectly interpreted as sarcastic, as judged by their verbal reactions 
and responses when completing the task. Considering this finding, in addition to the 
explanations purported above regarding a difficulty utilising prosodic cues and grasping 
speaker intentions, it is also possible that there was a problem of perseveration, i.e. 
inappropriate repetition of behaviour. Alternatively, or additionally, there may have been 
an element of priming and expectancy, i.e. once sarcasm was identified it was expected 
thereafter and continued to be incorrectly identified. Perseveration is a difficulty often 
seen after TBI, particularly after injuries to the frontal lobes and is considered an 
impairment of executive function (Lezak et al., 2004). It is worth noting that the 
individual who made markedly more literal errors did sustain a frontal lobe injury. It is 
possible that perseveration contributed to the overall higher number of literal errors for 
this individual, and perhaps the others who made more literal errors. Interestingly, 
perseveration has been considered a contributing factor to violent assaults and even 
murder (Hall, 1993). Considering the performance of the individual who made 22 literal 
errors, it is noticeable that their observed aggression score is the highest compared to the 
other TBI participants (OAS-MNR weighted aggression score of 109 over an 8 week 
period), and their self-reported aggression score the lowest (BPAQ score of 37). 
 
Although the findings are limited by small sample size, and no firm conclusions can be 
made in relation to the findings of one individual, this is still an interesting and novel 
discovery. Single case analysis could be conducted to further investigate this individual’s 
performance and further explore the research question considering the link between 
language comprehension and aggression. In addition, with regards to this particular 
individual, and others with similar difficulties, it could be useful in future research to 
explore in more detail the antecedents to aggressive displays, from the perspective of 
these subtle but significant communication impairments and poor insight around 
aggressive behaviour. 
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Returning to the group findings, most of the sarcastic material seems to have been 
interpreted correctly (i.e. non-literally) by the TBI participants, based on the result of 
relatively few sarcastic errors which were not significantly different in number to the 
control participants. This finding was not dissimilar to the findings of Channon et al. 
(2005) who found that brain injured participants did not often make incorrect literal 
interpretations of sarcastic material. Interestingly, Channon et al. reported that many 
errors made on sarcastic material were due to incorrect non-literal interpretations being 
made. In line with the current study findings, Channon et al. also found that their brain 
injured participants performed marginally worse than their control group on processing of 
sincere remarks, which they interpreted as a reflection of a subtle pragmatic difficulty. 
They note that sincere remarks are still open to interpretation, and misinterpretation may 
have been made more likely by the interspersion of sincere and sarcastic (i.e. non-sincere) 
items; the current study also interspersed sarcastic with literal (sincere) items, possibly 
contributing to the misinterpretation. This has clinical implications given the common 
interspersion of literal and non-literal language in day to day conversational exchanges. 
 
An additional finding of this experiment was that the position of the question (appearing 
first or second) made a significant difference in RTs for control but not TBI participants; 
when MoCA scores were statistically controlled for, control participants responded faster 
on questions presented second than first. This suggests that they benefitted from priming 
effects; the first question prepared them for the second question, so they responded faster. 
The TBI participants, however, did not show this benefit in terms of RT. This difference 
between the TBI and control participants could be due to reduced capacity for new 
learning in the TBI group and working memory impairments; reduced working memory 
capacity limits the ability to hold on to information in the short term and use it to 
influence subsequent cognitive processes and behavioural responses. This comparative 
deficiency may impact people with TBI in social situations, limiting their capacity to 
effectively follow and hold on to spoken information and respond appropriately, thus 
potentially causing subtle difficulties in social communication.  
 
Finally, and to directly consider the third research question regarding language, and in 
particular sarcasm, comprehension and aggression in people with TBI, it was 
hypothesised that aggression scores would relate to performance on the sarcasm task, i.e. 
higher aggression was expected to correlate with worse task performance. Some findings 
were in support of this hypothesis since the number of literal attitude errors made on the 
sarcasm experiment significantly positively correlated with observed aggressive 
behaviour, as per the OAS-MNR; the more errors made, the more aggressive behaviour 
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was observed. In addition, significant negative correlations were found between TASIT 
SI-M scores and OAS-MNR scores, showing that the lower the TASIT SI-M score 
(indicating poorer performance) the more aggressive behaviour was observed. Whilst 
these correlations must be interpreted cautiously given the small sample size and 
heterogeneity of the TBI group, they do highlight a relationship between language 
comprehension, and social cognition more generally (including mentalising and reading 
of paralinguistic cues), and aggressive behaviour. Although directional causality cannot 
be concluded since these are correlation analyses, it could be inferred that poor social 
cognition skills and impaired language comprehension contribute to increased aggressive 
behaviour, and thus could have a role in modulating aggressive behaviour. This furthers 
Miller et al.’s (2008) model proposing a role for language and executive function in the 
modulation of aggressive behaviour, indicating an important role for social cognition. It 
cannot be inferred, however, that it is purely the sarcastic language comprehension that 
links to aggressive behaviour, as the sarcasm experiment found most errors were made 
comprehending literal remarks, and the TASIT showed that difficulty was experienced on 
both literal and sarcastic material. Therefore, whilst we cannot conclude that sarcasm 
comprehension difficulties relate to aggression, more general language comprehension 
does appear to play a role. 
 
Furthermore, the significant negative correlation between number of literal attitude errors 
on the sarcasm experiment and TASIT EET scores suggests a role for emotion 
recognition in correctly inferring mental states of others, since better emotion evaluation 
skills link with fewer literal attitude errors. This finding is in line with existing theory of 
mind studies. For example, Bodden et al. (2013) identified distinct and overlapping 
neural correlates for cognitive theory of mind (inferring others’ mental states), and 
affective theory of mind (recognising others’ emotions). In addition, though the above 
correlation relates to literal language comprehension, Phillips et al. (2015) found 
relationships between emotion perception and sarcasm comprehension difficulties, 
suggesting a role for emotional identification in both literal and non-literal language 
compression when there is mentalising involved. 
 
Looking again at the current evidence for links between general language impairments 
and aggressive behaviour, Alderman and colleagues have reported predictive 
relationships between language function and aggressive behaviour (Alderman et al., 
2002). Interestingly, patients with TBI whose communication function was considered 
severely impaired accounted for over 80% of recorded physical assaults on others 
(Alderman, 2007). In addition, James and Young (2013) found that poor verbal function 
89 
 
increased chances of observed aggressive behaviour. In the current study, although 
measures of general verbal ability (WAIS-IV Verbal Comprehension Index) showed a 
moderate correlation with observed aggressive behaviour, this was not statistically 
significant and it was based on a small sample size which was likely impacted by extreme 
outlier values. 
 
In addition, poor awareness and insight into deficits is common after brain injury 
(Manchester & Wood, 2001; Stuss et al., 1991) and Alderman (2003) has suggested that 
limited insight may contribute to aggressive behaviour. In the current study, there was a 
moderate, negative relationship between observed aggressive behaviour and self-rated 
aggression in the TBI group, perhaps being suggestive of limited insight. However, this 
correlation did not reach statistical significance and again must be interpreted cautiously 
as the correlation was based on a small group of heterogeneous individuals. Nevertheless, 
the question of insight into post-TBI difficulties is important to consider in future 
research given the significance this may have on social integration; if insight into one’s 
behavioural difficulties is so severely limited, especially when the difficulties relate to 
aggression which is a highly socially unacceptable behaviour, it is likely that this will 
have a significant impact on social relationships and communication. Furthermore, 
insight is an important point to consider when using self-report methodology with people 
with TBI, as this may limit the validity of the data obtained, a point further discussed by 
Alderman, Bentley and Dawson (1999). 
 
 A final point to consider is the importance of neurobehavioural profile more generally, 
and global personality traits, in relation to aggressive behaviour after brain injury 
(Alderman, 2003; Miller, 1994). For example, Greve et al. (2001) found that impulsive 
personality traits featured significantly more in TBI patients who were aggressive than 
non-aggressive, and Wood and Liossi (2006) identified more disinhibition and 
impulsivity in aggressive than non-aggressive ABI patients. It is possible that these 
factors play a key role in contributing to aggressive behaviour, in combination with the 
explanations discussed above. Miller et al.’s (2008) model accommodates such processes 
via the role of executive function. Pulling these ideas together, it could be that 
communication difficulties (i.e. misinterpreting cues and intentions of others) trigger 
misunderstandings and feelings of frustration, which, as a result of impaired executive 
control (e.g. impulsivity and disinhibition), manifest as overt aggression. 
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4.1.1 Limitations and future research 
As has been stated throughout the above discussion, Experiment One was limited by the 
small sample size and heterogeneity of the sample. Unfortunately, due to the necessary 
yet stringent exclusion criteria many potential participants were excluded, which, 
alongside time limitations, meant only seven individuals were recruited to the TBI group. 
Thus, the study recruited half the number of participants considered necessary in 
preliminary power analyses. Having only seven individuals in each group limited the 
statistical power, i.e. the ability to identify any effects, and the generalisability of findings 
due to being a potentially unrepresentative group. 
 
In terms of gender and severity of injury, the TBI group was a relatively homogenous 
sample. The group reflects males with severe TBI, and this is important since gender 
plays a key role in aggression levels (Archer, 2004) and severity of injury has been 
related to aggressive behaviour after TBI (Miller et al., 1999). This does mean, however, 
that the results cannot be easily generalised to females with TBI and to people who have 
experienced less severe TBIs. However, although there were strict exclusion criteria, the 
TBI group still reflected a heterogeneous group, as seen in the variability in performance 
across the sarcasm task, and on the other measures (e.g. OAS-MNR, TASIT). This is, 
though, not unusual in TBI samples because of individual differences in functional 
neuroanatomy and patterns of healing after brain injury (seemingly similar injuries will 
often produce very different cognitive and behavioural profiles). Therefore, large 
variance was anticipated in the TBI group. 
 
In addition, given the small sample size, the data was at risk of including outliers and 
being skewed, further limiting the generalisability of findings. Multiple steps were taken 
pre-analysis to limit the impact of this. Firstly, in the data preparation stage, within-group 
outliers were removed from each participant’s data set. Secondly, the between-groups 
data was scrutinised in advance of the parametric analyses, and all necessary 
transformations were adopted in order to minimise the influence of outliers and skewing 
on the analysis of the data. In the correlational analyses, however, caution has been 
advised in interpreting the findings due to limited sample size and potential influence of 
extreme data points. It is possible that the performance of one or two TBI participants in 
particular (P04 and P07) skewed the data set, and this has been pointed out in the results 
section. Given the small sample size, and expectation of variability within the TBI group, 
it was not considered appropriate to remove the extreme data points. However, this may 
have led to relationships appearing stronger and more significant due to the effects of 
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skewing. Looking further at the data of one individual in particular who made 22 literal 
errors and no sarcastic errors (P04), and perhaps also participant P07 who also made 
many more literal than sarcastic errors, might help to illuminate the heterogeneity within 
the TBI group and allow greater consideration of the impact of the variability on the 
overall results. Whilst it was not considered viable at this stage due to limited and 
variable data, looking at these individual cases in future, perhaps in a case series format, 
may help to shed further light on the study findings. 
 
A further limitation pertains to the pre-morbid abilities of the TBI group. Although we 
have some insight into pre-morbid cognitive function via the Test of Pre-morbid Function 
(TOPF; Wechsler, 2011), which indicated mean pre-morbid scores on all WAIS-IV 
indices to be within the normal range (FSIQ M=91.57, SD=7.48), other areas of pre-
morbid function were not explored due to limited scope of the study. An interesting and 
potentially relevant factor, touched upon above, is the influence of pre-morbid aggression 
and personality traits, particularly impulsivity. Since this was not considered in the 
present study, it is difficult to disentangle the various influences on post-TBI aggression 
in the current study. There is, however, mixed evidence surrounding how much pre-
morbid aggression plays a role in aggression post-TBI, with some evidence suggesting a 
central role (Greve et al., 2001) and other evidence not (Miller et al., 1999). Perhaps 
future research could offer some clarification. 
 
Finally, with regards to the suitability of the control group, whilst efforts were taken to 
match this group according to gender, age and educational attainment, as per standard 
practice in this area of research, there are still factors limiting the validity of this control 
group as a ‘matched’ group. For example, the effects of having experienced a significant 
traumatic event were not taken into consideration when recruiting control participants. 
This is significant since the emotional distress associated with, for example, being in 
hospital for a significant amount of time, or being permanently disabled in some way, 
may have a significant or subtle impact on an individual’s capacity to integrate and 
communicate socially, and may subtly or even obviously impact performance on a task 
such as that used in the current experiment. It would be advisable in future research to 
consider recruiting a more suitably matched control group who have been through similar 
traumatic experiences, but who have not sustained brain injury, for example significant 
orthopaedic trauma. 
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4.1.2 Summary of Experiment One 
Overall, then, Experiment One revealed significant similarities as well as differences 
between the TBI and control participants. In particular, on the sarcasm experiment, 
although TBI patients did not show decreased performance on sarcastic contexts, they did 
show impairments when processing literal items in comparison to the control group. 
Performance on the TASIT for the TBI group was suggestive of difficulties in emotion 
recognition and broader features of social cognition, importantly including perception and 
comprehension of sarcasm. For the TBI group, the TASIT SI-M subtest also showed 
impairment on sincere items as well as sarcastic items, suggesting that they also 
experience difficulties interpreting literal information from the perspective of another 
person, indicating theory of mind impairments. The results suggest that sarcasm 
comprehension is facilitated for the TBI participants by identification of sarcastic prosody 
and contextual cues, even though there may be an impairment of theory of mind. In 
addition, there is evidence to suggest relationships between such theory of mind abilities 
and observed aggressive behaviour. 
 
 
4.2 Experiment Two 
Experiment Two was conducted to explore further whether non-literal language 
processing, and in particular sarcasm, plays a role in the modulation of impulsive 
aggression in young healthy adults who were divided into two groups, low and moderate 
aggression, according to their self-rated BPAQ scores. 
 
The results of this experiment indicated that context, question type and question order all 
led to significant effects. Increased facilitation, reflecting greater ease of processing, was 
observed when the story context was literal rather than sarcastic, and when the question 
was factual rather than attitude, in line with the hypotheses that literal contexts and 
factual questions would facilitate processing. These findings are consistent with findings 
from Experiment One, and will be discussed in the general discussion section. 
 
In addition, although there was no associated hypothesis, questions which appeared 
second in order were answered significantly faster than those which appeared first. This 
finding mirrored the performance of the control participants in Experiment One and is 
thought to reflect a priming effect; the first question sets up the second question, allowing 
it to be answered faster, regardless of whether it is a factual or an attitude question. 
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Considering the performance between the two groups, no statistically significant 
differences were observed between the low aggression and moderate aggression groups 
on RTs or error rates. Interestingly, the pattern of the RT data (as seen in Figure 12) 
shows slightly longer RTs in the moderate aggression group compared to the low 
aggression group, however this difference did not present on statistical analysis. With 
regards to errors, overall very few errors were made by participants in Experiment Two, 
with most participants performing at or near ceiling, making it difficult to identify any 
effects of context, question type or question order on error rates, if indeed there were any. 
 
Whilst existing research in non-clinical adult groups has demonstrated an association 
between poor verbal skills and aggressive behaviour in healthy populations (Barratt et al., 
1997; Stanford et al., 1997), no such association can be inferred from the performance on 
the current task as group differences were not large enough to reach statistical 
significance. Barratt et al., (1997) used the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS; 
Wechsler, 1955) prorated verbal IQ score to reflect verbal skills, and Stanford et al. 
(1997) used the Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT; Lezak, 1995). These 
previous studies therefore considered verbal skills quite generally, whereas, Experiment 
Two aimed to shed more light on the specific nature of the poor verbal skills in sarcasm 
comprehension. Whilst the current study did not identify a significant effect, this does not 
rule out a potential difficulty with figurative language comprehension, and more 
specifically sarcasm comprehension, in more aggressive individuals. It is possible that a 
population with higher aggression scores might be necessary to capture such differences 
in sarcasm comprehension. Furthermore, it is possible that the task developed and 
completed by this healthy young adult sample may not have been sensitive enough to 
detect subtle differences in performance between the groups; after all, the task was 
developed with a clinical population in mind and thus had to be pitched appropriately. 
 
Interestingly, across the two groups, self-rated BPAQ scores significantly positively 
correlated with self-rated sarcasm identity score; the more aggressive characteristics 
people reported, the more sarcastic they identified as. In line with this pattern, the 
moderate aggression group rated themselves as more sarcastic than the low aggression 
group, and this finding approached statistical significance. Interestingly, however, despite 
the relationship between the level of identification as a sarcastic person and self-rated 
aggression, sarcasm comprehension as assessed by the current task was not different 
between the low and moderate aggression groups. 
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4.2.1 Limitations and future research 
Due to the recruitment process mainly targeting university students, the resultant sample 
cannot be considered broadly representative of young healthy adults as there is a lack of 
diversity with regards to educational attainment and therefore associated socioeconomic 
status. In addition, there was not an even gender split in the sample. There was, however, 
a fair distribution of males between the two groups with six males in the low aggression 
group and seven in the moderate group. 
 
With regards to gender differences in aggression, past research indicates that males are 
more directly aggressive than females (Archer, 2004), and mean BPAQ scores in past 
research have indicated higher scores for men than women (77.8 and 68.2 respectively; 
Buss & Perry, 1992). However, although there were not equal numbers of males and 
females in the current experiment, the mean BPAQ scores did not differ significantly 
between males and females within each group, and on the whole with groups collapsed 
(63.31 and 59.71 respectively). Gender differences were not considered in the analysis of 
the sarcasm experiment data; this was not deemed necessary since BPAQ scores did not 
differ significantly between males and females and, due to the relatively small number of 
participants, splitting the data into additional groups by gender would have further limited 
the statistical power of the study. However, it would be interesting to consider gender 
differences in any future studies of sarcasm comprehension, especially since gender has 
been reported to play a role in the perception of sarcasm, in that men are considered more 
sarcastic than women (Katz et al., 2004). 
 
Moreover, although there was a statistically significant difference between the BPAQ 
scores of the two groups, this experiment was limited by relatively low to average 
aggression scores reported on the whole; as can be seen by the scores outlined in the 
above paragraph, the BPAQ scores in this study were lower than those reported by Buss 
and Perry (1992) in the development of the measure. This was, however, not surprising 
given the sample targeted. In an attempt to further explore the research question in a 
healthy adult population, it would be important to recruit participants who self-report 
much higher aggression scores, thus allowing a greater variation between low and high 
aggressive groups, which may result in more notable differences on the experimental task 
between the groups. 
  
Although all healthy participants completed the MoCA and scored within the normal 
range, they were not screened with any further measures of executive control. Future 
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research, in particular, should consider the role of executive function in contributing to 
aggressive behaviour. Executive weaknesses have been related to aggressive behaviour in 
healthy adults in past research and it has been suggested that aggression impulses may be 
sensitive to subclinical deficits of executive function (for a review see Hawkins & Trobst, 
2000). It would be interesting for future research to explore the differential and combined 
effects of non-literal language difficulties and executive dysfunction, in particular in 
relation to impulse control, on overt aggressive behaviour. 
 
4.2.2 Summary of Experiment Two 
Experiment Two was unable to provide further evidence in support of the relationship 
between aggressive behaviour and comprehension of sarcasm as no significant 
differences were seen between the low and moderately aggressive healthy individuals. 
Similarities in performance on the task across both groups will be discussed in the 
following section.  
 
 
4.3 General discussion 
The present findings shed light on the appreciation of sarcasm, and social cognition more 
generally, after TBI, and the role that language plays in modulating aggressive behaviour, 
which was the unique focus of this research. The significant relationships between 
observed aggression and literal attitude errors on the sarcasm experiment and with TASIT 
EET and SI-M scores for the TBI participants in Experiment One provide evidence for a 
role of language comprehension and theory of mind in modulating aggressive behaviour. 
These findings support and further the hypothesis put forward by Miller et al. (2008) that 
language is important in modulating impulsive aggression. In particular, Miller and 
colleagues proposed that linguistic processing is important for the regulation of aspects of 
executive functioning that help to inhibit aggressive impulses, including reflective 
functioning, cognitive restraint, emotional control and adaptation and deductive 
reasoning. They suggested that activation of language processing brain regions helps to 
dampen down limbic responses, via the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the orbital 
prefrontal cortex (OFC), which might otherwise result in emotionally driven impulsive 
behaviour (Miller et al., 2008).  
 
Past research associated language processing brain regions with the inhibition of 
aggressive behaviour (Dougherty et al.,1999; Pietrini et al., 2000) and hypoactivation of 
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ACC and OFC regions have been seen in people displaying impulsive aggression (Best, 
Williams & Coccaro, 2002). Therefore, the results of the current set of studies could be 
explained by subtle abnormalities due to the trauma in the brain regions proposed to be 
significant in these pieces of research. 
 
Furthermore, the findings from this study have highlighted a role for social cognition, 
particularly mentalising, in the modulation of aggressive behaviour. Previous studies 
highlighted links between aggression and social skills. For example, Kaukiainen et al. 
(1999) found that indirect aggression was associated with higher levels of social 
intelligence and social abilities, as well as low levels of empathy. It would be useful in 
future to study more specifically the different subcategories of aggression, and see how 
this links to language function and use of sarcasm, for example by using the Indirect 
Aggression Scale (Forrest, Eatough & Shevlin, 2005) which measures indirect aggression 
in addition to the direct aggression measures used in the current study. 
 
With regards to the main effects and interactions of question type seen across both 
experiments, attitude questions took significantly longer to be answered than factual 
questions, even when question length was controlled for. This indicates that the added 
complexity of having to consider someone else’s perspective, in comparison to simply 
reflecting on factual information, requires additional cognitive processes. This is in line 
with the multiple complex mechanisms thought to be involved in such mentalising tasks, 
including recognising that others have different perspectives to our own, recognising that 
beliefs do not necessarily correspond to reality, and recognising that beliefs not reality 
determines behaviour (Gallagher & Frith, 2003). 
 
4.3.1 Evidence for theories of non-literal language processing 
In an attempt to use this study’s findings to enter the debate around how non-literal 
language is processed in the healthy brain, evidence from the two experiments discussed 
above will be considered together here. Experiment Two demonstrated that context 
(sarcastic or literal) plays a significant role in the processing and response times for 
healthy young adults. In addition, this same main effect was seen for the healthy control 
group in Experiment One (as well as the TBI group, though this is less relevant for a 
consideration of processing in the healthy brain). Since the sarcastic material in this 
experiment was considered to be appropriately cued, i.e. with a spoken comment 
incongruent to the preceding context, and sarcastic intonation, this finding supports 
theories that argue for an additional stage of processing for non-literal material. For 
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example early models of non-literal language processing, such as the standard pragmatic 
model (Grice, 1975; Searle; 1979), suggested that non-literal information is processed 
literally first before being processed non-literally. This model would predict slower RTs 
for sarcastic compared to literal material, given the additional stage of processing 
required. This was the pattern observed across Experiments One and Two in the present 
study. 
 
The results, therefore, did not support the direct access model, proposed by Gibbs (1982; 
1983; 1984), which suggested that, assuming there is appropriate context, a non-literal 
interpretation can be accessed at a similar rate to the literal. As previously stated, 
appropriate cueing was provided in the sarcastic vignettes in the current experiment; 
nevertheless sarcastic vignettes were processed significantly slower than literal ones. 
 
The present findings are also consistent with the Graded Salience Hypothesis (GSH; 
Giora, 1997). This theory purports that literal and figurative language is processed and 
understood in terms of the salience of the meaning. For a word or phrase to be considered 
salient it must be stored in the mental lexicon, and salience is influenced by familiarity, 
frequency and conventionality (Giora, 1999). According to Giora et al. (2000), 
conventional metaphors and familiar proverbs, for example, would be considered salient, 
whereas “conversational implicatures constructed on the fly” (pp.64) would be 
considered as non-salient. Based on the GSH, the salient meaning is always interpreted 
first, regardless of whether it is literal or non-literal, or within an appropriate context or 
not. According to Haiman (1998) some sarcastic remarks are so well-used and familiar 
that regardless of an appropriate context they would be interpreted sarcastically; due to 
their familiarity and position in the mental lexicon they would be considered salient. 
However, the sarcastic comments in the present study were simply conversational 
remarks, not specific to sarcasm, that in isolation would not be considered sarcastic (e.g. 
“you’re playing really well today”, “you look beautiful” or “you’re a big help”). 
Therefore, despite the context that sets them up as sarcastic, and the auditory cues 
implying sarcasm (see Rockwell, 2000), the GSH would consider the remarks as non-
salient. Therefore, the present findings are consistent with the GSH; the non-salient 
sarcastic stimuli took significantly longer to be processed than the literal stimuli. 
 
Therefore, the current study findings support both the standard pragmatic model and the 
GSH. Further sarcasm studies that incorporate salient sarcasm would be helpful to shed 
more light on these two hypotheses. Salient sarcasm might include key words or remarks 
which automatically signal sarcasm regardless of their sentence context or prosody, for 
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example the remark ‘nice try’, or the use of commonly used adjectives that represent 
extreme descriptions (e.g. ‘hilarious’, ‘ecstatic’, ‘fascinating’, ‘hideous’), though these 
would vary cross-culturally and depend on familiarity within a cultural context. If salient 
sarcasm was incorporated, the GSH would predict equal processing times for sarcastic 
and literal material, while the standard pragmatic model would still predict processing 
facilitation for literal material only. 
  
Regarding the theories about the role of the two cerebral hemispheres in processing non-
literal language, it was not possible to directly explore them due to the small patient 
sample and heterogeneity of injury profile. Nevertheless, it is important to note that both 
the coarse semantic coding hypothesis (Beeman et al., 1994; Beeman, 1998) and the 
suppression deficit hypothesis (Tompkins & Lehman, 1998), implicate the RH in non-
literal language processing, but for different theoretical reasons. The coarse semantic 
coding hypothesis suggests that the RH activates wide semantic fields which are 
necessary for interpretation of non-literal language, as opposed to the LH being involved 
in narrow semantic field activation. On the other hand, the suppression deficit hypothesis 
contends that the integral role of the RH in non-literal language comprehension relates to 
its suppression of alternate and irrelevant interpretations. Although neither of these 
theories can be supported directly from the findings of the current study, it is worth 
noting that the majority of the TBI group did have some RH damage (6 of 7 patients) 
allowing some insight about how this might have affected performance. In accordance 
with past research, we concur that the importance placed on the RH in the comprehension 
of figurative language, is relevant for understanding the role of language in modulating 
impulsive aggression (see also Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Seger et al., 2000; Tompkins et 
al., 1997). In particular, past research related RH homologues of LH language regions to 
cognitive constraint of aggression (Pietrini et al., 2000), and Miller et al. (2008) argued 
for a role of RH language processing regions, in connection with frontal lobe areas 
associated with executive function in the modulation of aggressive behaviour. 
 
As mentioned above, although the majority of the TBI sample in the present study did 
have some RH damage (6 of the 7 patients), future studies with larger sample sizes, 
which are able to separate groups by LH or RH injury, could help to contribute to the 
understanding of hemispheric processing of non-literal language and could provide 
evidence to support or challenge the coarse semantic coding hypothesis and the 
suppression deficit hypothesis. Support found for either of these hypotheses could be 
extremely helpful; a clearer idea of whether there is a suppression deficit impairment or 
an impairment of broad activation would help to better understand difficulties in language 
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processing and the role it plays in the modulation of aggression and possibly help to tailor 
more appropriate interventions after brain injury. 
 
4.3.2 Implications of findings 
The findings of the current study which link impairments of social cognition and 
aggression after TBI, and in particular sarcasm comprehension and aggression, raise the 
potential to introduce new techniques in rehabilitation in order to support the assessment 
and management of aggressive behaviour after TBI, which could have wide implications 
for patients, family and loved ones, and services. 
 
The ability to communicate is considered fundamental to psychological wellbeing 
(Prigatano et al., 1985) and the literature clearly indicates that communication difficulties 
after TBI are related to poor social integration and reduced quality of life (Galski et al., 
1998). Furthermore, cognitive and behavioural difficulties are considered the most 
problematic and burdensome consequences of severe TBI according to patients, carers 
and families (Oddy et al.,1985; Ponsford et al., 2003). Given the current findings, there is 
a case for conducting more standardised assessment of social cognition and non-literal 
language comprehension for individuals after TBI, since this might have a role in 
behavioural control. Social cognition is particularly important given the findings of 
Spikman et al. (2012) who recently demonstrated that social cognition tests access a 
unique aspect of cognition, not accounted for by other cognitive assessments. More 
detailed assessment information such as this would contribute to a more comprehensive 
clinical formulation for the client, which in turn would lead to more appropriate and 
targeted interventions. In addition, social skills awareness and training could be 
incorporated into rehabilitation plans for individuals post-TBI. Furthermore, a greater 
awareness of these links may be important for awareness of likely triggers for aggressive 
behaviour; for example if specific language difficulties, such as impaired or incorrect 
identification of sarcasm, were identified as triggers for an individual’s aggression, 
aggressive incidents could be anticipated in future and plans employed to limit these as 
much as possible. 
 
As well as being able to tailor rehabilitation interventions appropriately for the benefit of 
the patient, it is pertinent to communicate any findings of social cognition or literal and 
non-literal language difficulties with the family and support networks around the 
individual with the TBI, and make them aware of the potential links to aggressive 
behaviour. This could help to increase the family’s/carers’ understanding of the specific 
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difficulties and needs of their loved ones, with a view to them being able to better 
communicate with and support them. Increased knowledge and awareness for the people 
around the brain injured individual is particularly important since family support is 
known to be extremely influential in improving quality of life for people with TBI 
(Webb, Wrigley, Yoels & Fine, 1995). After all, the starting point for any rehabilitation 
programme has been said to be with the patient and their family (Wilson, Winegardner & 
Ashworth, 2014). Additionally, and importantly, when considering the well-being of the 
families and carers of people with TBI, emotional and behavioural disturbances are 
highly likely to influence family wellbeing (Koskinen, 1998). Thus, the current research 
has significant clinical implications that could help improve the quality of life of TBI 
individuals and their families and/or carers.  
 
4.3.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research 
Potential limitations and recommended adaptations of the design of the experimental task 
which span both Experiment One and Two will be discussed. This will be followed by a 
broader discussion of potential opportunities for development in this area of research. 
 
4.3.3.1 The methodology, materials and paradigm 
Firstly, with regards to the experimental stimuli, although the materials attempted to 
achieve a balance between gender, relationships and social and occupational roles, these 
factors were not considered in the analysis. Katz et al. (2004) discussed the importance of 
social and cultural context on perception of sarcasm, and report that men produce more 
sarcasm and are considered more sarcastic than women. Thus, it is possible that greater 
difficulty is observed decoding the sarcastic comments of women than men. Although 
gender was controlled in the creation of the stimuli in the present study, it would be 
useful to consider gender effects in future investigations in this area. In addition, in 
relation to irony more generally, Pexman and Olineck (2002b) found that occupational 
stereotypes influenced detection of ironic intent. Therefore, exploration of the perception 
of sarcasm in vignettes with characters of different implied social and occupational 
contexts could be an interesting development. 
 
Secondly, something which was not rigorously controlled in this experiment was use of 
direct versus indirect sarcasm. Since comprehension of direct and indirect sarcasm did 
not appear to differ for people with head injury in Channon et al.’s (2005) study, the 
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current study incorporated both types, using mostly direct sarcasm. It would be useful in 
future, however, to further explore Channon et al.’s (2005) finding through further 
research, especially since indirect sarcasm has been associated with additional cognitive 
demands (Bucciarelli et al., 2003). 
 
This study did, however, control for positive versus negative sarcasm as all the sarcastic 
experimental stimuli featured negative sarcasm, i.e. saying something positive to 
communicate something negative. This was selected as it is the more common form of 
sarcasm (Gibbs, 2000). However, it might be useful in future to also explore and test 
positive sarcasm, since positive sarcasm uses negative remarks which if misinterpreted, 
(i.e., the non-literal meaning was not identified and the literal negative meaning inferred) 
they could be perceived as highly critical and offensive. 
 
Regarding the specific experimental paradigm used in the current study, the yes-no 
response methodology was utilised, as opposed to more complex methodologies such as 
those seen in the TASIT (McDonald et al., 2002) and paradigms developed for off-line 
research (e.g. Channon et al., 2005), as this more easily enabled assessment of on-line 
processing through RT data (as well as accuracy scores). In addition, this approach was 
chosen in order to minimise cognitive load, given that individuals with severe brain 
injuries and cognitive impairments would participate in the studies. However, there have 
been criticisms in the past towards experiments for which a simple yes or no response is 
required. For example, Channon et al. (2005) argue that these responses do not capture 
the subtle differences involved in the processing of the sarcastic comments. For example, 
as was the case in the current study, it was not clear what kind of error was made, i.e. was 
the sarcastic comment interpreted literally, or non-literally but incorrectly. As mentioned 
previously, Channon and colleagues reported that the errors made on the sarcastic 
material in their task represented some literal interpretations but mostly inadequate and 
inaccurate non-literal interpretations. Although this was not directly explored in the 
current study, anecdotally, comments from the TBI participants to the experimenter 
during the experiment indicated that many literal remarks were being interpreted non-
literally, and it would have been helpful to investigate more rigorously the nature of these 
literal errors in particular. Future studies that ask participants to explain sarcastic or literal 
vignettes may provide more insight in this domain. 
 
In relation to the measures of aggression, although the BPAQ is a well validated measure 
(Buss & Perry, 1992; Harris, 1995, 1997), and does distinguish between verbal and 
physical aggression, it does not assess other types of aggression. It might be useful in 
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future research to consider aggressive behaviour in terms of the impulsive-premeditated 
divide, using the Impulsive/Premeditated Aggression Score (IPAS; Stanford et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, more specific measures of indirect aggression, 
such as the Indirect Aggression Scale (Forrest et al., 2005), would also be a valuable 
addition. 
 
Moreover, use of self-report measures has limitations, especially in brain injured 
individuals who may have limited insight into their difficulties (Manchester & Wood, 
2001; Stuss et al., 1991). However, there are also limitations of the self-report 
methodology for non-brain injured individuals in relation to concern regarding how one is 
perceived by others, exemplified by the social desirability bias (Fisher, 1993). This 
problem was overcome in the TBI group by obtaining data of observed aggressive 
behaviour (OAS-MNR), which was possible given the residential nature of the 
rehabilitation setting. This would, however, not be a feasible tool for a non-clinical group. 
However, a proxy-report measure, perhaps completed by a family member, carer or 
friend, would be a valuable adjunct to a self-report measure in non-clinical samples as 
well, if that was feasible. 
 
4.3.3.2 Opportunities for development 
Suggestions for amendments and developments of the experimental task and analysis 
techniques have been made above. In terms of wider developments of this research, it 
would be a helpful development and natural way forward to consider not only the 
comprehension of sarcasm, but the spoken use of sarcasm by people with TBI, and how 
this links to displays of overt aggression. Since sarcasm is a socially acceptable way to 
communicate aggression, perhaps people who had a TBI and are more overtly aggressive, 
are unable to successfully generate sarcasm. No studies currently exist that explore the 
ability of such individuals to produce and appropriately use sarcasm. 
 
The current study captured a reflection of all participants’ cognitive ability, including 
aspects of executive function, by use of the MoCA, which was used as a control variable 
in the analyses. However, further explicit links with executive function should be 
explored, using more detailed measures. Executive function has been implicated in the 
processing of sarcasm and pragmatics, (e.g. McDonald & Pearce, 1996; Pearce, 
McDonald & Coltheart, 1998), and Miller et al.’s (2008) proposed hypothesis notes the 
importance of language in conjunction with executive skills in the modulation of 
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impulsive aggression. As has been highlighted throughout this discussion, executive 
function seems to play a key role in the modulation of aggression (Villemarette-Pittman, 
Stanford & Greve, 2002). Verbal working memory, in particular, seems central. This has 
been linked to behavioural control via internal verbal processes such as deductive 
reasoning, reflection, rehearsal and self-instruction (Baddeley, Chincotta & Adlam, 2001; 
Gruber & Goschke, 2004). More in depth testing in this area may be important to 
consider in future research of sarcasm and aggression. 
 
In terms of methodology for future research, single case studies may be a valuable way 
forward for research in the TBI field. Alderman et al. (1999) raise issues with group level 
research in this clinical area due to the heterogeneity of the individuals, and they support 
single case methodology. Though it was not within the scope of the current research, this 
could have been useful to gain a more in depth analysis of the performance of some of the 
individuals with TBI. 
 
4.3.4 Summary  
The present study investigated the ability to understand and interpret sarcasm correctly 
and whether this links with aggressive behaviour in a group of individuals with TBI as 
well as healthy control participants. Although the TBI group exhibited deficits on the 
TASIT, they did not demonstrate difficulty with the sarcastic items of the on-line sarcasm 
comprehension task, suggesting that the combination of prosodic and contextual cues 
supported comprehension. The TBI participants did, however, demonstrate difficulty 
interpreting literal comments both on the TASIT and the on-line sarcasm comprehension 
task. These findings may point to deficits in the comprehension of ambiguous contexts as 
well as perseveration deficits once they had detected a sarcastic context. Furthermore, 
TBI participants showed an inability to effectively link prior questions to subsequent 
questions in order to aid understanding. Significant links were found between observed 
aggression and errors made on literal attitude items, and performance on the TASIT SI-
M, indicating that poor social cognition and language processing impact aggression 
modulation. These findings did not extend to a non-clinical group, as explored in 
Experiment Two; individuals who self-reported low and moderate aggression levels 
performed statistically similarly on the on-line sarcasm experiment and in line with the 
control group in Experiment One. Overall, then, the present study sheds further light on 
the link between language, executive function and impulsive aggression, as proposed by 
Miller et al., (2008), suggesting that social cognition should be incorporated into future 
models of language processing and modulation of aggression. 
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Appendix 4: Disabilities Trust (parent organisation of the Brain Injury Rehabilitation 
Trust; BIRT) research ethics committee approval letter 
 
32 Market Place 
Burgess Hill 
West Sussex 
RH15 9NP 
Tel: 01444 239123 
Fax: 01444 244978 
                                                                              Email: info@thedtgroup.org 
 
 
Ms Joanne Allen 
xxxxxxxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxxx 
xxxxxxx 
22nd September 2015 
 
Dear Ms Allen, 
 
THE DISABILITIES TRUST RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE (DTREC) APPROVAL 
 
Study Title: Sarcasm comprehension and aggression after traumatic brain injury (TBI). 
 
We are pleased to inform you that the DTREC has APPROVED the above mentioned 
project. 
 
The documents reviewed are: 
 
a) DTREC Brief Application From dated 11 March 2015 
b) DTREC Full Application Form dated 10 April 2015 
c) Approved University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee Application, dated 18 
December 2014 
d) Study protocol, dated 11 March 2015 
e) Participant Information Sheet, dated 16 June 2015 
f) Participant Consent Form, 16 June 
g) NHR Research Ethics Committee approval letter, dated 15 July 2015 
h) Amendments and clarifications to study protocol, dated 11 June 2015 
i) University transfer report, dated 20 February 2015 
 
The approval period is from 07 September 2015 to 06 September 2016.  
 
The following are to be observed upon DTREC approval: 
  
1) The study will be conducted in accordance with Trust’s relevant policies. 
 
2) The Researcher should promptly report the DTREC of: 
 i. Deviations from, or changes to the protocol. 
ii. New information that may affect adversely the risk to the participants or 
the conduct of the study. 
iii. Completion of the study. 
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3) A Study Status Report should be submitted for the following: 
i. Study completion or termination: the Final Report is to be submitted 
within three months of study completion or termination. 
 
4) Any dissemination of the findings should acknowledge the support of the Brain 
Injury Rehabilitation Trust and The Disabilities Trust in the study. 
 
On behalf of the DTREC, I would like to wish you the best with your study. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
Dr Sue Copstick 
Clinical Director 
Graham Anderson House 
1161 Springburn Road 
Glasgow 
G21 1UU 
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Appendix 5: Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ; Buss & Perry, 1992) 
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Appendix 6: Screening questionnaire 
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Appendix 7: Handedness inventory (Briggs & Nebes, 1975) 
 
 
Are either of your parents left handed? If yes, which? _________________________  
 
How many siblings of each sex do you have? Male _________ Female ____________ 
 
How many of each sex are left handed? Male ___________ Female ______________ 
 
Which eye do you use when only using one? Eg, telescope, keyhole. _____________ 
 
Have you ever suffered any severe head trauma? _____________________________ 
  
Indicate hand preferences Always 
left 
(-2) 
Usually 
left 
(-1) 
No 
preference 
(0) 
Usually 
right 
(1) 
Always 
right 
(2) 
1. To write a letter legibly      
2. To throw a ball to hit a 
target 
     
3. To play a game requiring 
the use of a racquet 
     
4. At the top of the broom 
to sweep dust from the floor 
     
5. At the top of a shovel to 
move sand 
     
6. To hold a match whilst 
striking it 
     
7. To hold scissors to cut 
paper 
     
8. To hold thread to guide 
through the eye of a needle. 
     
9. To deal playing cards      
10. To hammer a nail into 
wood 
     
11. To hold a toothbrush 
while cleaning teeth 
     
12. To screw the lid of a jar      
Column total:      
Total score 
(range – 24 to +24) 
     
Designation: - Right handed (+9 and above) 
- Mixed handed (-8 - +8) 
- Left handed (-9 and below) 
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Appendix 8: Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA, Nasreddine et al., 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Appendix 9: Experimental stimuli 
 
Phase Story 
Type 
Story Question 1 Correct 
Answer 1    
(1 = yes, 
2 = no) 
Question 2 Correct 
Answer 2    
(1 = yes, 
2 = no) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Examples 
Sarcastic Richard was trying to help his wife with a 
dilemma at work. When he made an unhelpful 
suggestion, his wife said to him “Thanks, you're 
full of great ideas!” 
Did Richard suggest a 
bad idea? 
1 Did Richard’s wife 
think Richard 
suggested a bad idea? 
1 
Neutral Richard was trying to help his wife with a 
dilemma at work. When he made a helpful 
suggestion, his wife said to him “Thanks, you're 
full of great ideas!” 
Did Richard’s wife 
think Richard 
suggested a good idea? 
1 Did Richard suggest a 
bad idea? 
2 
Sarcastic Ryan had been bragging to his friend about how 
good he is at squash. When Ryan got badly beaten 
later, his friend said to him “Yeah, you're really 
good at squash!" 
Did Ryan play well? 2 Did Ryan’s friend 
think Ryan played 
badly? 
1 
Neutral Ryan had been bragging to his friend about how 
good he is at squash. When Ryan won a game 
later, his friend said to him “Yeah, you're really 
good at squash!" 
Did Ryan’s friend 
think Ryan played 
badly? 
2 Did Ryan play badly? 2 
 
 
 
Sarcastic Liz was playing tennis with a friend and kept 
hitting shots out of the court. Her friend said to 
her “You’re playing really well today Liz!” 
Did Liz’s friend think 
Liz was playing badly? 
1 Was Liz playing tennis 
well? 
2 
  
 
 
 
Practices 
Neutral Dennis was doing a speech at a local function and 
wanted his friend Lisa to go with him. Lisa was 
fully engaged, asking questions throughout and 
afterwards said to Dennis “That was a thrilling 
speech!” 
Did Dennis do a dull 
speech? 
2 Did Lisa think that 
Dennis had done an 
interesting speech? 
1 
Sarcastic Claire was making a cake and baked it in the oven 
for too long until it was black. Her mum said to 
her “That looks delicious!” 
Did Claire’s mum 
think that Claire was a 
good baker? 
2 Was Claire a good 
baker? 
2 
Neutral Roger was playing golf and hit his first ball 
straight into the hole he was aiming for. Bryan 
shouted “Great shot, hole in one!” 
Did Roger take a good 
first shot? 
1 Did Bryan think Roger 
had taken a good first 
shot? 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic Andrea and Ross were on holiday in France. 
Andrea was attempting to ask directions in French 
but was struggling. Afterwards Ross said to her 
“You’re practically fluent Andrea!” 
Was Andrea bad at 
speaking French? 
1 Did Ross think that 
Andrea was bad at 
speaking French? 
1 
Neutral Peter worked in a call centre and one day spent 
half an hour listening to the complaints of an 
angry customer. His colleague Rebecca said 
“Peter, you’re so patient with customers!” 
Did Peter have bad 
customer service 
skills? 
2 Did Rebecca think 
Peter had good 
customer service 
skills? 
1 
Sarcastic Zoe and Edward were lawyers. One day Edward 
did a poor job in Court and lost his case. Zoe said 
to Edward afterwards “You handled that case 
well!” 
Did Zoe think Edward 
had handled the case 
well? 
2 Did Edward handle the 
case well? 
2 
Neutral Sam cooked his girlfriend a celebratory meal 
which tasted delicious. When she tried it she said 
to him “You should be a chef!” 
Was Sam a good 
cook? 
1 Did Sam’s girlfriend 
think Sam was a bad 
cook? 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neutral Rob and his friend James had just finished an 
exam. Rob had answered every question correctly 
but didn’t want to brag about it. James said to him 
“You shouldn’t be so modest!” 
Did James think Rob 
was modest? 
1 Was Rob boastful? 2 
Sarcastic Patrick and his dad were watching a game show 
on TV. Patrick got every question wrong and his 
dad said to him “You’re good at this aren’t you!” 
Did Patrick’s dad think 
Patrick was good at 
the game show? 
2 Was Patrick bad at the 
game show? 
1 
Neutral Helen was learning to drive. She had to parallel 
park in front of all her friends and she did it on her 
1st attempt. When she got out of the car Andy 
shouted “Nice parking!” 
Was Helen bad at 
parking? 
2 Did Andy think Helen 
was bad at parking? 
2 
Sarcastic Dennis was doing a speech at a local function and 
wanted his friend Lisa to go with him. Lisa fell 
asleep in the middle and afterwards said to Dennis 
“That was a thrilling speech!” 
Did Lisa think that 
Dennis had done a dull 
speech? 
1 Did Dennis do a dull 
speech? 
1 
Sarcastic Joan’s son Paul asked her what she had done for 
her birthday last year. When she couldn’t 
remember he said to her “You’ve always had a 
great memory haven’t you!” 
Did Joan have a bad 
memory? 
1 Did Paul think Joan 
had a good memory? 
2 
Neutral Jess was going out and was ready half an hour 
before her taxi was due. Her boyfriend said to her 
“Super organised, as usual!” 
Did Jess’s boyfriend 
think Jess was 
disorganised? 
2 Was Jess organised? 1 
Sarcastic Steve was moving into his new house. His friend 
Mark came to see him but instead of offering to 
carry any boxes he stood and watched Steve. 
Steve said to Mark “You’re a big help!” 
Did Steve think Mark 
was helpful? 
2 Was Mark unhelpful? 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 1 
Neutral Susan had picked a play to take her friend Vicky 
to see. The play turned out to be excellent and 
Vicky said to Susan “What a fantastic play you 
picked!” 
Did Vicky think Susan 
had picked a bad play? 
2 Did Susan pick a bad 
play? 
2 
Sarcastic Gary was bowling with friends when he sent 
another ball straight into the gutter. His friend said 
“Another strike, well done!” 
Was Gary bad at 
bowling? 
1 Did Gary’s friend 
think Gary was good 
at bowling? 
2 
Sarcastic Matt and his brother John were going on a night 
out. When John arrived at Matt’s wearing odd 
shoes and a scruffy shirt Matt said to him 
“Looking stylish!” 
Did John look 
unstylish? 
1 Did Matt think John 
looked unstylish? 
1 
Neutral Joe came to work and immediately sat down and 
started working. His boss noticed his behaviour 
and said, “Joe, don’t work too hard!” 
Did Joe's boss think 
that Joe was working 
hard? 
1 Did Joe work hard? 1 
1 minute break 
Neutral Kate was a model and was showing her friend her 
new photos, including one that she was really 
pleased with. Her friend said “You look beautiful in 
that one!” 
Did Kate look bad in 
the photo? 
2 Did Kate’s friend 
think Kate looked 
good in the photo? 
1 
Sarcastic Nathan and Janice went to a dance lesson. Nathan 
was struggling to pick it up and was forgetting all 
his steps. Janice said to him “You’ll be teaching the 
class before long!” 
Was Nathan good at 
the dance lesson? 
2 Did Janice think 
Nathan was good at 
the dance lesson? 
2 
Neutral Gemma was picking up her sister Daniella to go 
out. Gemma turned up exactly on time and Daniella 
said to her “As prompt as ever Gemma!” 
Was Gemma late? 2 Did Daniella think 
Gemma was prompt? 
1 
 Neutral Jen was telling Alice a story about her night out. 
The ending was dramatic and Alice was surprised. 
She said to Jen “Another thrilling story Jen!” 
Did Alice think Jen 
had told an exciting 
story? 
1 Did Jen tell a boring 
story? 
2 
Sarcastic Chelsea and Sarah had fallen out at school. When 
Chelsea saw Sarah running out of the hairdressers 
with messy, green hair she said to her “Nice hair!” 
Did Chelsea think 
that Sarah’s hair 
looked bad? 
1 Did Sarah’s hair look 
good? 
2 
Sarcastic Kenneth was landscaping his garden but had got 
distracted and barely started. His grandson came to 
have a look after a week and said “I can see you’ve 
been working hard!” 
Had Kenneth been 
working hard on his 
garden? 
2 Did Kenneth’s 
grandson think 
Kenneth had been 
working hard on his 
garden? 
2 
Neutral Chloe and Ben were in a university tutorial group. 
Ben answered a question correctly and Chloe said 
to him “Nice answer!” 
Did Chloe think that 
Ben gave a poor 
answer? 
2 Did Ben give a poor 
answer? 
2 
Neutral Claire was making a cake and baked it in the oven 
until it was a perfect golden colour. Her mum said 
to her “That looks delicious!” 
Was Claire a bad 
baker? 
2 Did Claire’s mum 
think that Claire was 
a bad baker? 
2 
Sarcastic Melanie was singing to herself thinking no one was 
listening. She sang in a silly voice and missed every 
note. Her friend appeared and said “You have the 
voice of an angel!” 
Did Melanie have a 
bad singing voice? 
1 Did Melanie’s friend 
think Melanie had a 
good singing voice? 
2 
Neutral On Tom’s first football match playing as goal-
keeper he let no goals in. His team-mate Chris said 
“You could play professionally in goal!” 
Did Chris think Tom 
was good at goal-
keeping? 
1 Was Tom bad at 
goal-keeping? 
2 
 Sarcastic Mary was entering her vegetables into a 
competition but her produce was smaller than the 
other competitors. Her good friend Jane saw her 
entries and said “You’ve got some winning 
vegetables there!” 
Did Jane think Mary 
was likely to win the 
competition? 
2 Was Mary likely to 
win the competition? 
2 
Sarcastic Lauren had been teaching her mum how to use her 
new computer. After the 10th explanation of 
sending an email, her mum did it herself. Lauren 
said “You’re a computer whiz mum!” 
Did Lauren’s mum 
struggle using 
computers? 
1 Did Lauren think her 
mum struggled using 
computers? 
1 
Sarcastic Tina and her friend were trying on dresses in a 
shop. Tina had got the wrong size and when she 
couldn't do the zip up her friend said “Looks great, 
perfect fit!” 
Did Tina’s friend 
think Tina looked 
good in the dress? 
2 Did Tina look bad in 
the dress? 
1 
Neutral Ian was attempting some DIY plumbing. His 
girlfriend came home to see a new bathroom fitted. 
She said to him “Nice work. I see those DIY 
lessons came in handy!” 
Had Ian done a good 
job? 
1 Did Ian’s girlfriend 
think Ian had done a 
good job? 
1 
Neutral Simon was always punctual at work and 
enthusiastic about his job. In his appraisal he was 
told he wouldn’t get a bonus. He told his colleague 
Geoff who said “Shame, you’re such a hard 
worker!” 
Did Geoff think 
Simon was a hard 
worker? 
1 Was Simon a hard 
worker? 
1 
End of part 1 
 Break while setting up next part 
 
Start of part 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic Sam cooked his girlfriend a celebratory meal but 
badly burned it. When she saw it she said to him 
“You should be a chef!” 
Did Sam’s girlfriend 
think Sam was a bad 
cook? 
1 Was Sam a good 
cook? 
2 
Sarcastic Susan had picked a play to take her friend Vicky to 
see. The play turned out to be terrible and Vicky 
said to Susan “What a fantastic play you picked!” 
Did Susan pick a bad 
play? 
1 Did Vicky think 
Susan had picked a 
bad play? 
1 
Sarcastic Gemma was picking up her sister Daniella to go 
out. Gemma turned up 20 minutes late and Daniella 
said to her “As prompt as ever Gemma!” 
Did Daniella think 
Gemma was prompt? 
2 Was Gemma 
prompt? 
2 
Neutral Kenneth was landscaping his garden and had 
completely transformed it. His grandson came to 
have a look after a week and said “I can see you’ve 
been working hard!” 
Did Kenneth’s 
grandson think 
Kenneth had been 
working hard on his 
garden? 
1 Had Kenneth been 
working hard on his 
garden? 
1 
Sarcastic Jess was going out but was frantically looking for 
her keys whilst the taxi was waiting. Her boyfriend 
said to her “Super organised, as usual!” 
Was Jess organised? 2 Did Jess’s boyfriend 
think Jess was 
disorganised? 
1 
Neutral Melanie was singing to herself thinking no one was 
listening. She sang well and hit every note. Her 
friend appeared and said “You have the voice of an 
angel!” 
Did Melanie’s friend 
think Melanie had a 
good singing voice? 
1 Did Melanie have a 
bad singing voice? 
2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sarcastic On Tom’s first football match playing as goal-
keeper he let 12 goals in. His team-mate Chris said 
“You could play professionally in goal!” 
 
Was Tom good at 
goal-keeping? 
2 Did Chris think Tom 
was bad at goal-
keeping? 
1 
Neutral Matt and his brother John were going on a night 
out. When John arrived at Matt’s wearing smart 
shoes and a designer shirt Matt said to him 
“Looking stylish!” 
Did Matt think John 
looked unstylish? 
2 Did John look 
unstylish? 
2 
Sarcastic Rob and his friend James had just finished an exam. 
Rob had answered every question correctly and 
bragged about it. James said to him “You shouldn’t 
be so modest!” 
Was Rob modest? 2 Did James think Rob 
was modest? 
2 
Neutral Steve was moving into his new house. His friend 
Mark came to see him and offered to help Steve 
carry in his boxes. Steve said to Mark “You’re a big 
help!” 
Was Mark helpful? 1 Did Steve think 
Mark was unhelpful? 
2 
Neutral Andrea and Ross were on holiday in France. 
Andrea was confidently and clearly asking for 
directions in French. Afterwards Ross said to her 
“You’re practically fluent Andrea!” 
Did Ross think that 
Andrea was bad at 
speaking French? 
2 Was Andrea good at 
speaking French? 
1 
Sarcastic Peter worked in a call centre and one day hung up 
the phone on an angry customer mid-complaint. His 
colleague Rebecca said “Peter, you’re so patient 
with customers!” 
Did Rebecca think 
Peter had bad 
customer service 
skills? 
1 Did Peter have bad 
customer service 
skills? 
1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2 
Sarcastic Kate was a model and was showing her friend her 
new photos, including one where the camera caught 
her sneezing. Her friend said “You look beautiful in 
that one!” 
Did Kate’s friend 
think Kate looked 
good in the photo? 
2 Did Kate look bad in 
the photo? 
1 
Neutral Zoe and Edward were lawyers. One day Edward did 
a great job in Court and won his case. Zoe said to 
Edward afterwards “You handled that case well!” 
Did Edward handle 
the case well? 
1 Did Zoe think 
Edward had handled 
the case badly? 
2 
Neutral Joan’s son Paul asked her what she had done for her 
birthday last year. When she recounted the day 
perfectly he said to her “You’ve always had a great 
memory haven’t you!” 
Did Paul think Joan 
had a bad memory? 
2 Did Joan have a bad 
memory? 
2 
 
1 minute break 
 
Neutral Patrick and his dad were watching a game show on 
TV. Patrick got every question right and his dad 
said to him “You’re good at this aren’t you!” 
Was Patrick bad at 
the game show? 
2 Did Patrick’s dad 
think Patrick was 
good at the game 
show? 
1 
Sarcastic Helen was learning to drive. She had to parallel 
park in front of all her friends and it took her 5 
attempts. When she got out of the car Andy shouted 
“Nice parking!” 
Did Andy think 
Helen was bad at 
parking? 
1 Was Helen bad at 
parking? 
1 
Neutral Liz was playing tennis with a friend and kept hitting 
winning shots. Her friend said to her “You’re 
playing really well today Liz!” 
Was Liz playing 
tennis badly? 
2 Did Liz’s friend 
think Liz was 
playing badly? 
2 
 Neutral Tina and her friend were trying on dresses in a 
shop. Tina had got the right size and when she 
zipped it straight up her friend said “Looks great, 
perfect fit!” 
Did Tina look good 
in the dress? 
1 Did Tina's friend 
think Tina looked 
bad in the dress? 
2 
Sarcastic Chloe and Ben were in a university tutorial group. 
Ben answered a question incorrectly and Chloe said 
to him “Nice answer!” 
Did Ben give a poor 
answer? 
1 Did Chloe think that 
Ben gave a good 
answer? 
2 
Neutral Lauren had been teaching her mum how to use her 
new computer. Without any explanation, her mum 
managed to send her first email by herself. Lauren 
said “You’re a computer whiz mum!” 
Did Lauren think her 
mum struggled using 
computers? 
2 Did Lauren’s mum 
struggle using 
computers? 
2 
Sarcastic Ian was attempting some DIY plumbing. His 
girlfriend came home to see the bathroom flooded. 
She said to him “Nice work. I see those DIY 
lessons came in handy!” 
Did Ian’s girlfriend 
think Ian had done a 
good job? 
2 Had Ian done a bad 
job? 
1 
Neutral Mary was entering her vegetables into a 
competition and her produce was bigger than the 
other competitors. Her good friend Jane saw her 
entries and said “You’ve got some winning 
vegetables there!” 
Was Mary likely to 
win the competition? 
1 Did Jane think Mary 
was likely to win the 
competition? 
1 
Neutral Gary was bowling with friends when he sent 
another ball straight down the middle towards the 
pins. His friend said “Another strike, well done!” 
Did Gary’s friend 
think Gary was good 
at bowling? 
1 Was Gary good at 
bowling? 
1 
Sarcastic Jen was telling Alice a story about her night out. 
The ending had an anti-climax and Alice was 
unimpressed. She said to Jen “Another thrilling 
story Jen!” 
Did Jen tell a boring 
story? 
1 Did Alice think Jen 
had told a boring 
story? 
1 
 Sarcastic Simon was often late for work and uninterested in 
his job. In his appraisal he was told he wouldn’t get 
a bonus. He told his colleague Geoff who said 
“Shame, you’re such a hard worker!” 
Was Simon a hard 
worker? 
2 Did Geoff think 
Simon was a hard 
worker? 
2 
Neutral Chelsea and Sarah were friends from school. When 
Chelsea saw Sarah coming out of the hairdressers 
after a haircut she said to her “Nice hair!” 
Did Sarah’s hair look 
bad? 
2 Did Chelsea think 
that Sarah’s hair 
looked good? 
1 
Neutral Nathan and Janice went to a dance lesson. Nathan 
picked it up really quickly and could remember all 
his steps. Janice said to him “You’ll be teaching the 
class before long!” 
Did Janice think 
Nathan was good at 
the dance lesson? 
1 Was Nathan good at 
the dance lesson? 
1 
Sarcastic Joe came to work, and instead of beginning to 
work, he sat down to rest. His boss noticed his 
behaviour and said, “Joe, don’t work too hard!” 
Did Joe work hard? 2 Did Joe's boss think 
that Joe was working 
hard? 
2 
Sarcastic Roger was playing golf and hit his first ball straight 
into the sand bunker, far from the hole. Bryan 
shouted “Great shot, hole in one!” 
Did Bryan think 
Roger had taken a 
bad first shot? 
1 Did Roger take a 
good first shot? 
2 
End of experiment 
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Appendix 10: TBI patient participant information sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Patient participant Information sheet – Version 2  
 
Research study: Sarcasm and aggression after traumatic brain 
injury  
 
Invitation paragraph  
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you 
decide whether or not to take part you need to understand why the 
research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please read 
this sheet, talk to others if you wish or ask me for more information.  
 
What is the purpose of the study?  
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist from the University of Leeds and 
am conducting this research as a part of my doctorate qualification. I 
am interested in exploring the links between language and aggressive 
behaviour after brain injury.  
 
Why have I been invited?  
You are being invited to take part as you have suffered a traumatic 
brain injury. I would like to investigate how you process language and if 
this relates to certain aspects of behaviour including aggression.  
 
Do I have to take part?  
It is up to you to decide. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet, which I will then give to you. I will then ask you to 
sign a consent form to show you have agreed to take part. You are free 
to withdraw from the study during the experiment and for two weeks 
following your testing date, without giving a reason. This would not 
affect the care you receive.  
 
What will happen to me if I take part?  
I will visit you to ask you to complete some questionnaires and a 
computer-based experiment. I will need to see you 1 or 2 times and 
each visit will take about an hour of your time.  
 
Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential?  
All information about you will be handled in confidence. At no time will 
you be identified by name and no information that I keep will be able to 
be linked to you personally. 
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What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that your taking part in the study will inform research into 
language and behaviour after traumatic brain injury which will be of 
benefit to services assessing and treating people who have suffered 
brain injury. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be written up for a doctoral thesis. In addition, the 
results may be published in psychological journals and disseminated at 
research seminars and conferences. Results from this project may be 
included in future projects. You will not be identified in any way in the 
thesis or in any published reports. If you would like me to send you a 
copy of any papers published, please let me know. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
The principle investigator for this study is Joanne Allen at the Leeds 
Institute of Health Sciences at the University of Leeds. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been reviewed by a panel organised by the 
University of Leeds as part of the requirements of the main 
researcher’s doctoral training. It has been reviewed and approved 
through University of Leeds Institute of Psychological Sciences 
Research Ethics Committee, the Brain Injury Rehabilitation Trust 
Research Ethics Committee and the NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Where can I find out more information or report a 
problem/concern? 
If you would like more information about taking part in this project, 
please contact the principal investigator, Joanne Allen, or the project 
supervisor, Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou, on the details below. If you 
want to make a complaint please do so via Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou. 
 
Joanne Allen     Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou 
Clinical Psychology Programme  School of Psychology 
University of Leeds    University of Leeds 
Charles Thackrah Building  Lifton Place 
101 Clarendon Road   Leeds, LS2 9JT 
Leeds, LS2 9LJ    Tel: 0113 343 5716 
Tel: 0113 343 2732              Email: E.Klepousniotou@leeds.ac.uk 
Email: ps11jma@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for thinking about taking part in this study. 
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Appendix 11: Control participant information sheet 
 
 
 
Control participant Information sheet – Version 2 
Research study: Sarcasm and aggression after traumatic brain injury 
Invitation paragraph 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you 
decide you need to understand why the research is being done and what it 
would involve for you. Please take time to read the following information 
carefully. Talk to others about the study if you wish. Ask me if there is 
anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Please take 
time to decide whether or not you wish to take part. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
I am a Trainee Clinical Psychologist from the University of Leeds. I am 
interested in exploring the links between language and behaviour. This is 
of use when thinking about assessment and treatment for people who 
have suffered a brain injury. Little is currently known about the processes 
involved in specific aspects of language processing and particular 
behaviours, though after brain injury both of these areas can be affected.  
Why have I been invited? 
You are being asked to take part so that I can investigate how normal 
language processing occurs in healthy adults compared to people who 
have suffered a traumatic brain injury. You have been identified as being 
demographically similar in some way (e.g. gender, age, background) to 
the participants in the research who have suffered a brain injury. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide. I will describe the study and go through this 
information sheet, which I will then give to you. I will then ask you to sign a 
consent form to show you have agreed to take part. You are free to 
withdraw from the study during the experiment and for two weeks following 
your testing date, without giving a reason. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will ask to meet you at a location of your choice and ask you to complete 
some questionnaires and a computer-based experiment. I should only 
need to see you once for approximately 1 hour. 
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Will my taking part in the study be kept confidential? 
I will follow ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence. At no time will you be identified by name. No 
information that I keep will be able to be linked to you personally. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
We hope that your taking part in the study will inform research into 
language and behaviour after brain injury which will be of benefit to 
services assessing and treating people who have suffered brain injury. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results will be written up for a doctoral thesis. In addition, the results 
may be published in psychological journals and disseminated at research 
seminars and conferences. Results from this project may be included in 
future projects. You will not be identified in any way in the thesis or in any 
published reports. If you would like me to send you a copy of any papers 
published, please let me know. 
 
Who is organising the research? 
The principle investigator for this study is Joanne Allen at the Leeds 
Institute of Health Sciences at the University of Leeds. 
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
The research has been reviewed by a panel organised by the University of 
Leeds as part of the requirements of the main researcher’s doctoral 
training. It has been reviewed and approved through University of Leeds 
Institute of Psychological Sciences Research Ethics Committee, the Brain 
Injury Rehabilitation Trust Research Ethics Committee and the NHS 
Research Ethics Committee. 
 
Where can I find out more information or report a problem/concern? 
If you would like more information about taking part in this project, please 
contact the principal investigator, Joanne Allen, or the project supervisor, 
Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou, on the details below. If you want to make a 
complaint please do so via Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou. 
 
Joanne Allen     Dr Ekaterini Klepousniotou 
Clinical Psychology Programme  School of Psychology 
University of Leeds    University of Leeds 
Charles Thackrah Building   Lifton Place 
101 Clarendon Road   Leeds, LS2 9JT 
Leeds, LS2 9LJ    Tel: 0113 343 5716 
Tel: 0113 343 2732              Email: E.Klepousniotou@leeds.ac.uk 
Email: ps11jma@leeds.ac.uk 
 
Thank you for thinking about taking part in this study. 
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Appendix 12: TBI patient participant consent form 
 
 
 
Patient participant consent form 
Title of research: Sarcasm and aggression after traumatic brain injury 
Name of researcherː Joanne Allen 
Participant identification number:  
 Add your 
initials in 
the box if 
you agree 
I have read the information sheet dated 13.7.15 (Version 2). I 
have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask 
questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time during the experiment, and for two 
weeks after that, without giving any reason, without my medical 
care or legal rights being affected. 
 
I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes, and 
data collected during the study, may be looked at by individuals 
from The University of Leeds or The Brain Injury Rehabilitation 
Trust, or from regulatory authorities, where it is relevant to my 
taking part in this research. I give permission for these 
individuals to have access to my records. 
 
I understand that my personal details will be kept confidential 
and my data will be anonymous. I understand that the 
information collected about me may be used to support other 
research in the future, and may be shared anonymously with 
other researchers. 
 
I agree to take part in the above study.  
       
                    
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
            
Name of Person   Date   Signature 
taking consent  
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Appendix 13: Control participant consent form 
 
 
 
Control participant consent form 
Title of research: Sarcasm and aggression after traumatic brain injury 
Name of researcherː Joanne Allen 
Participant identification number:  
 Add your 
initials next to 
the statement 
if you agree 
I confirm I have read the information sheet dated 13.7.15 
(Version 2). I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered 
satisfactorily. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free 
to withdraw at any time during the experiment, and for two 
weeks after that, without giving any reason, and without there 
being any negative consequences. 
 
I give permission for members of the research team to have 
access to my anonymised responses. I understand that my 
name will not be linked with the research materials, and I will not 
be identified or identifiable in the report or reports that result 
from the research.   
 
I understand that the information collected about me may be 
used to support other research in the future, and may be shared 
anonymously with other researchers. 
 
I agree to take part in the above research project.  
 
 
                    
Name of Participant   Date   Signature 
 
            
Name of Person   Date   Signature 
taking consent 
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Appendix 14: Script for experimental procedure 
 
Research script 
 
Order 
1. Information sheet 
2. Consent form 
3. Screening questionnaire 
4. Handedness questionnaire 
5. MoCA 
6. BPAQ 
7. E-prime experiments 
i. Examples 
ii. Practice 
iii. Experiment 
iv. Experiment 
8. Sarcasm questions 
9. Debrief sheet 
 
Experiment instructions 
The sections italicised and in speech marks below do not have to be read 
verbatim; this is more of a guide as to what you need to remind the 
participant of and when. 
 
1. Examples 
Set up the file. First screen = instructions screen. 
“Have a read through this and let me know when you’ve read it, 
before pressing anything” 
Participant reads instructions 
“After you’ve been asked the questions, think about how you’d 
answer it, and if you think you know the answer tell me it out loud. 
You will be given the answers on the screen.” 
Run file. You can talk throughout to clarify if needed. Explain you can 
press any key after you’ve read/heard the story to move on to the 
questions. In the examples only you (experimenter) should press any 
key to move quickly through the questions if the person is responding 
quickly and with no difficulty. If they are slow and need the time, leave 
each screen to time out and move onto the next. 
If the participant needs this to be repeated, because they did not 
understand the task, or consistently made errors, run the example file 
again. If they still make mistakes are unsure how to respond talk 
through an example, e.g. “When it is asked ‘Did Richard suggest a bad 
idea’, remember it says that ‘Richard made an unhelpful suggestion’. 
When it is asked ‘Did Richard’s wife think Richard suggested a bad 
idea’ although his wife says that he is ‘full of great ideas’, the way she 
says this suggests she doesn’t really mean this. Listen carefully to both 
the situation and the comment.” 
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2. Practice 
Set up the file. First screen = instructions screen. 
“Have a read through this and let me know when you’ve read it, 
before pressing anything”. 
Participant reads instructions 
“As it says, this is a practice, but you won’t be told the correct 
answers this time. I want you to answer them yourself using the 
mouse. Please listen to the full story and answer the questions as 
quickly as you can”. 
Make sure you look at how the participants are responding. If they 
make an error go back to this by running the practice file again – if they 
make mistakes again, talk through the vignettes e.g. “When it asks 
‘does Liz’s friend think Liz was playing tennis badly’, remember the 
story said that Liz was ‘hitting shots out of the court’, and although the 
friend said Liz was playing ‘really well’, the way she said this suggested 
she didn’t really mean this. Listen carefully to both the situation and the 
comment.” 
Remind them throughout that if they have finished listening to the story 
they can press any key to move onto the questions (to speed it up). 
Ensure they are clear they know what to do. 
 
3. Experiment (part 1 or 2 depending on order) 
Set up the first experimental file. First screen = instructions screen. 
“This is the first part of the real experiment now. I will leave the 
room and sit outside so that I don’t distract you. There is a 
programmed 1-minute break in the middle where I’ll ask you to stay 
in the room, and the test will restart. When it comes to an end the 
programme will close - please let me know and I’ll come and set up 
the next file. 
“The format is the same as in the practice. There may be stories 
and questions that seem a bit more ambiguous (less obvious) than 
others, so please take a guess if you’re not sure. Remember to 
listen to the full story and respond as soon as you think you know 
the answer. Is that all clear?” 
If not clarify anything as necessary. 
*Wait outside – good time to score the MoCA and BPAQ* 
 
4. Experiment (part 1 or 2 depending on order) 
Check participant was happy with last bit/had any questions. 
“This is just like before. I’ll sit outside whilst you are completing the 
task. Again there is a 1-minute break in the middle, please don’t 
leave the room. When it is finished the programme will close down 
– at this point please let me know when you are finished. 
 
End. 
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Appendix 15: Data preparation instructions 
 
Instructions for Cleaning and Prepping Data for Analysis 
 
For each participant there are 2 experimental files we are interested in; 
part 1 and part 2. Some people will have done part 1 first, and some part 2 
– it is counterbalanced to control for potential confounds such as practice 
effects or fatigue. You want all of this experimental data (both part 1 and 
part 2) in the one spreadsheet. 
 
Moving data from e-prime into the Excel spreadsheet: 
1. Open whichever Edat.2 file the participant did first (this will be part 
1 or part 2 depending on the counterbalancing order) 
a. Rename that Edat.2 file appropriately – e.g.  
C01_ALJ1987_Part 1 
2. Open file. Tools > Arrange Columns. Remove all columns and then 
arrange in following order: 
Subject, Age, Group, Handedness, Name, Sex, Question1.ACC, 
Question1.RT, Question2.ACC, Question2.RT 
 
 
3. Re-save as – e.g. C01_ALJ1987_Part 1_analysed 
4. Export button  (next to ‘save’ icon) > ‘Excel’ in drop down menu > 
save in folder (.txt file) 
5. Open .txt file > Select all (Ctrl + A) > Copy 
6. Open the template Excel spreadsheet and Paste into the sheet 
named “Raw data” 
7. Highlight all the data in the first 6 columns (the demographic info), 
ignoring the top 2 rows (file name and column headings) > Copy 
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8. Open second sheet named “Data-check for factual errors” and 
paste into the demographics section (cell A3) and paste again 
underneath this (cell A33) so it repeats twice  
a. This will no longer be blue so if you want it to be in colour (so 
easier to visually separate the sections) highlight cells and 
use the fill colour option to change colour 
9. Go back to “Raw data” sheet > highlight the data in the last 4 
columns (the accuracy and RT data), again ignoring the top 2 rows 
> Copy 
10. Go to “Data-check for factual errors” sheet and paste into the red 
data section for the corresponding experiment part – cell T3 for 
Part 1, cell T33 for Part 2) 
a. Again the colour will have changed so fill colour if wanted  
11. Complete column H with the order the participant did the part, so if 
they did Part 1 first, the order for that section would say 1, but if 
they did Part 1 second the order would say 2 for that section, like 
below) 
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  or  
N.B. It’s important to make sure the accuracy and RT data is pasted 
next to the correct story/question info (the green section) depending 
on the part number (i.e. which part was completed first – part 1 or 
part 2). 
 
You will now need to be doing the same with the second Edat.2 file 
with the other set of experimental data from the other experimental 
part: 
12. Open whichever Edat.2 file the participant did second (this will be 
part 1 or part 2 depending on the counterbalancing order) 
a. Rename that Edat.2 file appropriately – e.g.  
C01_ALJ1987_Part 2 
13. As above, Open file. Tools > Arrange Columns. Remove all 
columns and then arrange in following order: 
Subject, Age, Group, Handedness, Name, Sex, Question1.ACC, 
Question1.RT, Question2.ACC, Question2.RT 
14. Re-save as – e.g. C01_ALJ1987_Part 2_analysed 
15. Export button  (next to ‘save’ icon) > ‘Excel’ in drop down menu > 
save in folder (.txt file) 
16. Open .txt file > Select all (Ctrl + A) > Copy 
17. Open the Excel spreadsheet and Paste into “Raw data” underneath 
the other data from the other part (row 33) 
18. Highlight the new accuracy and RT data in the last 4 columns that 
you’ve just pasted in > Copy 
19. Go to “Data-check for factual errors” sheet and paste into the 
appropriate data section – again as in step 10 above this needs to 
correspond to the correct experiment Part – cell T3 for Part 1, cell 
T33 for Part 2) 
a. Again the colour will have changed so fill colour if wanted  
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 Removing errors and outliers: 
20. Firstly you need to sort the data in “Data-check for factual errors” 
sheet. Highlight all data minus the first row > Data > Sort > Sort by 
“Story Type” > add level > Then by “Q1 Type” add level  > Then by 
“Q2 Type” 
 
 
 
21. Insert 3 blank rows between each of the 4 sorted sections (neu-att-
fac, neu-fac-att, sar-att-fac, sar-fac-att), so it should look as follows: 
 
 
 
22. Next look for errors, as indicated by a ‘0’, on factual (fac) questions. 
 ‘neu’ ‘Att’ ‘Fac’ 
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23. If there are any factual question errors the whole story needs 
removing (even if the attitude question is correct). Highlight the 
whole row with the factual error in, by clicking the row number on 
the left (in this case row 32) > Cut > Paste in “Errors & outliers” 
sheet under the Factual errors heading 
24. Go back to the “Data-check for factual errors” sheet and delete this 
row by clicking on the row number to highlight it > right click > 
delete 
25. If there are errors on both question 1 and question 2 (as in row 3 
above), you know that one is definitely a factual question error so 
just cut this and paste it in the “Errors & outliers” sheet, again 
deleting the empty row where it came from (as in steps 23 & 24 
above) 
26. Once all factual errors are removed, highlight the data > copy > 
paste into the next sheet along “Data-check for attitude errors” 
 
27. Now you’re looking for errors on attitude (att) questions only, but 
first the questions need separating out. Highlight the data (without 
the headings) > copy > paste below leaving 3 empty rows. 
28. Delete the Q2 data in the first section, and the Q1 data in the 
second (newly pasted) section. Also, remove the 3 columns of 
information relating to the question you’ve just deleted (the green 
cells). It should look as follows in the 2 screenshots: 
Q1 type = ‘fac’. 
Therefore this 
needs removing. 
 
Error on 
question 1. 
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29. Now look for errors on attitude questions: 
 
Q1 type = ‘Att’. 
This needs 
removing. 
 
Error on 
question 1. 
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30. If there are any attitude question errors highlight the row with the 
attitude error in, by clicking the row number on the left > Cut > 
Paste in “Errors & outliers” sheet under the Attitude errors 
heading. 
31. Go back to the “Data-check for attitude errors” sheet and delete this 
row by clicking on the row number to highlight it > right click > 
delete 
 
32. Next remove outliers. Start by rank ordering each block of RT 
data. Highlight block, always taking one row above the actual 
data > Data > Sort > Sort by select the last option in the list – it will 
either be “Question1.RT”, “Column U” or “Column W” (see images 
below) 
 
 
 
 
 Do this for all 8 blocks (4 question1, 4 question2). 
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33. Now calculate means and standard deviations of the RT data in 
each of the 8 blocks separately 
a. MEAN: fx button – choose AVERAGE from drop down menu 
– make sure appropriate range of cells is chosen 
b. STDEV: fx button – choose STDEV (if using Excel 2007 or 
older) or STDEV.S (if using a newer than 2007 version of 
Excel) – make sure appropriate range of cells is chosen 
 
 
 
34. Calculate 2 STDEV above the mean: use formula    =(mean)+ 
(stdev)*2    enter appropriate cell for mean and stdev not the 
words! 
35. Calculate 2 STDEV below the mean: formula    =(mean)-(stdev)*2 
36. Identify and remove any data that lies above or below the 
upper/lower limits just calculated. Cut and paste these outliers into 
the sheet named “Errors & outliers” under the heading Outliers 
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37. Copy and paste the formulas for means/StDevs to apply them to 
the second question, but make sure the cell range is adjusted to 
include all of the appropriate data. Similarly, identify and move 
outliers to “Errors & outliers” sheet 
38. ONCE OUTLIERS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AND REMOVED, DO 
NOT CLEAN DATA AGAIN! 
39. Once all the data has been cleaned, copy this data from “Data-
check for attitude errors” sheet and paste into the sheet named 
“Data cleaned”. Remove the gaps between groups where means 
and StDevs have been calculated 
40. Copy and paste this cleaned data into the spreadsheet containing 
all data from all participants in the appropriate sheets: All cleaned 
data; factual errors; attitude errors; outliers. 
 
  
Outlier. Needs 
removing. 
2 StDevs 
above the 
mean. 2 StDevs 
below the 
mean. 
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Appendix 16: Sarcasm questions 
 
 
Sarcasm questions 
 
 
 
1. How often do you use sarcasm in your day to day conversations?  
 
Extremely often, very often, often, not very often, rarely, extremely 
rarely, never. 
 
 
 
2. How sarcastic would you say you are as a person, on a scale of 0-10, 
where 0 = Not at all sarcastic and 10 = extremely sarcastic? 
 
